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Institutions shape people’s behavior and exert fundamental influence on 
financial markets. In this thesis I examine how financial markets and firms are 
affected by institutions, paying particular attention to investor protection law and 
marketization. In the first paper, I examine the impacts of checks on government 
power on stock market and firm value. Specifically, I propose that better government 
power check system reduces the risk of firms and investors being expropriated by 
public officials therefore boost firm value. Based on the revised internal discipline of 
the Communist Party of China, I find that the promulgation of the internal discipline 
led to a significant increase in firm value. Furthermore, the increase in market value 
depends on the vulnerability of firms to expropriation by public officials. Private 
firms, firms located in provinces with poor institutions, firms that are less influential 
to local economies and firms without political connections experience the highest 
increase in value. Taken together, this paper confirm the importance of checks on 
government power to firm value. The second essay looks at corruption of 
state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China. I propose that bribery of SOE managers 
will be less prevalent in listed SOEs with more state ownership due to the 
monitoring effect of large shareholders and the monitoring effect is more important 
for listed SOEs located in provinces with poor institutions. Based on the sample of 
listed SOEs in China, I find that the number of bribe-taking managers of an SOE is 




prominent in provinces with poor institutions. These results still hold after adjusting 
for partial observability and imbalance of sample. The second essay confirm the 
monitoring effect of large shareholders on firm managers. The third essay proposes 
that better investor protection not only contributes to larger financial markets but 
also provides firms with more freedom in choosing their capital structure. Based on 
a sample of listed firms in 64 countries, I find that size of financial markets are 
positively correlated with the extent to which investors’ rights are protected, which 
is consistent with existing literature. More importantly, I find that the dispersion of 
capital structure among firms is positively correlated with how well shareholders 
rights are protected. This finding support my hypothesize that better investor 
protection enlarges financial markets and therefore allow firms to have more 
freedom to choose capital structure that meet their needs. However, the relation 
between creditor protection and dispersion of capital structure among firms is 
non- linear. The dispersion tend to be lower when creditor protection is too weak or 
too strong and it peaks when creditor protection is at medium level. This finding 
support both supply side and demand side view of debt financing. Overall, this 





Cross-country differences in the development of financial markets can be explained 
by the differences in the quality of institutions among various countries. Financial 
markets are better developed in countries with sound and effective institutions that 
protect investors from being expropriated. This is because such protection enhances 
investors’ ability to secure the fruit of their efforts and thereby encourages investors 
to make investments and to finance firms. In this thesis, I conduct three studies that 
examine the effects of institutions on financial markets. In the first study, I find that 
improvement in institutions that constrain government power reduces investors ’ 
concern of being expropriated by government officials. It thus leads to an increase in 
firm values as investors are more willing to finance firms. In the second study, I find 
that the monitoring effect of large shareholders on the behaviour of firm managers is 
more pronounced in places with weak institutions. This finding supports the 
argument that institutions and large shareholders complements each other in 
monitoring firm managers to protect interests of shareholders. The last study 
examine how institutions affect capital structure of firms. I find that as institutions 
improve, dispersion of firms’ capital structure enlarges. One possible explanation is 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Financial market promotes long-run economic growth by improving investment 
efficiency (King and Levine, 1993; Wurgler, 2000), increasing savings (McKinnon, 
1973; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), encouraging competition (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Guiso et al., 2004) and allowing firms and industries to expand 
(Beck et al., 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Due to its importance to economic 
growth, substantial efforts have been made in order to explain cross-country 
differences in financial development. 
New institutional economics argues that sound and effective institutions, by 
imposing restrictions on people, enhance contractual enforcement and property 
rights protection (North, 1991). Therefore, it reduces transaction costs and thus 
positively affects economic outcomes. The law and finance theory proposed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) further assert that institutions that protect investors from being 
expropriated, which is affected by a country’s legal origin, promote financial 
development by enhancing investors’ ability to secure their investment return. 
Countervailing theories that challenge law and finance theory mainly disagree with 
it on the question of whether it is legal tradition that fundamentally determines 
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The argument that 
sound and effective institutions facilitate financial development is accepted by most 
researchers (La Porta et al., 2008). 
In this thesis, I conduct three studies to further explore the effects of institutions 
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on financial markets. My investigation on the relation between financial market and 
institutions fills gaps in existing literature by identifying a new form of institutions 
that checks government power and boosts firm values and by examining how 
market-supporting institutions affect the monitoring role of large shareholders on 
firm managers. I also explore how investor protection institutions affect allocation of 
capitals in financial market. The following paragraphs briefly summarize remaining 
chapters of this thesis. 
In the third chapter, I identified a new form of institutions that allow 
government power to be checked thus promotes financial development and boosts 
firm value. Following the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), substantial 
studies report that institutions that protect investors from being expropriated by 
corporate insiders encourage investors to finance firms therefore boost firm value 
(La Porta et al., 2002). However, corporate insiders is not the only source of 
expropriation as government can also use its political power to expropriate investors. 
In many countries, checks and balances system and political competition is 
introduced as tools for constraining government power and for protecting investors. 
However, countries such as China, Singapore and South Korea, that are ruled under 
one-party dictatorship also manage to achieve financial development without 
conventional tools for constraining government power. I argue that government 
might build system that allow their power to be checked by themselves instead of by 
a third party and the system contributes to the development of financial sectors. The 
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promulgation of the revised internal discipline of the Communist Party of China 
provides me with a good setting for testing this hypothesis. I find that stock market 
in China experienced a significant increase in value around the day when the revised 
internal discipline is promulgated. Furthermore, I also document that firms that are 
more vulnerable to government expropriation gained a higher increase in market 
value. This study helps explain economic puzzle of China and provides further 
evidence to argument that checks on government power is an important determinant 
of financial development. 
Chapter 4 focuses on managerial corruption of firms and the roles of large 
shareholders and market-supporting institutions on preventing managers from 
involving in corruption. La Porta et al. (1999) find that except in few countries 
which provide strong legal protection to outside investors, firms are usually not 
diffusely owned and tend to have several large shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that one benefit of having large shareholders is that they have both 
motivation and ability to monitor managers therefore reduce agency costs. Thus, it is 
predicted that managers are less likely to behave corruptly in firms that are less 
diffusely owned. However, empirical evidence on managerial corruption is limited, 
partly due to the secrecy of corruption. I take advantage of the national wide 
anti-corruption campaign in China since 2012 to explore whether the existence of 
large shareholders affects corruption of firm managers and how the effect is 
influenced by local market-supporting institutions. I find that listed state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) with higher proportion of state ownership are less likely to have 
bribe-taking managers. The negative relation is more prominent in provinces with 
weak market-supporting institutions, indicating that ownership structure and 
institutions complement each other in mitigating agency problem. This study 
contributes to literature by presenting relatively scarce firm level evidence on 
determinants of corruption and my findings are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s 
(1997) argument that large shareholders are effective monitors of firm managers. 
In chapter 5, I extend literature on law and finance theory by examining the 
effects of legal protection of investors on capital structure of firms. The willingness 
of investors in financing firms depends on investment return they expect to earn (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Sound and effective legal institutions that protect investors from 
being expropriated by corporate insiders reduce investors’ potential lost due to 
expropriation and thereby promote financial development. The enlarged financial 
markets thus gives firm more freedom in choosing their capital structure as they are 
less likely to be financially constrained.  Existing literature on capital structure 
focuses largely on the role played by firm attributes. However, little is known about 
the relation between legal protection of investors and firms’ choice of capital 
structure. 
I present empirical evidence that shareholder protection and creditor have 
different effects on the dispersion of capital structure. Sound and effective legal 
protection of shareholders’ rights leads to larger dispersion in capital structure. This 
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is consistent with my original hypothesis. However, in terms of creditor rights 
protection and dispersion in capital structure, the relation is more complex. 
Specifically, when creditors’ rights are too weakly protected or too strongly 
protected, the dispersion in capital structure is predicted to be lower. The dispersion 
is the highest when creditor rights protection is at medium level. This finding is 
consistent with both supply side and demand side view of debt financing. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
Institutions refers to “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions” (North, 1991). Interactions between people need 
to be shaped and people’s behaviour need to be constrained because it reduces 
people’s risk of being cheated by others and thus makes them willing to interact with 
others. Economic agents (e.g. individuals or firms) are more likely to trade with 
others when they possess more information regarding their partners’ past 
performances, when the trade is more repeatable and when then number of players is 
limited. However, as trade size and volume grow, obtaining complete information of 
other parties become difficult or even impossible. In order to reduce uncertainty, 
exchange agreements must be defined and enforced by all parties involved in a 
transaction. For example, lenders of loans might require borrowers to keep their 
liquidity above a certain level to control for the risk that borrowers will default.  
However, exchange agreements are not reached at no costs. In the previous 
example, maintaining liquidity might prevent borrowers from making investments in 
profitable projects. Lenders also incur transaction costs because they have to spend 
resources (e.g. time, money and labor) to negotiate with and monitor borrowers. 
Resources that economic agents spend on specifying what is exactly being 
exchanged and traded and on enforcing corresponding contracts are referred to as 
transaction costs (North, 1994). It is one of the primary determinants of economic 
outcomes (e.g. economic growth and financial development) because it affects 
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overall economic efficiency (North, 1987). When transaction costs are high, 
economic agents need to spend sizable resources in finding partners to trade with 
and in negotiating contracts that are acceptable to all parties. In other words, 
economic agents have to bear considerable costs and economic  efficiency is reduced 
as substantial resources are wasted on collecting information and on enforcing 
contracts instead of being spent on production. Therefore, economic outcomes 
depend on the size of transaction costs. Good institutions make economic agents’ 
behaviour more predictable and make it easier for economic agents to recover their 
loss. Thus it enlarges benefits of trading and reduces costs of defections.  
In terms of financial markets, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that two set 
of institutions, namely contracting institutions and property rights institutions, play 
an important role in determining financial markets development. Contracting 
institutions refer to institutions that support contracts enforcement and facilitate 
resolution of contract disputes. Property rights institutions refer to institutions that 
constrain government power and protect economic agents against government 
expropriation. The importance of contracting institutions and property rights 
institutions to financial markets has long been emphasized in literature and these 
theoretical arguments are supported by plenty empirical evidence. 
Contracting Institutions and Financial Markets 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that financial contracts that investors sign with 
firms to which they provide capitals are inherently incomplete. That is, decisions 
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concerning investment projects cannot be fully determined in the initial contracts. 
Incompleteness of financial contracts brings potential risks to investors as objectives 
of investors, who are providers of capitals, and that of corporate insiders (owners, 
managers and controlling shareholders), who are users of capitals, can be very 
different. Investors’ primary goal is often monetary returns while entrepreneurs and 
managers might prioritize certain non-pecuniary goals. Hurst and Pugsley (2010) 
report that over 50% of entrepreneurs of small business indicate that non-pecuniary 
objectives such as taking control of one’s own schedule and flexibility of working 
locations are the main reasons why they start business, and 4% of them choose to 
become self-employed simply because they cannot find firms who are willing to hire 
them. Only 34% of respondents report that generating income is the main purpose of 
their business. 
Difference in the goals between investors and firms therefore makes 
enforcement of financial contracts very important as investors need to be ensured 
that their money are used and spent in the ways that meet their interest. Furthermore, 
substantial academic works report that when contracts are poorly enforced, investors 
are at the risk of being deliberately expropriated by corporate insiders, namely 
owners of the firms (Demsetz,1983; Faccio et al., 2001; Schack, 2001), managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Burkart et al., 2003; John et al., 2008) and controlling 
shareholders (Bae, et al., 2012; Baek et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 
2002). 
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Sound and effective contracting institutions such as low level of legal 
procedural formalism, low level of legal complexity and few lega l procedures in 
resolving dispute between investors and firms reduce investors’ concern that firms in 
which they invest will behave in ways deviate from predetermined contractual terms 
(Djankov et al., 2003). Firms’ behavior will be better bound and interest of firms and 
investors are better aligned in countries with sound and effective contracting 
institutions because costs of failing to implement financial contracts are higher. 
Therefore investors are more encouraged and willing to finance firms as well a s 
participate in financial markets.  
Property Rights Institutions and Financial Markets 
Contracting rights institutions promote financial development by reducing 
investors’ potential risks of being cheated by people they interact with. Property 
rights institutions, on the other hand, mainly deal with risks imposed by government 
or other politically advantaged elite groups (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The 
grabbing hand view of government and the predatory theory of state both argue that 
government is a tool for extracting and transferring resources back to elite groups 
who have political power (Frye and Shleifer, 1996; North, 1981). Therefore, 
government is believed to expropriate its citizens in order to maximize its own 
interests. Although in reality, governments do not always act in ways described in 
the above two theories, they do impose expropriation risk on citizens thereby exert 
fundamental impacts on economic outcomes.  
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Alchian (2008) define property rights as “a socially enforced right to select uses 
of an economic good”. Property rights define who own an economic good, how the 
economic good will be used and who have claims on the return of using the 
economic good. Investors are always at the risk of their investment return being 
stole by others, such as competitors and government. Without clearly defined and 
well-enforced property rights, both private assets and investment return of firms can 
be grabbed by others, especially by government (Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). This 
reduces return investors expect to earn and thereby discourages investors from 
making investments. In other words, secured property rights provide investors with 
incentives to finance firms through securing their investment return. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) find that well-established property rights institutions have a much 
stronger effect on a country’s overall level of investment than contracting 
institutions do. They explain that this is because terms of contracts could be 
privately negotiated and altered to mitigate weak contracting institutions but the risk 
of being expropriated by government can hardly be reduced without well-established 
property rights institutions. Beck, et al. (2008) report that property rights protections 
increase small and median size firms’ access to external financing because they rely 
more on commercial or relation-based financing sources. Berkowitz et al. (2015) 
report that the enactment of property rights law in China leads to a higher increase in 
market value of firms with more tangible assets as these assets can be used as 
collateral for bank loans. In other words, property rights promote financial 
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development by increasing supply of external financing. 
Sound and effective property rights institutions also increase demand of 
external financing by encouraging firms to make investments, especially 
investments in intangible assets. Claessens and Laeven (2003) argue that compared 
with tangible assets such as land, buildings and equipment, intangible assets are 
easier to be stole. They find that firms adjust their investment strategies by making 
more investments in intangible assets when property rights protection are enhanced. 
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2003) find that weak property rights institutions 
deter firms from making investments even when bank loans are available. These 
findings support the argument that secured property rights increases demand of 
external financing by making firms more willing to make investments.  
Institutions, Corporate Governance and Financial Markets 
The theoretical arguments that emphasize the important role of institutions in 
economic and financial development provide a fundamental explanation to 
cross-country differences in economic and financial market development. Given the 
importance of the topic, past decades have witness a growing literature on corporate 
governance that examines the effects of institutions on financial sectors. Corporate 
governance mainly deals with the ways in which investors protect their investment 
return from being stole or grabbed by corporate insiders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
As mentioned before, investors, especially those without significant control over 
firms (e.g. minority shareholders and creditors), cannot take for granted that all their 
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investment return will finally come back to them.  The mismatch between control 
rights and cash flow rights of firm managers and controlling shareholders motivates 
them to expropriate other investors for the purpose of pursuing their own interests. 
Early literature on corporate governance focuses largely on firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms including board of directors, ownership structure, 
management compensation and corporate policies (e.g. dividends and capital 
structure). 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that corporate governance depends not only 
on firm-level corporate governance mechanisms discussed in prior studies but also 
on legal rules that protect investors against expropriation by corporate insiders. They 
construct a set of indices that measure how well investors are protected against 
expropriation by corporate insiders, namely managers and controlling shareholders, 
and report that countries with institutions that provide strong protection to investors 
tend to have better developed financial market. In addition to macro- level evidence, 
they also present micro- level evidence by reporting a positive relation between 
firms’ access to external financing and soundness of investor protection institutions. 
In particular, they find that in countries with better legal protection of investors, 
firms have higher market value and higher level of debt. La Porta’s et al. (1997, 
1998) argument that how well investors are protected by legal rules affects corporate 
governance and financial markets is referred to as the law and finance theory. 
Following the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), substantial studies 
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document that the quality of institutions affects financial markets at both 
macro- level and micro- level. La Porta et al. (1999) find that firms are less likely to 
have large shareholders and more likely to be diffusely held in countries with sound 
and effective investor protection institutions. They argue that this is because legal 
protection of investors impose constrains on corporate insiders’ ability to expropriate 
shareholders therefore corporate governance needs not to solely rely on the 
monitoring effect of large shareholders. Consistent with the law and finance theory, 
other studies find that strong legal protection of investor is associated with better 
corporate governance including less earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003; Shen 
and Chih, 2005; Francis and Wang, 2008), higher firm valuation (La Porta et al., 
2002; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Bris and Cabolis, 2008), more dividend payouts (La 
Porta et al., 2000), less excess cash holdings (Dittmar et al., 2003), higher top 
management turnover of poorly performed firms (Volpin, 2002) and better stock 
price performance during financial crisis (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
Current studies on the effects of legal institutions on financial market focus 
largely on legal protection against expropriation by corporate insiders. Besides 
corporate insiders, government also imposes expropriation risk on investors, 
especially in developing countries whose institutions are weak. Investors’ concern 
that they are not able to fully secure their investment return makes them less willing 
to make investments even in profitable projects, and thereby reduces market values 
of firm and dampens financial market development. More recently, a growing 
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literature starts to look at how government expropriation and intervention affect 
firms and financial markets. Cull and Xu (2005) find that government expropriation 
risk has first order effects on economic and financial development and firms that are 
more likely to be expropriated by government reinvest less profits. Lin et al.(2010) 
report that firms investment less in research and development (R&D) and are less 
innovative when property rights protection is weak. Lin and Wong (2013) argue that 
the risk of being expropriated by government discourages firms from making 
investments. Consistent with their argument, they find that firms, especially foreign 
owned ones, are less likely to make investments in countries with higher level of 
government intervention. Du et al. (2015) document that higher government 
expropriation forces firms to diversify into unrelated business areas in order to 
recover costs they incurred in building relationships with government officials. 
These studies suggest that government expropriation reduces firm value by reducing 
their ability to secure investment return and by reducing their willingness in 
investing in profitable projects. However, studies that directly examine effects of 
government expropriation on firm is limited. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I 
contribute to literature by exploring how institutions that constrain government 
power affect firm value and affect the effectiveness of large shareholders in 
monitoring firm managers. 
Law and finance theory argues that legal protection of investor promotes 
financial market development by enhancing corporate governance and reducing 
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investors’ risk of being expropriated by corporate insiders. Empirical studies that 
examine relation between legal protection of investor and financial market 
development mainly look at how legal institutions affect size and liquidity of 
financial markets (La Porta, et al., 1997; Beck and Levine, 2005; Brockman and 
Chung, 2003; Chung, 2006). At firm level, researchers also find how well rights of 
investors are protected by legal institutions affect firms’ choice of capital structure. 
Himmelberg et al. (2004) report that sound and effective legal protection of 
shareholders reduce equity risk premium. Therefore, equity financing become 
cheaper for firms, which leads to a decrease in average leverage of firms as they 
tend to rely more on equity financing instead of debt financing. Cheng and Shiu 
(2007) document that the average leverage of firms located in countries with 
effective creditor rights protection tend to be higher. However, these studies mainly 
focus on cross-country differences in the average level of capital structure without 
paying much attention to the differences in capital structure among firms located in 
the same country. Firms differ with each other in many aspects, including their needs 
for external financing and optimal capital structures. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
sound and effective legal protection of investors not only affects the average level of 
capital structure but also determine the dispersion of capital structure among firms. I 
extend literature on law and finance theory by exploring how investor protection law 
affects the dispersion of capital structure among firms in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 Government Power Self-Check System and Firm Value: A Natural 
Experiment from China 
Abstract 
This paper uses the promulgation of the revised internal discipline of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) as a natural experiment to examine the impacts of checks on 
government power on equity market and firm value. The revised internal discipline, 
by constraining behaviors of CPC members, especially Chinese government 
officials’, improves property rights protection, legal enforcement and rule of law in 
China. We propose this improvement in institutions as a result of government power 
self-checking will invoke a positive reaction in stock market and boost firm value. 
The findings confirm our prediction. Specifically, we find that return of stock market 
on the day when the CPC’s internal discipline was promulgated is significant higher 
than the average daily return of Chinese stock market in the same year. Furthermore, 
stock prices of firms that are privately owned, that are smaller and less important to 
local economy, that have no political connections, and that locate in provinces with 
poor legal institutions and powerful government react more positively to the 
promulgation of CPC’s internal discipline. Our findings confirm the importance of 





Institutions such as social norms and legal rules shape people’s behaviors and 
exert profound influences on the prosperity of a society (North, 1989). The law and 
finance theory argues that investors’ risk of being expropriated by corporate insiders 
discourages them from financing firms. Therefore, financial markets tend to be 
underdeveloped and firms are valued lower in countries with weak legal protection 
of investors against corporate insiders (La Porta, et al. 2002; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).  
Corporate insiders, namely managers and controlling shareholders, are not the 
only ones who might expropriate investors. Governments play a vital role in a 
country’s economy, especially in developing countries where institutions are weak 
and underdeveloped. As the ultimate coercive power, the government has the ability 
and motivation to expropriate its citizens, including firms and investors. Institutions 
that check government power reduce the risk of expropriation and therefore 
positively affect economic outcomes, such as economic growth, investment and 
financial market development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
Literature on new institutional economics have long been stressing the 
importance of constraining the power of government (North and Thomas, 1973). 
Substantial empirical works suggest that effective institutions, such as secured 
property rights and strong judicial independence allow government power to be 
checked thereby contributing to financial development and boosting the value of 
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firms (Beck et al., 2003; Berkowtiz et al. 2015; Feld and Voigt, 2003; Johnson et al., 
2002). Democracy and political competitions are often viewed as a necessity to 
maintain such institutions. Countries that lack democracy and political compet itions 
is often viewed as having no effective checks on government power. Thus, they are 
predicted to remain economically and financially underdeveloped. However, this 
view is challenged by the rapid and sustained financial growth of China, South 
Korea and Taiwan over past decades. Allen et al. (2005) find that institutions 
including laws, government quality, corporate governance and accounting standards, 
which are commonly regarded as important determinants of financial development, 
are significantly underdeveloped in China. However, Chinese equity markets have 
experienced fast growth since their inception in 1990. 
Weignast (1993) argues that if government is able to build institutions that 
support growth, such as providing secured property rights and maintaining judicial 
independence, it also has the ability to attenuate them. Thus, to some extent, it is the 
will of government, which determines what institutions will be established, that 
fundamentally affects financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Glaeser et 
al. (2004) assert that this is the reason why countries or regions ruled by dictators 
(e.g. South Korea, China and Taiwan) are able to get out of poverty and experience 
fast financial development because their governments are willing to pursue policies 
that constrain their own power. In other words, some governments can be relatively 
self-disciplined and are willing to establish institutions that limit their political 
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power. We define these institutions as government power self-checking system 
where the ruling party of countries under one-party or dominant-party dictatorship 
sets rules and regulations that allow government power to be checked. The effect of 
formal institutions, such as secured property rights, democracy and political 
competition on financial development and firm value is well-documented. However, 
the government self-checking system as a means of checking government power and 
its effect on financial development have received less attention. 
In this study, we identify the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) internal 
discipline as part of the government power self-checking system and examine its 
effect on China’s equity market and firm value. The internal discipline is based on 
the Constitutions of the Communist Party of China and thereby imposes no 
restrictions on citizens who are not members of the CPC. However, most 
government officials, especially high- level government officials (provincial level or 
higher), are CPC members who therefore need to abide by the internal discipline. 
Government officials being caught breaching these rules get punished in various 
ways, ranging from a warning to being expelled from the CPC. The latter often 
signals the end of their political careers. Thus, the internal discipline is actually a 
tool for constraining government power. The first version of the CPC’s internal 
discipline was promulgated on December of 2003. On Oct 12th, 2015, the CPC 
promulgated a revised version of internal discipline aiming at combating and 
preventing corruption. By comparing the old (promulgated in 2003) and revised 
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(promulgated in 2015) versions of the CPC’s internal discipline, we find that the 
revised version contains more rules and imposes stricter penalties. Therefore, it 
provides us with a good setting to test the effects of the government power 
self-checking system on equity market and firm value. 
We find that the Chinese equity market experienced a significant increase in 
value on the day the revised internal discipline was promulgated. The average stock 
return of firms listed on the Main Board was 3.95%, about 40 times as large as that 
of other days in the same year. The market portfolio that contains all Main Board 
listed firms gained 8.42% and 11.92% in the 5-day (2 days before and 2 days after) 
and 11-day window (5 days before and 5 days after), respectively. These results are 
consistent with investors viewing the promulgation of the CPC’s internal discipline 
as positive economic news. 
Firm level regressions affirm that the government power self-checking system 
is an important complement to weak institutions in China. National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI) of China constructs a set of province- level indices that 
measure the quality of market-supporting institutions of each province. Using these 
indices to distinguish the relative completeness of marketization and the quality of 
market-supporting institutions in each province of China, we find that cumulative 
abnormal return is significantly higher for firms in provinces with powerful 
government and weak market-supporting institutions. These results support our 
argument that the government power self-checking system serves as an alternative 
 26 
mechanism to constrain government power and ensure the functioning of financial 
markets. 
We also examine how stock prices of firms react to the news based on firms’ 
vulnerability to government expropriation and needs for sound and effective 
institutions. Our firm level regressions report higher value gains of firms that are 
privately owned, located in provinces with poor institutions, small and less 
important to local economies and politically unconnected. For example, an 1 unit 
increase in government intervention index is associated with a decrease in 11-day 
CAR by 0.18%. Given that the difference in government intervention index between 
province with higher score and lowest score is 22, holding other variables 
unchanged, the 11-day CAR of firms located in the province with the highest 
government intervention is predicted to be 3.96% higher than that of firms located in 
the province with the lowest government intervention. The 11-day CAR of 
non-SOEs is expected to be 2.1% higher than that of SOEs. The 5-day CAR of firms 
with politically connected CEOs are predicted to be lower by 0.3% (15% if 
annualized). These results support our argument that government power 
self-checking systems boost firm value by mitigating investors’ and firms’ concerns 
of being expropriated by government. 
Our paper contributes to literature in three ways. Firstly, our study contribute s 
to law and finance theory by presenting empirical evidence that government 
expropriation risk reduces firm values. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the 
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willingness of investors to finance firms depends on how well they are protected 
from expropriation. Sound and effective company and securities laws limit corporate 
insiders’ abilities to expropriate outside investors, therefore encouraging them to 
make investments in firms. This ultimately leads to larger financial markets and 
higher firm value (La Porta et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2008; Djankov,et al., 2008; 
Brockman and Chung, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2000). Besides 
corporate insiders, government is another source of expropriation. Current studies 
find that the potential risk of being expropriated by government reduces both firms’ 
incentive to make investments and their access to external finance (Berkowitz et al., 
2015; Johnson, et al., 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005). We document that the equity market 
in China experienced an increase in value after the promulgation of the revised 
internal discipline of CPC, which aims at checking the political power of 
government officials. Moreover, consistent with our expectation, increase in firm 
value is positively correlated with firms’ vulnerability to government expropriation.  
Secondly, our findings contribute to new institutional economics by identifying 
the government power self-checking system as a new form of institutions that 
constrains government power and allows financial market to flourish. Contracting 
institutions and property rights institutions are two indispensable institutions that 
promote financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Levine (2005) also 
argues that private property rights are fundamental to individuals’ welfare and a 
country’s prosperity. Empirical studies document that enforceable contracts and 
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secured property rights lead to better economic outcomes at both country level and 
firm level (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck and Levince, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005; 
Berkowitz et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2002). However, fast economic and financial 
development in China, Taiwan and South Korea challenges the institutions-finance 
nexus as the one-party or dominant-party system in these countries or regions is 
supposed to lead to poor contracting and property rights institutions therefore 
causing stagnated economic growth and underdeveloped financial markets. Allen et 
al. (2005) argue that reputation and relationships serve as alternative channels for 
firms to raise funds from investors and for economies to grow. In this study, we find 
that a government might also establish institutions that check its own power and thus 
contribute to the development of financial sectors and allow firms to be more highly 
valued. 
Our study also relates to literature on legal enforcement. Current studies 
relating to law and finance theory mainly focus on using the existence of certain 
legal rules to measure the quality of legal institutions (e.g. Djankov et al., 2008). 
However, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) argue that, in some circumstances, when 
legal rules are not properly enforced, it is better not to have them because poor 
enforcement could even have negative consequences. La Porta et al. (2006) show 
that private enforcement benefits financial markets while public enforcement has 
little effect. The promulgation of revised internal discipline of the CPC does not lead 
to any changes in legal rules but potentially enhances legal enforcement and rule of 
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law in China. Our study finds that public enforcement could also exert positive 
effects on equity markets, at least in countries with powerful government. 
The next section contains a brief introduction of China ’s political system and 
the CPC’s internal discipline. Section 3 reviews related literature. In Section 4, we 
develop 5 hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 describes and summarizes data used in 
this paper. Section 6 contains a discussion about empirical results and Section 7 
concludes. 
3.2 Institutional Background 
3.2.1 China’s Political System and Checks on Government Power 
One reason why institutions are weak in China is because of poor legal 
enforcement as there is a conflict of interest between enforcing law and the 
monopoly power of the CPC, especially when government officials are engaged in 
lawsuits (Allen et al., 2005). The monopoly power of the CPC stems from China’s 
political system: single-party system. In China, the CPC is the sole ruling party, and 
there is very little chance, if none at all, for other political parties to come into power 
and rule the country. China’s single-party system also violates the assumption of 
checks and balances, which is the conventional way to check government power (Alt 
and Lassen, 2008). Under the one-party political system, no matter how government 
branches are divided, it cannot be taken for granted that government branches will 
check each other as they are led by the same political party and leaders (in China’s 
case, they are the CPC and the leaders of the CPC). Therefore, the one-party system 
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gives the CPC the monopoly of political power in China and makes its power left 
unchecked. It thus leads to issues that authoritarian regimes suffer (e.g. less 
independent judiciary, corruption, arbitrary legal enforcement and a lack of property 
rights protection) (Xu, 2011).  
 Due to the monopoly of political power of the CPC, members of the CPC 
usually enjoy privileges that cannot be obtained by non-party members. Djilas (1959) 
argues that the CPC has become a new ruling class since the post-revolutionary 
period and people without political connections usually have to face political and 
economic discrimination or even overt persecution. For example, during Maoist 
period, party members of the CPC, especially party leaders, enjoyed a monopoly on 
certain goods and resources, such as jobs, education opportunities and houses 
(Dickson and Rublee, 2000). In addition, Xu (2011) points out that the Chinese 
government is usually deeply involved in business, and there is no clear boundary 
between government and business. The above two facts make political connections a 
very attractive resource to firms. This not only induces corruption, as firms without 
political connections might try to build relationships with government officials or 
CPC leaders through bribery in order to gain access to privileges, but also leads to 
unfair competition between private firms and state-owned enterprises. Having 
realized these problems, recently, leaders of the CPC have greatly emphasized 
strengthening the internal control of the CPC in order to enhance checks on 
government power and mitigate the problem of political and economic inequality 
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between party members and non-party members. 
3.2.2 Internal Control of CPC  
The CPC has long been emphasizing the importance of its internal control. In 
its early years, especially in the early 1920s, the focus of the CPC was on recruiting 
more members, without paying much attention to the quality of existing and 
potential members. As the number of CPC members grew, corruption started to 
emerge because some opportunists joined the CPC not for political purposes, but for 
their personal gains. In August 1926, the central committee of the CPC issued a 
document named Firmly Eliminate Corrupted CPC Members, which is the first 
document about internal control and anti-corruption. Half a year later, in April 1927, 
the first internal control department—Central Monitoring Committee (CMC) was 
established in order to strengthen internal control of the CPC. However, due to 
historical reasons, 6 out of 10 committee members were dead within the same year 
and 2 members’ whereabouts was unknown. The CMC was then disbanded in 
December 1927 and was replaced by a smaller and less powerful department named 
Central Investigation Committee (CIC), with only part of the CMC’s power and 
functions reserved. Although the CMC only existed for several months, it pioneered 
practice of internal control and checks and balances within the CPC and this model 
was preserved.  
The reason why the CPC relies heavily on internal control instead of legal rules 
was because before 1949, the CPC was not the ruling party of China. As a result, it 
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had no power to issue or change legal rules. Thus, internal rules and regulations was 
an important alternative mechanism that enabled the CPC to improve institutions in 
areas controlled by them. 
In modern China, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is 
the highest internal control institution of the CPC. The main responsibility of the 
CCDI is to enforce internal rules and regulations to combat corruption and 
malfeasance of the CPC members. Because the majority of China’s government 
officials are CPC members, CCDI is, in fact, the most important organization that 
check all CPC organizations, including government organizations, in China. Before 
the establishment of the CCDI, the control system of the CPC was Central Review 
Committee over period 1928-1933, the Central Party Affairs Committee during 
1933-1945 and Central Control Commission during the years 1945 to 1949. The 
CCDI was established in 1949, the year in which the People’s Republic of China 
was founded.  
Although the CCDI is claimed to be independent of the CPC’s executive 
institutions, such as Central Committee and its Politburo, most of the work of the 
CCDI is still directed by the top leaders of the CPC. In addition, members of the 
local CDI were elected by their corresponding committee of the CPC, and 
higher-level CDI can only endorse or reject the proposal of the committee. Thus, 
lower level CDI is not only responsible to higher level CDI but also responsible to 
their corresponding committees of the CPC. This is known as the dual- leadership 
 33 
system as the early leaders of the CPC believed that loyalty to the party is more 
important than fighting corruption. Therefore, the lack of autonomy makes CCDI 
not very effective in checking power of government (Guo, 2014).  
Since Hu Jintao’s term as the General Secretary of the CPC, the CCDI has 
undergone reforms to become more independent from party committees below the 
Central Committee in order to fight corruption more effectively. Specifically, at the 
16th National Congress in 2002, the CCDI Secretary (the leader of the CCDI) was 
appointed as the chief coordinator of all anti-corruption efforts on mainland China. 
This position was later given the name Central Leading Group for Inspection Work. 
During Hu Jintao’s term, the CCDI’s power and influence was increased as reflected 
by the increased number of Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members at the 
CCDI plenary sessions. The CCDI underwent a further reform toward independence 
under Xi Jinping, who was elected as the General Secretary of the CPC in 2012. 
Specifically, the CDI across China now operates separately from the party apparatus, 
with local CDIs only responsible to higher level CDIs. Leaders of CDIs also began 
to shed concurrent positions so as to avoid conflict of interest and to focus solely on 
the enforcement of internal discipline.  
Furthermore, the CCDI established four discipline and inspection offices since 
the 18th National Congress. One of them is the Propaganda and Organization 
Departments of the CCDI, which is the first central- level organization other than the 
Central Committee. The establishment of these new offices indicates that the CCDI’s 
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independence has increased dramatically. In 2014, the CCDI also established an 
internal office for the supervision of disciplinary system officials. This office works 
at ensuring that officials of the CDI follow internal rules and regulations of the CPC. 
Its officials report directly to the CCDI and are not responsible to other government 
organizations in which they are located. All of these efforts made are to strengthen 
the internal control of the CPC. 
3.2.3 Internal Rules and Regulations of CPC 
Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, combating corruption and 
promoting integrity have become an important topic and a priority of the CPC. For 
example, according to the official website of the CCDI, during 2013 and 2014, 688 
government officials were sacked or demoted because of corruption and 
malfeasance. Among these sacked or demoted government officials, 42 of them are 
high level officials (provincial level cadres or higher). It should be mentioned that 
not all of the sacked or demoted officials breached laws. In fact, some of them were 
sacked or demoted because of unethical rather than illegal behaviors. For instance, 
Zhao Zhiyong, a member of the Standing Committee of Jiangxi province, was 
expelled from the CPC because of abusing his power for personal gains. However, 
he was not prosecuted by court, indicating that what he did only breached internal 
rules and regulations of the CPC but not Chinese laws.  
In recent years, the leaders of the CPC believe that corruption and abuse of 
political power is a serious problem within the CPC. Several public speeches about 
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corruption have been made by CPC leaders. On October 12th, 2015, the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC meeting held by the General Secretary 
of the CPC and the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping 
promulgated revised internal rules and regulations called The Chinese Communist 
Party Disciplinary Regulations, aimed at combating and preventing corruption and 
malfeasance within CPC1. 
In 2003, the CPC issued the first version of The Chinese Communist Party 
Disciplinary Regulations, and the regulations that were issued in 2015 were a 
revised version of the first set of regulations. The purpose of issuing the first version 
of The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations  was also to promote 
integrity and prevent corruption and malfeasance. However, as time elapsed, leaders 
of the CPC found that the old disciplinary regulations were not comprehensive 
enough to deal with current complex situations, and there needed to be new stricter 
ones. The differences between the first version of The Chinese Communist Party 
Disciplinary Regulations (issued in 2003) and the revised version (issued in 2015) 
are two-fold. Firstly, punishments for the misconduct already defined in old version 
of internal discipline have become more severe. Secondly, more actions are defined 
as misconduct and inappropriate by the revised version.  
It is important to note that The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary 
                                                                 
1 During the meeting, CPC also issued a new set of rules called Chinese Communist Party Standards on 
Integrity and Self-Discipline. However, it is very abstract and more like a guideline which depicts ideology 
instead of a practical set of rules. Thus, the focus of this research is on analyzing The Chinese Communist Party 
Disciplinary Regulations, which is more concrete and practical. 
 36 
Regulations are not legal rules, and only members of the CPC are required to abide 
by these rules. The reason is because it is the Party Constitution of CPC but not the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China that serves as the fundamental 
guidelines for designing the internal discipline. In other words, breaching rules and 
regulations of The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations is not an 
issue for non-CPC members, and even for CPC members it might only be 
considered as party issues instead of legal issues. However, it does not mean that 
The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations and China’s legal rules are 
completely different. In fact, there are many overlaps between them. For example, 
Chapter IV Article 27 of Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations states 
that if party members of The CPC are found to have committed graft or 
pretermission of duty, they should be deprived of party positions, be placed on 
probation within the party or be expelled from the party, depending on the severity 
of their misconduct. Chapter VIII Article 382 of the Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China defines what is considered as graft and then states that graft is 
illegal and legal punishment which depends on the seriousness of the circumstances. 
It can be seen that graft is viewed as an offense both by the CPC internal discipline 
and by China’s legal rules. In other words, if a member of the CPC breaches both the 
internal discipline of the CPC and the legal rules of China, he/she is subjected to 
both punishments laid down by the internal discipline of the CPC and the laws of 
China. 
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Although rules and regulations of The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary 
Regulations overlap with some of the legal rules and regulations of China, they are 
often stricter than legal rules and regulations. Chapter IV Article 32 of The Chinese 
Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations states that party members who minorly 
breach laws and are not prosecuted by courts should still be deprived of party 
positions, be placed on probation within the party or be expelled from the party, 
depending on the severity of their misconduct. 
3.2.4 Functions of the New Internal Rules and Disciplines 
The promulgation of the revised The Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary 
Regulations improves the protection of property rights in China and the quality of 
China’s legal institutions through three channels2. Firstly, it provides checks on the 
power of government by specifying what kind of behavior is not allowed. Chapter 
IX Article 105 states that if party members are found to have the following conducts, 
they should be given warning or serious warning, deprived of party positions, be 
placed on probation within the party or be expelled from the party, depending on the 
severity of the situations: 1) Excessively asking for money or labor services from 
citizens, 2) Withholding money or other properties of citizens or penalizing them in 
violation of the relevant provisions, 3) Delaying payments to other citizens in 
violation of the relevant provisions, 4) Charging fees during administrative activities 
                                                                 
2 The analysis is based on the differences in rules and regulations between old and new version of The Chinese 
Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations 
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in violation of the relevant provisions, 5) When dealing with affairs regarding 
citizens, purposely making difficulties for citizens and deliberately asking them for 
bribes. 
Secondly, the revised internal discipline enhances legal enforcement of China 
by clearly stating that dereliction of duty is not allowed. Chapter X Article 119 states 
that if CPC leaders of any level are found to intercede with relevant government 
departments or to influence judicial and law enforcement activities, a serious 
warning should be given, they should be deprived of their party positions and placed 
on probation within the party or expelled from the party, depending on the severity 
of the situation. 
Lastly, the internal discipline mitigate conflicts of interest by putting constraints 
on the activities that CPC members, especially government officials, are allowed to 
be involved in. Rule of law has long been a critical issue in China since its attempts 
to get to grips with modernity in late Qing Dynasty (Randell, 2002). During the civil 
war period, its importance was oppressed by other more critical goals (e.g. 
consolidating power and fighting against the CPC) of the Republican government 
led by Chinese Nationalist Party. Rule of law quickly became one of the most 
important issues again as People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders announced their 
ambitious goals of modernizing China and establishing a socialist rule-of- law state 
(Randell, 2002). However, rule of law in China is still very weak because CPC is the 
sole ruling party. When the interests of CPC members conflict with those of 
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non-CPC members, member of CPC might abuse their political power in order to 
protect their own interest.  
The new internal discipline, by putting constraints on the type of business 
activities that current or retired government officials are allowed to participate in, 
mitigates conflict of interest between member of the CPC and others. Chapter XIII 
Article 89 states that if retired or resigned CPC leaders of any level are found to 
have accepted jobs offered by companies or intermediaries belonging to the regions 
or lines of business previously charged by them, or to have engaged in 
profit-generating activities which are related to areas they used to be responsible for, 
a warning or serious warning should be given and they should be deprived of their 
party position, or placed on probation within the party depending on the severity of 
the situations. 
3.3 Literature Review 
Government plays a vital role in economic activities and there are three views 
of how government interact with other economic agents such as firms and investors 
(Frye and Shleifer, 1996). The invisible hand model argues that government, in 
general, are well-organized, free from corruption and benevolent. Reforms of many 
Eastern European countries, especially those want to join or have already joined the 
European Union, are guided by this model (Sachs, 1994). The helping hand model 
asserts that government plays an active role in promoting economic development. 
They pursue industrial policies, support certain firms while suppressing others and 
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often build strong and close relationship with entrepreneurs. Government are usually 
corrupt, but the corruption is controlled and even organized. China, Singapore and 
South Korea are some of the examples. Lastly, the grabbing hand model asserts that 
governments are unorganized interventionists. Each independent politician 
prioritizes their own interest over others’ and thus does not follow unified public 
policy stance. Their power is left highly unchecked which allows them to impose 
their private wills over commercial disputes and to carry out predatory rules and 
regulations (Frye and Shleifer, 1996). 
The grabbing hand model is believed to be the most detrimental to economic 
outcomes such as economic growth, financial development and firm valuation. 
Government officials, like other citizens, are self- interested utility maximisers. That 
is, they place greater emphasis on their own goals and objectives over the goals of 
others. As the policy makers and ultimate coercive power of a country, they can 
easily expropriate others, therefore adversely affecting financial development and 
firm value when their power is left unchecked. Existing literature identifies three 
channels through which firm values are affected by the extent to which government 
power is checked, namely government expropriation, political connections and legal 
enforcement. 
3.3.1 Expropriation Risk and Firm Value 
The main objective of investors is to earn monetary return on their investments. 
The higher the return they expect to earn, the higher the prices they are willing to 
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pay for financial assets such as shares and bonds. Financial performance of firms 
which determines how much profits belong to investors determine their investment 
return. However, there is no guarantee that investors will get all profits which belong 
to them. In addition, capitals that investors provide to firms through purchasing of 
financial assets also might not be used by entrepreneurs in ways that maximize 
investors’ interests. This is referred to as expropriation risk, which is when investors’ 
interests are hurt by the behaviour of certain self- interested economic agents. The 
expropriation risk that investors face determines how much profits will finally come 
back to them. Faccio et al. (2001) argue that highly concentrated corporate control in 
East Asia allows controlling shareholders to set unfair term for intra-group sales of 
goods and services and even for transferring assets. By doing so, controlling 
shareholders are able to extract high returns even from projects that yield negat ive 
profits. Minority shareholders, however, hardly get anything. Therefore, both 
financial performance and expropriation risk affect the attractiveness of firms to 
potential investors and thus firm value depends on these two factors. Expropriation 
risk reduces firm value because it reduces the expected returns or cash flows of 
investors (La Porta et al., 1997). Corporate insiders and government are the two 
main sources of expropriation.  
3.3.1.1 Expropriation by Corporate Insiders 
Financial contracts that investors sign with firms to which they provide capitals 
are inherently incomplete (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). That is, decisions concerning 
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investment projects cannot be fully determined in the initial contracts. Moreover, 
sometimes investors do not even have the ability to negotiate any contracts but to 
accept contracts that are predetermined by others. For example, minority 
shareholders cannot decide whether and how much dividend will be paid each year 
(Allen, 1993). Agency theory further argues that principals (i.e. investors) engage 
agents (i.e. managers) to provide certain services by delegating some 
decision-making authority to them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, if agents 
are self- interested utility maximizers, which is often the case, it is reasonable to 
assume that they will prioritize their own interests over principals’. The separation 
of ownership and control in modern diffusely held corporations creates opportunities 
for agents to pursue their own goals and objectives at the expense of the ir principals. 
In other words, when not properly monitored by investors, managers are prone to 
private benefit extraction. This is referred to as agency problem or more precisely 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
La Porta et al. (1999) find that except in few countries with very good 
protection of investors, firms are seldom widely held. Instead, large and controlling 
shareholders, usually families or government, are more common. Faccio et al. (2001) 
also report that family as controlling shareholders is the predominant ownership 
structure in East Asia and West Europe. These controlling shareholders often have 
significant control rights and cash flow rights. Through pyramidal ownership and 
participation in management, they can easily expropriate other shareholders 
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(Shleifer and Vishny,1997; Liu and Tian, 2012; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Faccio et 
al., 2001; Lemmon and Lins, 2003).  
The potential risk of being expropriated by managers and controlling 
shareholders discourages outside investors from financing firms. Investors are less 
willing to pay for financial assets such as shares and bonds because they are not 
confident that firms’ profits will finally come back to them in the form of dividends 
or interests. Sound and effective institutions that provide protection against 
expropriation of corporate insiders mitigate the issue and therefore promote financial 
development and boost firm values. Following the seminal work of La Porta et al. 
(1997), substantial studies find that sound legal protection of outside investors 
boosts values of firms by affecting ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; 
Claessens, et al., 2002), dividend policies (La Porta et al., 2000) and investment 
efficiency (Wurgler, 2000).  
3.3.1.2 Expropriation by Government 
Government is another source of expropriation. Clark (2003) points out that 
when budgeting for investment projects, investors should not only employ 
conventional financial analysis techniques but also take into consideration the 
possibility of the loss caused by a country’s social, political and economic 
environment. Risk of government expropriation is one of the most critical 
determinants of the political environment. Kobrin (1984) argues that government 
expropriation often takes the form of formal takeovers, government interventions, 
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involuntary sales of equity and divestment as a result of renegotiation. Government 
expropriation reduces firm value by discouraging firms from making investments in 
potentially profitable projects and by limiting their access to external finance. 
3.3.1.2.1 Government Expropriation and Firm Investment 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that investors often manage to find ways 
to change terms of formal and informal financial contracts, thereby mitigating 
private expropriation. For example, a board could design a compensation scheme 
that aligns the interest of managers with that of shareholders and that provides 
managers with the incentive to maximize shareholders’ value (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003). However, expropriation by government cannot be easily avoided as it is 
impossible for investors to sign contracts with government that prohibit their 
expropriation behaviour. Thus, government expropriation has a stronger effect on 
economic outcomes than the expropriation of corporate insiders (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005). 
To firms, government expropriation is a mere threat and there are no potential 
gains. Besley (1995) argues that secured property rights, by reducing expropriation 
risk, provides investment incentives therefore boosting economic growth. When 
facing a high expropriation risk, firms might give up profitable investment 
opportunities because of the uncertainty over how much they can finally earn by 
making those investments (Opp, 2007). As a result, firms in countries with relatively 
high government expropriation risk tend to make less investment that their 
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counterparts which operate in countries with relatively low government 
expropriation risk. Substantial studies present country level evidence that the 
potential risk of being expropriated by government reduces both domestic 
investment (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro,1995; Clague et al., 1999) and foreign 
investment (Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Harm and Ursprung, 2002; Busse 
and Hefeker, 2007).  
At firm level, Johnson et al. (2002) report that compared with availability of 
external finance, property rights protection against government expropriation has 
more fundamental influence on firms’ reinvestment decisions. Based on a survey of 
entrepreneurs in five former Soviet Union countries (Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Ukraine and Russia), they find that firms are reluctant to make investment decisions 
without secured property rights even when bank loans are available or when firms 
have abundant retained earnings. Cull and Xu (2005), using a sample of Chinese 
firms, extend Johnson’s et al. (2002) study by dividing property rights protection 
into government expropriation risk protection and private contracting risk protection. 
They find that government expropriation risk appears to be the main concern for 
firm reinvestment, and small firms are more likely to be expropriated by government. 
Lin et al. (2010) also document that corporate research and development (R&D) is 
higher when the risk of being expropriated by government is lower. 
3.3.1.2.2 Government Expropriation and Firms’ Access to External Finance  
Government expropriation not only discourages firms from making investments 
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in profitable projects but also discourages investors to finance firms. Firms have 
more access to external finance and are valued higher when financial markets are 
large and active due to higher supply of capitals. However, higher expropriation risk 
reduces both realized and expected returns of investors. Therefore, it dampens 
development of financial sectors. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that cross-country 
differences in financial market development can be attributed to different 
colonization strategies centuries ago. When geographical and disease environment 
were not suitable for colonizers to settle down, they established extractive states to 
allow for the transfer of resources back to colonizers. These places often lack 
property rights and government can easily expropriate its citizens. Financial markets 
are found to be underdeveloped because of potential expropriation by government 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001). As a result, firms are valued lower due to a lack of 
investors. Berkowitz et al. (2015) document that market return on the day property 
rights law was enacted in China was significantly higher than the average daily 
return of the same year. Furthermore, firms that face higher expropriation risk (firms 
with a higher proportion of tangible assets, more cash flow, and weaker political 
connections) experienced a higher market return. This finding support Acemoglu’s et 
al. (2001) argument that secured property rights allows firms to have more access to 
equity finance and to be valued higher. 
Government expropriation also reduce firms’ access to debt financing, 
including those which need to be secured by collateral. Djankov et al. (2008) argues 
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that the willingness of creditors to finance firms depends on their ability to seize 
collateral on firms that fail to repay interests or principals. Creditors ’ ability to seize 
collateral of firms that default on loans not only depends on how well contracts are 
enforced, but also on government’s incentive to expropriate firms. If government 
abuses its political power to expropriate the assets of firms, both firms and creditors 
will find it difficult to secure collateral underlying loans. Firth et al. (2009) find that 
banks are more willing to grant loans to firms with government as a minority 
shareholder partly because they believe these firms will be less likely to be 
expropriated by government.  
3.3.2 Political Connections and Firm Value 
The second channel through which government power affects firm value is 
political connections. The helping hand model of government argues that market 
competition between firms is shaped by government that has the power to determine 
which firms will be supported and which firms will be killed (Frye and 
Shleifer,1996). Many Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Singapore and South 
Korea fit this model and firms often try to obtain support from government by 
establishing political connections with government officials. 
Following the seminal work of Fisman (2001), many studies report that 
political connections benefit firms in various ways and boost their market value. 
Firstly, political connections allow firms to have easier access to capitals, especially 
bank loans. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) report that in Indonesia, politically 
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connected firms are less attracted by foreign capital markets than non-connected 
firms. The reason is because local government often provides these firms with cheap 
loans (through state owned banks). Claessens et al. (2008) find, in Brazil, firms that 
contribute to the elected federal deputies experience a significant increase in 
leverage during the four-year period after election, indicating that these firms have 
preferential access to bank loans. Based on Pakistani data, Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
report political connected firms, on average, obtain 45 percent more loans than 
non-connected firms even though the default rate of these firms is 50 percent higher. 
Micco et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011) also find evidence showing political 
connected firm are financially favored and supported by the government. 
Another mechanism through which political connections benefit firms is a 
higher possibility of receiving government bailouts. A cross country study conducted 
by Faccio (2006) reveals that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed 
out by the local government than are their non-connected counterparts. This enables 
connected firms to have more access to external financing, especially through the 
debt market because lenders will take the potential bailout into consideration when 
making lending decisions. Although Boubakri et al., (2012) do not find direct 
evidence supporting the argument that government is inclined to help politically 
connected firms that are in financial distress, they argue that the increased leverage 
ratio of these firms after the establishment of political connections results from 
lenders’ perceived higher possibility of a government bailout. 
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In countries where there is a lack of well-developed institutions and legal 
systems, political connections can become more beneficial as it helps firms 
overcome market and state failure and secure property rights (Li et al., 2008). Sheng 
et al. (2011) find that firms with political connections can exploit their power gained 
from these connections by requiring government to enforce business contracts or 
stop illegal behaviors. Ambler et al. (2001) state that when legal enforcement in a 
country is relatively weak and inefficient, government involvement, as requested by 
firms with political connections, can be more efficient than formal legal processes. 
In addition, studies of political connections in China also find that firms with 
political connections could have more government subsidies (Chen et al., 2008), 
lower rent-seeking behaviors by politicians (Chen et al., 2011) and government 
awarded privileges (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gul 2006). Because of these benefits 
that political connections grant to firms, politically connected firms are usually 
valued higher than their counterparts without such types of connections (Faccio, 
2006). 
3.3.3 Legal Enforcement and Judicial Efficiency 
Checks on government power also improves rule of law and legal enforcement 
of a country thereby boosting the value of firms. The grabbing hand model of 
government argues that poorly checked government power leads to a situation where 
government officials impose their will over commercial disputes, therefore it 
damages the enforcement of legal rules and regulations. Firms in countries with poor 
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legal enforcement face a higher risk as they have to deal with larger uncertainty 
regarding their legal rights. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) argue that it is the 
enforcement of good legal institutions but not good institutions itself that leads to 
satisfactory economic outcomes. Moreover, when enforcement of legal rules is weak, 
in some conditions, the existence of legal rules can be harmful, and it is better not to 
have them (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) use 
insider trading laws of the U.S. and Pakistan to demonstrate the importance of legal 
enforcement. Specifically, they point out that U.S. is the first country to adopt legal 
rules that prevent insider trading. Although the phrase insider trading does not 
appear in the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there are several important U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions about insider trading which indicates the success 
enforcement of the legal rule. In contrast, Part 3 in Chapter II of the Listed 
Companies Guidelines of Pakistan explicitly states that “No person...shall either on 
his own behalf...deal in securities of a company listed on a stock exchange on the 
basis of any unpublished price sensitive information”. However, Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2009) report that the adoption of this legal rule in Pakistan does not invoke 
significant market reactions. It was not until the enforcement of anti- insider trading 
law, as signified by the first prosecutions, that the cost of equity financing decreased 
dramatically as outside investors finally believed that they were protected by the 
law. 
Modigliani and Perotti (2000) even assert that enforcement of laws tends to be 
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more important than adoption of laws. They argue that, in term of financial markets, 
enforcement of securities laws can influence ways through which firms raise funds. 
When securities laws are poorly enforced, even in countries with many laws aiming 
at protecting investors, firms will find it difficult to raise funds through equity 
markets and tend to rely more on debt markets and bank loans. The reason is 
because without actual enforcement, investors are not fully convinced that they are 
protected from expropriation. Thus, firms are pushed to financial intermediaries in 
order to raise capitals (Modigliani and Perotti, 2000). La Porta et al. (1997) 
document that firms located in countries with appropriate securities laws and high 
quality enforcement are valued higher. Lerner and Schoar (2005) also provide 
empirical evidence supporting the argument that legal enforcement is important. 
Specifically, Lerner and Schoar (2005) report that countries with common law legal 
origin tend to have better legal enforcement than countries with civil law origin (the 
quality of legal enforcement is measured by the time needed to resolve contract 
disputes). Good legal enforcement protects outside investors and allows them to 
enter complex contracting, which ultimately leads to the prosperity of financial 
markets. There is also empirical evidence showing that the quality of legal 
enforcement not only matters for equity markets but also for debt markets. Cristini et 
al. (2001) document that, in Argentina, the quality of judicial enforcement is 
positively correlated with the amount of credit allocated to firms. Fabbri (2002) 
reports that, in Spain, cross-regional differences in the external finance available to 
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firms can be partly explained by differences in the performances of courts. All these 
findings indicate that good legal enforcement and an efficient judicial system 
contribute to the development of financial market and to higher firm values. 
3.4 Hypothesis Development 
3.4.1 Overall Market Reaction 
Literature on the relation between institutions and financial development argues 
that cross-country differences in financial market development and firm valuation 
can be explained by the difference in legal institutions (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; 
La Porta et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Levine, 
2005). Sound and effective institutions enhance investors’ ability to secure their 
investment return therefore lead to better developed financial markets and higher 
firm values. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) further argue that government imposes 
higher expropriation risk on investors because it is difficult for investors to find 
ways other than institutions which check government power to avoid being 
expropriated by government. Government expropriation discourages firms from 
making investments in potentially profitable projects because firms are worried that 
they cannot secure their investment return (Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002). 
It also hampers the financial development of a country and makes it difficult for 
firms to raise funds from financial markets and therefore lowers their value to 
investors (La Porta et al., 1997).  
Due to the lack of democracy and political competition, the power of the 
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Chinese government is considered not properly checked. In some other Asian 
countries or regions such as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, one political party 
has overwhelming advantages over other political parties and has ruled the place for 
quite a long period. Financial markets are predicted to be underdeveloped and firms 
are predicted to be valued lower in these places. However, past decades have 
witnessed both China and these countries or regions with dominant party political 
system experience fast economic and financial growth. Allen et al. (2005) argue that 
alternative financing and governance mechanisms complement weak checks on 
government power and allow the economy to flourish. 
We propose a new explanation to this paradox by arguing that government 
power is not left unchecked in China. It is checked through what we call government 
power self-checking system where the CPC, the sole ruling party, set rules and 
regulations that constrain power of government officials and prevent it from being 
abused. The internal discipline of the CPC is part of the system. It imposes 
restrictions on the behaviour of CPC members and therefore checks power of 
government officials in China. 
The revised internal disciplines of the CPC enhance checks on government 
power in China through three channels. Firstly, provisions that aim at preventing 
corrupt behaviour enhance the protection of property rights in China therefore 
reducing government expropriation. For example, Chapter IX Article 106 states that 
CPC members are not allowed to harm the general public’s autonomy in production 
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and operation activities. Secondly, the revised internal discipline checks government 
power by improving legal enforcement in China. Chapter X Article 119 clearly 
states that intervening judicial and law enforcement activities are prohibited. Thirdly, 
the revised internal discipline improves the rule of law in China by imposing 
restrictions on the type of business activities members of the CPC are allowed to 
participate. This reduces government officials’ incentive to get involved in business 
activities which therefore mitigates the potential for conflicts of interest. For 
instance, Article 84 Chapter VIII states that CPC members are not allowed to send 
gifts to government officials including their spouses, children or other relatives 
exceeding a certain value. Prior studies find that property rights, legal enforcement 
and rule of law are all important determinants of financial development and market 
values of firms as they reduce transaction costs and provide incentive for investment 
(Johnson, et al., 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005; La Porta et al., 1997; Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2009). 
The revised internal discipline, by providing checks on government power 
through the above three channels, is supposed to invoke a positive reaction in the 
equity market. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Stock market reacts positively to the promulgation of the revised 
internal discipline. 
3.4.2 Stock Return of Firms 
Although the promulgation of the revised internal discipline is expected to 
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invoke a positive reaction in Chinese stock market because it enhances checks on 
government power, it might not benefit all listed firms in China equally. Firms differ 
from each other in their risk of being expropriated by government. Firms that are 
more vulnerable to government expropriation have higher needs for checks o n 
government power. Therefore, these firms are expected to experience a higher 
increase in market value after the promulgation of the revised internal discipline. We 
develop the four following hypotheses based on this argument. 
3.4.2.1 Local Institutions and Stock Return  
Like the development of China’s economy, which is not balanced among 
various regions, the quality of market-supporting institutions is not the same across 
the whole country. According to the Governance, Investment Climate and 
Harmonious Society Survey by World Bank, legal institutions and investment 
climate is the best in Southeast China and the worst in Northwest China. This 
problem stems from China’s unique government structure. Xu (2011) depicts the 
political system in China as a regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime. 
Under RDA, political activities such as appointments of government officials are 
highly centralized. However, economic activities are mainly governed and dictated 
by subnational or local governments. This unique government structure ensures that 
local governments have unified goals as they are selected and appointed by the 
central government. At the same time, it allows local governments to tailor policies 
based on their own circumstances. RDA together with the unbalanced human capital 
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development leads to the unbalanced development of institutions among various 
provinces in China (Xu, 2011).  
Firms are less threatened by government in provinces with sound and effective 
market-supporting institutions because government power is better constrained in 
these provinces. For example, the Governance, Investment Climate and Harmonious 
Society Survey reports that entrepreneurs are more confident in courts and have to 
make less informal payments in order to get loans from state owned banks in 
provinces with better developed market-supporting institutions. Thus, we 
hypothesize that firms in provinces with weak market-supporting institutions benefit 
more from the promulgation of the revised internal discipline. 
Hypothesis 2: Stock prices of firms in provinces with weak market-supporting 
institutions react more positively to the promulgation of the revised internal 
discipline. 
3.4.2.2 State Ownership and Stock Return 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) used to be the pillars of China’s economy. 
Although SOES’ influence over China’s economy is much weaker than before as a 
result of the rise of private sectors over the past decades, SOEs still play a vital role 
or even dominant role in many industries and in many provinces. During the partial 
privatization process, many SOEs sell part of their shares to other investors, 
including individuals, institutional investors and even foreign investors and become 
listed SOEs. Because Chinese government is the one of the shareholders of listed 
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SOEs, it is motivated to protect listed SOEs from being expropriated by others (i.e. 
managers and other shareholders). However, for those firms without state ownership, 
they are at the risk of being expropriated by government as the government has no 
direct stakes in these firms. Du et al. (2015) report that private firms in China often 
suffer severe government expropriation in the form of higher informal levies, 
extra- legal payments and entertainment expenses. Only when entrepreneurs in China 
are willing to bear these extra costs can they establish a relationship with local 
governments and thus be approved to diversify their business in order to expend 
their firms (Du et al., 2015).  
However, the revised internal discipline might also benefit firms with state 
ownership, especially SOEs or firms with high percentage of state ownership. 
Although compared with privately owned firms, firms with state ownership are less 
concerned of being expropriated by government, the promulgation of the revised 
internal discipline might reduce the probability that shareholders of firms with state 
ownership being expropriated by corporate insiders. One of the largest concern of 
state ownership is that no individuals, including government departments or officials 
who are directly in charge, are their real owners. As a result, the monitoring of 
managers in firms with state ownership might become less intensive as people are 
not that devoted to spend resources and efforts in doing so. Thus, corporate insiders 
of firms with state ownership might become more motivated to expropriated 
shareholders for their own interests either because they have less stakes in these 
 58 
firms or because of less intensive monitoring. The promulgation of the internal 
discipline is expected to put more constrains on behaviors of managers of firms with 
state ownership, which are assets of the government. Therefore, it also benefits firms 
with state ownership and should also invoke a positive reaction to their stock prices. 
Given the above discussion, we believe it is an empirical question whether 
privately owned listed firms or state owned listed firms react more positively to the 
promulgation of the revised internal discipline. Thus, we develop the following two 
competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3a: The stock prices of privately owned listed firms react more 
positively to the promulgation of the revised internal discipline than that of 
state-owned listed firms do. 
Hypothesis 3b: The stock prices of state owned listed firms react more positively to 
the promulgation of the revised internal discipline than that of privately owned listed 
firms do. 
3.4.2.3 Importance to Local Economy and Stock Return  
Large firms are less threatened by government expropriation in China. 
Compared with small firms, large firms provide more employment opportunities, 
more taxes and so on. Thus, they are more important to local economies than small 
firms do. Under RDA, economic development achievement is one of the most 
important criteria for the promotion of government officials in China (Xu, 2011). 
Hence, local governments have a stronger motivation to protect large firms which 
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local economies heavily rely on. Chen et al. (2008) even find that local government 
help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent regulations set by central 
government in order to attract investment and advance their political careers. 
Consequently, the need for checks on government power is higher for small firms 
that is less important to local economy. 
Large firms are also more able to build and maintain good relationship with 
government therefore are less concerned of government expropriation. One of the 
ways in which firms protect themselves in countries with weak institutions is to 
build relationships with government. Firms that lack resources (e.g. money and time) 
to build such a relationship are put into a disadvantaged position. The lack of good 
relationships with government might prevent firms from getting the necessary 
supports from government, especially in places with weak institutions. Sheng et al. 
(2011) report that political ties built by Chinese firms enable firms to require local 
governments to enforce business contracts or stop illegal behaviour. Ambler et al. 
(2001) even argue that government involvement is a more effective way to solve 
disputes for firms with a sound relationship with government.  
However, building and maintaining such a relationship is not without cost. Cai 
et al. (2011) estimate that, on average, Chinese firms spend 3% of their total value 
added in building and maintaining relationships with government. Therefore, the 
durability and closeness of relationship with government depend on firms’ ability to 
afford such costs. Cull and Xu (2005) report that, in China, the size of firms is an 
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important determinant of such relationships as large firms are more able to afford 
costs incurred in building and maintaining relationships with government. In other 
words, large firm are more able to build and maintain a good relationship with 
government. 
Because of the unbalanced economic development in China and the unique 
RDA government structure mentioned above, it makes more sense to compare firms 
located in the same regulatory regions (i.e. province) rather than with firm located in 
other regulatory regions. For example, in the sample of this paper, the average total 
assets of listed firms in Beijing, the capital city and one of the most developed 
regions of China, are around 82 billion RMB. However, that of Gansu, one of the 
least developed provinces, is only 206 million RMB (0.21 billion RMB). The huge 
cross-regional differences in firm size makes it more appropriate to compare firms 
located in the same region. Furthermore, regional economic activities are mainly 
governed by local governments instead of the central government. For instance, 
firms located in Gansu are more likely to interact with Gansu governments instead 
of the governments of other provinces or cities. Therefore, local government 
imposes a higher threat to firms than central government or the governments of 
other provinces. We measure firms’ sizes based on their relative size to other firms in 
the same province, and we define firms that are relatively large compared with other 
firms in the same province as firms that are more important to the local economy 
and vice-versa. Based on the above analysis, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: The stock prices of firms that are less important to the local economy 
react more positively to the promulgation of the revised internal discipline. 
3.4.2.4 Political Connections and Stock Return  
Political connections are usually viewed as precious resources to firms in 
relation-based economies such as Malaysia, South Korea and China. The reason for 
this is because governments in these countries are more powerful and thus have 
more influence on economic activities than governments in western free-market 
style economies. According to the 2015 Doing Business Report by the World Bank, 
it takes 11 steps to gain permission from government to start a new business in 
China, and it takes around 31.4 days to go through all necessary procedures. In 
contrast, it only takes 1 procedure to start a new business in Canada, and 6 in the 
U.K. and the U.S. The days required to finish all necessary procedures are about 1, 6 
and 5.6 for those countries, respectively. 
Existing literature documents that political connections provide various benefits 
to firms and therefore boost their market values. The political power of government 
officials is one of the most important determinants of the values of political 
connections as it affects the amount of benefits that politicians are able to provide to 
firms. Faccio (2006) finds that political connections are significantly valuable to 
firms in countries with high levels of corruption while they do not have significa nt 
value to firms in countries with low levels of corruption. Other studies find that 
affiliation to powerful politicians significantly boosts market values and the 
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financial performance of firms (Jayachandran, 2006; Goldman et al., 2008, 2013). 
Amore and Bennedsen (2013) further report that doubling the political power of 
politicians leads to a double in the financial performance of firms that are politically 
connected to them. The promulgation of the revised internal discipline imposes 
restrictions on the behaviour of government officials in China and therefore weakens 
their abilities to provide benefits to politically connected firms. As a result, political 
connections become less valuable or even burdensome in some extreme cases. 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The stock prices of firms without political connections react more 
positively to the promulgation of the revised internal discipline. 
3.5 Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of firms listed on the Main Board (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) in China over the period 2014-2015. 
Stock return and financial data of listed firms are collected from the China Stock 
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. To mitigate the effect of firm 
specific information on our empirical results, we exclude firms that release material 
news including stock split, dividends, seasoned equity offering and M&A 
announcement within a 3 day event window (1 day before and 1 day after) 
surrounding the event date (Oct 12th, 2015).  
The first half of 2015 has witnessed a significant increase in value of stock 
market in China. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index peaked at 5178 on 
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June 12th then started to decline rapidly. It lost about 40% of its value within 3 
months. As a result, 47.2% listed firms’ stocks are suspended from trading. These 
firms are not included in our sample because we do not have their stock return on 
the event date. Our final sample includes 1154 listed firms. 
We follow Lin et al.(2016) and use the market portfolio’s raw return to examine 
the effect of revised internal discipline on the entire equity market. Classic event 
study looks at common patterns in changes in stock prices in response to their 
specific news and on their own event dates. Abnormal returns are often used in order 
to remove the effect of other news that has market-wide implications on stocks 
prices. However, the promulgation of the revised internal discipline affects all firms, 
instead of specific firms, at the same time. For this reason, we use market portfolio’s 
raw return around the event date to examine the effect of revised internal discipline 
on the entire stock market in China.  
We use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in our firm level regressions as an 
independent variable to explore how different firms react to the promulgation of the 
revised internal discipline. The market model is used to estimate the abnormal return 
of firms. We use 200-day estimation window to calculate betas of firms and then use 
the market model to estimate predicted stock return over the event window. 
Abnormal return is calculated by subtracting predicted stock return from realized 
stock return. By adding up abnormal return, we get the CAR over the event window. 
We propose that four firm characteristics affect how stock prices react to the 
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revised internal discipline. Specifically, we predict that the stock prices of firms 
located in provinces with weak market-support institutions, of firms that are 
privately owned, of firms that are less important to local economies and of firms that 
have not built political connections will react more positively to the promulgation of 
the revised internal discipline due to their higher needs for checks on government 
power. In order to avoid our results being distorted by extreme values, we did a 99% 
winsorization on our control variables. In other worlds, we set data above the 99th 
percentile to the 99th percentile and data below 1 st percentile to 1st percentile. For 
Tobin’s Qf and leverage, we did a 95% winsorization because there are much more 
outliers. We did not winsorize the indices that measure the quality of 
market-supporting institutions in China. 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the data and Table 3.2 presents the 
correlation matrix. 
We use six indices constructed by NERI of China to measure the quality of 
market-supporting institutions in each province. Resource allocation index is based 
on local government expenditures as a percentage of local GDP. A higher ratio 
indicates that local government plays a more important role in the resource 
allocation of the local economy. The index ranges from -23.31 to 10.29, and it is 
constructed in a way that a higher index indicates that government is less involved in 
resource allocation. Government intervention index is constructed based on how 
much time firms need to spend on dealing with government officials. This index 
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ranges from -12.95 to 9.89 and a higher value means a lower level of government 
intervention. The non-tax burden index is based on non-tax expenditures that firms 
incur when doing business, such as payments made in order to get licenses and other 
administrative fees. It ranges from 12.84 to 15.8. High index means low burden. 
The aforementioned three indices capture how powerful local government is. 
The other three indices we use, namely producer protection index, foreign 
investment index and intellectual property rights protection index measure the 
quality of legal institutions. The producer protection index is constructed based on a 
survey of firms’ evaluation of local government’s legal enforcement and court’s 
judicial independence. The index ranges from -1.91 to 8.93 and a higher index 
means better protection. Foreign investment index is based on the ratio of foreign 
investment (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) to local GDP. Foreign 
investors are more sensitive to the quality of local institutions and higher foreign 
investment might indicate better quality of institutions. Foreign investment index 
ranges from 0.19 to 10.8 and higher index indicates more foreign investment and 
better quality of institutions. Lastly, intellectual property rights protection index is 
based on the ratio of the number of patent applications and the number of approved 
patents to the number of practitioners in technology industries. The higher the index, 
the better the legal protection of intellectual property rights. This index ranges from 
1.05 to 53.51 and a high index indicates more secured intellectual property rights. 
All six indices are collected from Fan et al. (2011). 
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Two variables are used to measure government ownership of listed firms. The 
first variable named private is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
largest shareholder is not a government organization and takes the value of 0 if it is. 
Secondly, we also use the percentage of shares owned by government as an 
independent variable to measure government ownership of firms. These data are 
collected from the CSMAR database. 
We use three ways to measure a firm’s importance to the local economy. The 
importance to the local economy (assets) is calculated by dividing a firm’s total 
assets to the sum of total assets of all listed firms in our sample that are located in 
the same province. The importance to the local economy (sales) and the importance 
to the local economy (taxes) are calculated in the same way. The financial data of 
listed firms are collected from CSMAR database. 
Lastly, we use two ways to measure the political connections of firms. The first 
variable is the number of board members who are also CPC members as a 
percentage of the number of total board members. We define it as party intensity. 
The higher the ratio, the more likely a firm is politically connected to the Chinese 
government as CPC is the sole ruling party of China. The second variable, politically 
connected CEO, is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO of the company is 
a CPC member and equals 0 if the CEO is not a member of CPC. The background of 
board members and the CEO of listed firms are available at the CSMAR database. 
Control variables we include in this study are board size, board independence, 
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Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), leverage and total assets. Board size is the 
number of board members, and board independence is the number of independent 
board members as a percentage of the number of total board members. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated by dividing the market value of a firm’s debt and equity by their book 
value. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total 
equity to total debts. These data are also collected from the CSMAR database. To 
mitigate concern that the statistical significance of our firm level regressions is 
overstated, we cluster standard errors at province level.  
<Insert Table 3.1 Here> 
<Insert Table 3.2 Here> 
3.6 Empirical Results  
3.6.1 Reaction of Overall Stock Market 
Our empirical results are based on the news that the revised internal disciplines 
are promulgated on Oct 12th, 2015. Therefore, if there is other news that has 
market-wide implications, it will make it difficult for us to interpret our results. We 
first look at internet search volumes of “Internal Disciplines”and compare it with 
internet search volumes of other terms that have market wide- implications including 
“Economic Reform”, “Economic Development” and “Economic Growth”. Figure 
3.1 graphs the Baidu search index on these four terms. We find that the search 
volume of“Internal Disciplines”experiences a dramatic increase in late October 
while the search volume of three other terms remain quite constant throughout the 
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whole year. “Internal Disciplines”only becomes the term that has the highest search 
volume on Baidu among these four terms in October. This indicates that the 
promulgation of internal disciplines obtained wide-spread public and media 
attention. We also use the WIND database and Google to search news related to the 
financial market in China on Oct 12th, 2015. However, we fail to find any other 
major news in financial markets such as new regulations or changes in interest rate. 
<Insert Figure 3.1 Here> 
As argued in the previous section, we use raw return instead of abnormal return 
of market portfolio to examine the reactions of the stock market in China to the 
promulgation of the revised internal disciplines of the CPC. Figure 3.2 plots the 
cumulative market return over a 46-day event window [-15, 30]. We find that the 
cumulative return of market portfolio is significant positive during the event window. 
This result is consistent with our hypothesis that investors viewing the revised 
internal discipline as a tool to check government power therefore react positively to 
its promulgation. In Table 3.3, we also compare the market portfolio’s return on the 
event date and over two event windows (a 5-day event window and an 11-day event 
window) with the market portfolio’s return on other days in 2015. The one-day 
return of the market portfolio on the event date (Oct 12th, 2015) is 3.95%, both 
statistically and economically higher than the average one-day return of market 
portfolio in other days of 2015, which is only 0.11%. The cumulative market return 
(-2, +2) and cumulative market return (+5, -5) show the same pattern. The 
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cumulative return of the market portfolio over the event window (-2, +2) is 8.42%, 
much higher than the cumulative stock return of the other days in 2015 with the 
same event window. When the event window is extended to (-5, +5), the cumulative 
return of the market portfolio increases to 11.92%, about 10 times higher than that of 
the other days of 2015. These results support our hypothesis that China’s stock 
market reacts positively to the promulgation of the CPC’s internal discipline. 
<Insert Figure 3.2 Here> 
<Insert Table 3.3 Here> 
3.6.2 Local Institutions and Market Reaction 
In order to test our second hypothesis, we use the CAR of listed firms over an 
11-day event window (5 days before the event date and 5 days after the event date) 
as a dependent variable. Government power and the quality of legal institutions 
varies from province to province in China because of its unique government 
structure (RDA). Thus, firms’ stock prices are expected to react differently to the 
promulgation of the CPC’s internal discipline, depending on the extent to which 
local government’s power is checked and the quality of legal institutions.  
We first construct a market portfolio for each province which contains all listed 
firms located in that province. We then take the average of the 5-day event window 
(CAR (-2, +2)) of firms in the same province to reach the five-day event window 
CAR of the market portfolio of that province. Figure 3.3 plots the five-day event 
window CAR of the market portfolio for each province in China. The CAR of the 
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market portfolio varies greatly among provinces. Consistent with our expectation 
that investors viewing promulgation of the revised internal discipline as good news, 
the CAR of the market portfolio is positive for most provinces, except for Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Qinghai, Shanxi and Hunan. Median CAR is 1%, and the highest CAR is 
3.2% (Yunnan). 
<Insert Figure 3.3 Here> 
We run firm-level OLS regressions to further explore how share prices of firms 
react to the promulgation of the revised internal discipline, depending on quality of 
local institutions. We use six indices constructed by NERI as explanatory variables 
and examine differences in the CAR of firms located in different provinces. Firms 
located in provinces where government power is relatively unchecked face a higher 
expropriation risk. Thus, their CAR is expected to be higher around the event date. 
OLS regression results are presented in Table 3.4. The first three columns of Table 
3.4 illustrates how local government power affects the CAR of firms. The 
coefficients of all three independent variables are negative and statistically 
significant at 10% level. This result indicates that firms located in provinces with 
more powerful government experience a higher increase in market value. For 
example, an 1 unit increase in the resource allocation index is associated with a 
decrease in CAR of 0.18%. Given that the range of the index is -23.31 to 10.29, 
holding other things unchanged, the CAR of firms located in provinces with the 
lowest government involvement in resource allocation (Shandong) is expected to be 
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lower than that of firms located in provinces with the highest government 
involvement in resource allocation (Tibet) by 6.05%. 
The other three variables, namely producer protection index, foreign investment 
index and intellectual property rights protection index capture the quality of legal 
institutions in each province. By checking government’s power, the internal 
discipline also improves legal institutions in China by enhancing legal enforcement 
and the rule of law. Therefore, firms located in provinces with weak legal 
institutions are expected to benefit more by the internal discip line. As can be seen 
from the last three columns of Table 3.4, the coefficient of three indices are 
statistically significant and are negative. Among the indices, the coefficient of 
foreign investment is the largest with an 1 unit decrease in the index leading to 0.4% 
increase in CAR over the 11-day event window. The OLS regression results shown 
in Table 3.4 support our second hypothesis that firms in provinces with powerful 
government and weak institutions have higher needs for constraining government 
power, and therefore investors expect to benefit more from the revised internal 
discipline. 
<Insert Table 3.4 Here> 
3.6.3 State Ownership and Market Reaction 
Firms differ from each other in their potential risk of being expropriated by a 
government whose power is not properly constrained. Compared with SOEs, private 
firms are more likely to be expropriated by government as government has no stakes 
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in these firms. On the one hand, Chen et al. (2011) find that, in China, private firms 
in provinces with a less market-oriented economy or with more government 
discretion in resource allocation are prone to establish political connections with 
local government to avoid being expropriated. Cull and Xu (2005) also argue that 
government expropriation is one of the main reasons why private firms are reluctant 
to reinvest their profits. On the other hand, government are motivated to protect 
SOEs from being expropriated in order to protect their interests. Cheung et al. (2010) 
document that firms owned by central government or with central government 
affiliated directors are protected from being expropriated when having related party 
transactions. Therefore, private firms are more in need of secured property rights, 
good legal enforcement and rule of law.  
We use two variables to measure state ownership of listed firms. The first one is 
a dummy variable named private, with a value of 1 if a firm’s largest shareholder is 
not government. OLS regression results are presented in Table 3.5. In panel A, the 
dependent variable is CAR of the 11-day event window (5 days before the event date 
and 5 days after event date) and in panel B the dependent variable is the CAR of the 
5-day event window (2 days before the event date and 2 days after the event date). In 
the first column, we run univariate regression without adding other control variables. 
In column 2, we add some firm characteristics, such as profitability, size and 
leverage as control variables, and in column 3 we add more control variables and 
cluster standard errors at province level. The coefficient of our variable of interest 
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are all statistically significant and positive. For example, the OLS regression results 
in column 3 of panel A indicates that the 11-day event window CAR of firms with 
government as the largest shareholder is expected to be lower by 2.1%. Regression 
results in the third column of panel B suggest that having government as the largest 
shareholder is expected to lead to a decrease in the 5-day event window CAR by 
1.6%.  
In addition to the dummy variable, we also use a continuous variable which is 
equal to the percentage of shares owned by government to measure state ownership. 
OLS regression results are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3.5. The last 
column of panel A and panel B report that a 1% increase in state ownership is 
estimated to reduce the 11-day event window CAR and 5-day event window CAR 
by 0.064% and 0.044% respectively. These results are consistent with our hypothesis 
that private firms benefit more from the revised internal discipline.  
<Insert Table 3.5 Here> 
3.6.4 Importance to Local Economy and Market Reaction 
In hypothesis 4, we propose that firms that are more important to the local 
economy tend to face less expropriation risk imposed by local governments for two 
reasons. Firstly, these firms are usually big firms and thus have more resources than 
their smaller counterparts to build political connections with local governments to 
obtain government protection or at least mitigate government expropriation. 
Secondly, local economic development is one of the most important criteria for 
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government officials’ promotion in China. Thus, when choosing firms to expropriate, 
local government officials are more likely to expropriate smaller and less important 
firms instead of bigger and more important ones to ensure their career path will not 
be severely affected.  
We use three variables to capture a firms’ importance to the local economy 
relative to others and test this hypothesis. These three variables reflect three different 
dimensions of the importance of a firm to the local economy. The importance 
measured by total assets could capture a firm’s contribution to local employment as 
bigger firms usually have more employees. Importance measured by sales could 
capture a firm’s contribution to local GDP and importance measured by taxes could 
capture a firms’ contribution to local government’s income. OLS regression results 
are presented in Table 3.6, Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. The dependent variable in the 
first three columns of these tables is the 11-day event window CAR and that of the 
last three columns is the 5-day event window CAR. In Table 3.6, the variable of 
interest is the firm’s importance to local economy based on its sizes. In Table 3.7, the 
variable of interest is the firm’s importance to local economy based on its sales and 
in Table 3.8 the variable of interest is the firm’s importance to local economy based 
on its taxes.  
The coefficient of all three variables of interest are statistically significant and 
negative. Specifically, an 1 unit increase in a firm’s importance to local GDP is 
predicted to lead to a decrease of 0.135% in the 11-day event window CAR and a 
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decrease of 0.056% in the 5-day event window CAR. This is consistent with our 
expectation that firms which are less important to the local economy have a higher 
expropriation risk and therefore benefit more from the constraining of government 
power.  
<Insert Table 3.6 Here> 
<Insert Table 3.7 Here> 
<Insert Table 3.8 Here> 
3.6.5 Political Connections and Market Reaction 
Having political connections in China not only provides firms with monetary 
benefits such as more bank loans, government subsidiaries or procurement contracts 
but also allows them to get non-pecuniary ones. Li et al. (2008) argue that political 
connections make government more willing to help firms and allow them to mitigate 
problems such as market failure and weak institutions. For instance, government are 
more willing to solve disputes regarding business contracts of politically connected 
firms (Sheng et al., 2011). Francis et al. (2009) find that firms with political 
connections incur lower costs during their initial public offering (IPO) process. The 
revised internal discipline, however, might reduce values of political connections by 
putting constraints on the type of business activities which not only government 
officials, but also CPC members (i.e. retired government officials) are allowed to 
participate in. Therefore, government officials or those who are able to help firms 
build political connections might find it is more difficult or dangerous to provide 
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benefits to firms as it might threaten their career and reputation. 
We use two variables to measure political connections. Firstly, we use the 
number of board members who are CPC members as a percentage of total number of 
board members and we name it party intensity. There are two reasons why we use 
party intensity to measure political connections. First of all, the higher the ratio, the 
more CPC members a firm’s board has and the higher the probability that they have 
built valuable political connections with government which is ruled by the CPC. 
Secondly, the revised internal discipline puts restrictions on all CPC members. 
Therefore, the political power of board members who are not government officials 
but have political resources such as retired government officials will also be 
constrained. We also measuring a firm’s political connections by looking at whether 
a firm’s CEO is a member of CPC.  
OLS regression results are reported in Table 3.9. In the first three columns, we 
use party intensity as an independent variable, and in the last three columns, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s CEO is a member of the CPC is 
used as independent variable. Like Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, the dependent variable 
of panel A is the 11-day event window CAR and that of panel B is the 5-day event 
window CAR. Column 3 of panel A indicates that a 1% increase in party intensity is 
estimated to reduce the 11-day event window CAR by 0.031%. Column 6 of panel A 
suggests that having a politically connected CEO is associated with a decrease in the 
11-day event window by 0.6%. These results are also consistent with our expectation 
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that the revised internal discipline benefits firms without political connections more 
because they have higher need for constraining government power. We also notice 
that the coefficient of party intensity is not statistically significant in the third 
column of panel B. Part of the reason might be that party intensity is highly 
correlated with state ownership as SOEs tend to have more board members who are 
also CPC members. Overall, our hypothesis is supported by the OLS regression 
results. 
<Insert Table 3.9 Here> 
3.7 Conclusion 
The risk of being expropriated by government is one of the determinants of 
financial development. When facing with higher level of government expropriation, 
both firms and their investors will become less motivated to make investments 
because of their concern of not being able to secure their investment return. It thus 
dampens development of financial sectors and lowers values of firms. In this paper, 
we identify a new form of institutions, which we name government power 
self-checking system, that allow government power to be checked and therefore 
reduce government expropriation risk and promote financial development even in 
countries with a sole ruling party or dominant political party. We use the 
promulgation of the CPC’s internal discipline as an event study to examine effects of 
checks on government power on stock market and market value of firms.  
On 12th Oct, 2015, the CPC promulgation a revised version of its internal 
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discipline aiming at imposing restrictions on behaviour of CPC members therefore 
preventing corruption. The internal discipline improve institution in China by 
enhancing property rights protection, legal enforcement and rule of law. We find that 
the equity market in China experienced an increase in value on the event day and 
over multiple-day periods surrounding the event date. Furthermore, we also 
document that values of firms that are more vulnerable to government expropriation 
and that have higher needs for sound and effective institutions (i.e. secured property 
rights, good legal enforcement and rule of law) increase more. Specifically, we find 
that the CAR of firms located in provinces with weak market-supporting institutions 
(powerful government and weak legal protection of firms and investors), firms 
without state ownership, firms that are less important to the local economy in terms 
of employment, GDP growth and government income, and firms that are not 
politically connected is higher. These findings support our argument that checks on 
government power reduce investors’ risk of being expropriated by government and 
thus promote financial market development and boost market values of firms. 
Our findings are consistent with new institutional economics that checks on 
government power is important for economic outcomes (North and Thomas, 1973). 
People, when interacting with others, have to spend resources in preventing 
themselves from being cheated or expropriated by others. This is referred to as the 
transaction costs. Sound and effective institutions, especially those enhance contract 
enforcement and secure private property rights reduces transaction costs and thus 
 79 
promotes economic and financial development (North, 1991). The quality of 
institutions depends on how well government power is checked to prevent it from 
being abused by government officials for personal their gains. Therefore, better 
checks on government power is predicted to lead to better development of financial 
market. Our findings that market value of firms increases on the event day and 
around the multiple-day event windows present empirical evidence support the 
argument. 
We extend work of La Porta et al. (1998) by presenting empirical evidence that 
expropriation risk imposed by government also negatively affects the financial 
development and values of firms. Law and finance theory proposed by La Porta et al. 
(1998) argues that investors’ concern of being expropriated by corporate insiders 
discourages them from financing firms therefore leads to lower firm values because 
the risk reduce investors’ expected return. The role of government in expropriating 
investors is not widely discussed in law and finance theory. Our findings that 
government expropriation hampers financial development and reduces market 
values of firms is consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) argument that 
expropriation of government also matters for financial development. The results in 
our study complements law and finance theory by shedding light on the relation 
between firm value and institutions other than the legal protection of investors from 
being expropriated corporate insiders. 
However, our study is not without any limitations. Firstly, we do not quantify 
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changes between the old and revised version of internal discipline. Therefore, we 
only use the promulgation of the revised internal discipline as an event-study to 
examine how reduction in potential government expropriation affects the entire 
stock market and different firms. In other words, our study cannot answer what type 
of government expropriation matters more and what kind of government 
self-checking is more effective. Another limitation is that we do not account for how 
effective the revised internal discipline is being enforced in difference provinces or 
cities in China. The relation between the enforcement of revised internal discipline 
and market reactions of firms located in different areas might provide extra support 
for our conclusion. However, we fail to find proxies that allow us to measure how 
well the revised internal discipline is enforce in different parts of China. We might 
try to find meaningful and effective measurements to examine the relation. 
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3.8 Figures  
Figure 3.1 Searching Volume of Possible Compounding Terms 
This figure shows the searching volume of Internal Discipline, Economic Development, Economic 
Growth and Economic Reform on the most popular searching engine Baidu in China. To  make the 
searching volume comparab le, they are scaled by their historical h igh since 2011, when Baidu starts 
to provide searching volume data. 
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Figure 3.2 Cumulative Market Return around Event Day 
This figure plots the cumulative raw return around the event date when revised internal discipline of 
CPC is promulgated on 12
th
 of Oct, 2015. The starting date is 15 days before event date and the 







Figure 3.3 CAR of Market Portfolio for Each Province 
This figure p lots the 5-day event window CAR of market portfolio for each province in China. The 






Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the data 
Variable Mean Median Max Min STD Observations 
Dependent Variables       
CAR (-2,+2) 1.64% 0.98% 39.58% -38.10% 6.33% 1154 
CAR (-5,+5) 3.22% 2.32% 70.41% -45.52% 9.67% 1154 
Independent Variables       
Private 0.350 0.000 1 0 0.477 1154 
State ownership 23.070 21.930 87.500 0.000 23.300 1154 
Importance to Local 
Economy (Total Assets) 
0.027 0.006 0.566 0.000 0.063 1154 
Importance to Local 
Economy (Sales) 
0.027 0.006 0.736 0.000 0.064 1154 
Imp rtance to Local 
Economy (Taxes) 
0.027 0.004 0.587 0.000 0.077 1154 
Politically Connected 
CEO 
0.566 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.496 1154 
Party Intensity 0.243 0.182 1.000 0.000 0.227 1154 
Resource Allocation 3.056 3.100 10.290 -23.310 3.081 1154 
Government Intervention 3.439 2.98 10.000 -12.000 2.993 1154 
Non-tax Burden 1.347 1.360 15.800 12.840 0.625 1154 
Producer Protection 5.514 5.370 8.930 -1.910 1.827 1154 
Foreign Investment 5.591 5.370 9.120 0.280 1.689 1154 
Intellectual Property 
Protection 
23.386 12.220 53.510 1.050 20.089 1154 
Control Variables       
Board Size 11.479 11.000 26.000 5.000 3.223 1154 
Board Independence 0.388 0.375 0.750 0.214 0.775 1154 
Tobin’s Q 2.954 2.504 4.877 0.307 2.764 1154 
ROA -0.018 0.250 0.182 -0.245 1.430 1154 
Leverage 1.975 0.986 4.185 0.075 5.062 1154 
Total Assets (billion yuan) 10.700 0.625 2210 0.190 105.86 1154 
Marketization Index 7.335 7.390 2.392 11.800 0.380 1154 
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Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix fo r the variables used in this study. CAR11 is the CAR for event window (-5, +5), CAR5 is the CAR for event window (-2, +2), 
ra is resource allocation index, g i is government intervention index, ntb is non -tax burden index, pp is protection of producer index, ipp is intellectual property 






 represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 CAR11 CAR5 ra gi ntb pp ipp fip bs bi q roa leverage ta 
CAR11 1              
CAR5 0.620
***
 1             
ra -0.017 0.007 1            
gi -0.008 -0.006 0.641
***







 1          






 1         








 1        















 0.035 -0.019 0.016 -0.032 -0.010 -0.037 1      
bi -0.032 0.012 0.006 -0.018 0.003 -0.023 -0.018 -0.018 0.027 1     
q 0.015 -0.024 -0.004 -0.015 -0.006 -0.000 -0.021 -0.002 -0.047 0.014 1    




 0.026 0.030 0.040 0.034 -0.019 0.001 -0.050 1   
leverage -0.012 0.029 -0.019 -0.028 0.013 -0.036 -0.036 -0.040 0.028 -0.049 0.092
**
















Table 3.3 Comparison between Event Date and Other Dates in 2015 
This table reports the comparison between event date market return and cumulat ive market return 
around event date with those of other days in 2015. Market return is the market capitalization 
weighted average stock return. The difference is statistically significant at 1% level. 
 Event 
Date 
Average of other 







Stock Market Return 3.95% 0.11% 3.84% 22.11 <0.001 
Cumulative Stock 
Market Return (-2,+2) 




Market Return (-5,+5) 
11.92% 1.10% 10.82% 16.64 <0.001 
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Table 3.4 OLS regressions examining the effects of market-supporting 
institutions on stock returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect of market-supporting institutions  on CAR around 
the promulgation date of the rev ised internal d iscipline of CPC. Dependent variable is the CAR of the 
11-day event window. We use 6 indices constructed by NERI of China to measure institutions. 






 represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, +5) 
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Industry  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Province Province Province   Province Province Province 
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Adjusted R2 0.058 0.058 0.058   0.058 0.060 0.058 
Observations 1154 1154 1154   1154 1154 1154 
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Table 3.5 OLS regressions examining the effects of state ownership on stock 
returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect o f state ownership on CAR around the 
promulgation date of the revised internal discipline of CPC. Dependent variable in panel A is the 
CAR of the 11-day event window and dependent variable in panel B is the CAR of the 5-day event 







 represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A Dependent Variable: CAR(-5, +5) 







   






Marketization Index   -0.001 
(0.467) 
  -0.002 
(0.244) 
Importance to Local Economy 
(Total Assets) 
  -0.105*** 
(0.008) 
  -0.108*** 
(0.004) 
Party Intensity   -0.039*** 
(0.007) 
  -0.030** 
(0.025) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.033 0.065 0.033 0.049 0.103 
Observations 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
Panel B Dependent Variable: CAR(-2, +2) 
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Marketization Index   -0.001 
(0.530) 
  -0.001 
(0.344) 
Importance to Local Economy 
(Total Assets) 
  -0.059* 
(0.066) 
  -0.059** 
(0.021) 
Party Intensity   -0.012 
(0.239) 
  -0.011 
(0.337) 


























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.031 0.043 0.028 0.047 0.061 
Observations 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
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Table 3.6 OLS regressions examining the effects of firms’ importance to local 
economy on stock returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect of firms’ importance to local economy  on CAR 
around the promulgation date of the revised internal discipline of CPC. Dependent variables are the 
CAR of the 11-day event window and the CAR of the 5-day event window. The independent variable 
is the firm’s importance to local economy based on its size. Definition of other variables are 






 represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-5, +5) 
Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Marketization Index   -0.002 
(0.244) 
  -0.001 
(0.344) 
State Ownership   -0.066*** 
(0.000) 
  0.039*** 
(0.003) 
Party Intensity   -0.030** 
(0.025) 
  -0.011 
(0.337) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.022 0.103 0.008 0.018 0.061 
Observation 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
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Table 3.7 OLS regressions examining the effects of firms’ importance to local 
economy on stock returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect of firms’ importance to local economy on CAR 
around the promulgation date of the revised internal discipline of CPC. Dependent variables are the 
CAR of the 11-day event window and the CAR of the 5-day event window. The independent variable 
is the firm’s importance to local economy based on its sales. Definit ion of other variab les are 






 represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-5, +5) 
Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Marketization Index   -0.010 
(0.217) 
  -0.001 
(0.311) 
State Ownership   -0.046*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.045*** 
(0.002) 
Party Intensity   -0.041* 
(0.051) 
  -0.012 
(0.333) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.026 0.061 0.005 0.022 0.057 
Observation 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
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Table 3.8 OLS regressions examining the effects of firms’ importance to local 
economy on stock returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect of firms’ importance to local economy on CAR 
around the promulgation date of the revised internal discipline of CPC. Dependent variables are the 
CAR of the 11-day event window and the CAR of the 5-day event window. The independent variable 
is the firm’s importance to local economy based on its taxes. Defin ition of other variab les are 






 represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-5, +5) 
Dependent Variable:  
CAR (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Marketization Index   -0.001 
(0.255) 
  -0.001 
(0.249) 
State Ownership   -0.066*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.042*** 
(0.002) 
Party Intensity   -0.035** 
(0.021) 
  -0.009 
(0.139) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.028 0.069 0.009 0.022 0.065 
Observation 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
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Table 3.9 OLS regressions examining the effects of political connections on 
stock returns 
This table reports regression results for the effect of firms’ polit ical connections  on CAR around the 
promulgation date of the revised internal discipline of CPC. Dependent variable in panel A is the 
CAR of the 11-day event window and dependent variable in panel B is the CAR of the 5-day event 







 represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A Dependent Variable: CAR(-5, +5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






   






Importance to Local 
Economy(Total Assets) 
  -0.108*** 
(0.004) 
  -0.133*** 
(0.006) 
Marketization Index   -0.002 
(0.244) 
  -0.003 
(0.277) 
State Ownership   -0.066*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.002*** 
(0.000) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.027 0.103 0.014 0.030 0.063 
Observation 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
Panel B Dependent Variable: CAR(-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Importance to Local 
Economy(Total Assets) 
  -0.059** 
(0.021) 
  -0.071** 
(0.015) 
Marketization Index   -0.001 
(0.344) 
  -0.001 
(0.201) 
State Ownership   0.039*** 
(0.003) 
  0.044*** 
(0.000) 




























































Industry Dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster No No Province No No Province 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.020 0.061 0.010 0.027 0.060 
Observation 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 
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3.10 Appendix 1 Definition of Variables 
This table reports definition and sources of variables used in this study. 
Variable Definition Source 
CAR(-2, +2) Cumulative abnormal return of a firm over a 5-day 
period. The period starts at 2 days before the event 
date and ends at 2 days after the event date. CAR is 
calculated by subtracting estimated return from 
realized return. We use market model and realized 
return of firms over a 200-day period before event 
window to calculate estimated return. 
CSMAR 
data base 
CAR(-5, +5) Cumulative abnormal return of a firm over a 11-day 
period. The period starts at 5 days before the event 
date and ends at 5 days after the event date. CAR is 
calculated by subtracting estimated return from 
realized return. We use market model and realized 
return of firms over a 200-day period before event 
window to calculate estimated return. 
CSMAR 
data base 
Private A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
largest shareholder of a firm is not a government 
organization. It takes the value of 0 if the largest 
shareholder is a government organization. 
CSMAR 
data base 
State ownership A continuous variable that equals to the percentage of 






The ratio of a listed firm’s total assets to the sum of all 
listed firms’ total assets located in the same province. 
We use it to capture a firm’s importance to local 
employment based on the assumption that larger firms 






The ratio of a listed firm’s sales to the sum of all listed 
firms’ sales located in the same province. We use it to 






The ratio of a listed firm’s taxes to the sum of all listed 
firms’ taxes located in the same province. We use it to 
capture a firm’s importance to local government 
income based on the assumption that majority of a 





A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s 
CEO is a CPC member and takes the value of 0 if not. 
We collect the data by reading background of listed 




Party Intensity A continuous variable that equals to the ratio of 
number of board members who are CPC member to 





An index based on the ratio of local government 
expenditure to local GDP. The index is constructed in 
a way that higher index indicates lower government 
involvement in resource allocation. 





An index based on the time that firms need to spend 
with government officials when doing business. The 
index is constructed in a way that higher index 
indicates lower government intervention in market. 




An index based on non-tax expenditures that firms 
incur when doing business such as payments made in 
order to get licenses and other administrative fees. The 
index is constructed in a way that higher index 
indicates lower non-tax burden.  




An index based on a survey of firms’ evaluation of 
local government’s legal enforcement and court’s 
judicial independence. The index is constructed in a 
way that higher index indicates better protection of 
producer. 





An index based on the ratio of foreign investment 
(including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) to local 
GDP. The index is constructed in a way that higher 
index indicates higher foreign investment. Higher 
index indicates better market-supporting institutions 
based on the assumption that foreign investors are 
more willing to make investments in province with 
sound and effective institutions. 





An index based on the ratio of number of patents 
applications and number of approved patents to 
practitioners of technology industries. The index is 
constructed in a way that higher index indicates better 
intellectual property rights protection based on the 
assumption better intellectual property rights 
protection leads to more active patent market. 




An index that captures overall marketization reform 
progress in each province of China. The index is 
constructed in a way that higher index indicates higher 
extent to which local economy is market oriented. 
 
Fan et al. 
(2011) 
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Board Size A continuous variable equals the number of board 





A continuous variable equals the ratio of number of 




Tobin’s Q A continuous variable equals the ratio of market value 
of a firm’s debt and equity to its book value. 
CSMAR 
data base 




Leverage A continuous variable equals the ratio of a firm’s total 





A continuous variable equals the value of a firm’s total 





Chapter 4 Do Large Shareholder and Market Institutions Matter for 




The literature on firms- level corruption studies largely focuses on bribe-payers, and 
pays little attention to bribe-takers. In this study, we examine the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) whose managers are caught for taking bribes during China’s 
Anti-Corruption Campaign since 2012. We predict that large shareholders and better 
legal institutions can prevent SOE managers from taking bribes. We find that 
increase in the holding of large shareholders and sound and effective market 
supporting- institutions are correlated with smaller incidence of bribe-taking 
managers. This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) argument that large 
shareholders are both motivated and able to monitor managers. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Corruption refers to any act that subverts the public good for private or 
particularistic gain (Gerring and Thacker, 2004). It has long been a problem not only 
for developing countries but also for developed countries. The African Union reports 
that around 25% of all African countries’ GDP is lost due to corruption every yea r, 
which amounts to more than 148 billion dollars (von K'Orinda-Yimbo, 2008). 
Mediare and Medicaid, the U.S. health care programme, estimates that 5% to 10% of 
its budget is wasted because of corruption (CleanGovBiz, 2014). In total, corruption 
is estimated to cost 2.6 trillion dollars (5% of global GDP) each year (Global 
Agenda Councils, 2012).   
Private-to-public corruption, where government officials are involved, is 
widely studied in the literature. However, private-to-private corruption has received 
much less attention3. The past decades have witnessed a spate of ethic scandals in 
the business world, including Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, and Parmalat which 
manipulated financial reports, purposely concealed information and used firms’ 
funds for personal gain. These scandals raise the question of whether corruption in 
the business world has received enough attention (Gopinath, 2008). In this study, we 
shed light on this issue by focusing on the bribery of firm managers. In particular, 
we intend to answer the question of whether large shareholders and 
                                                                 
3 Argandona (2003) defines private-to-private corruption as “a manager or employee exercises a 
certain power or influence over the performance of a function, task or responsibility within a private 
organization or corporation”. 
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market-supporting institutions, which are the two main corporate governance 
mechanisms, deter firm managers from taking bribes. 
Literature on corporate governance and ownership structure has long been 
emphasizing the important role played by large shareholders in monitoring firm 
managers. Managers are often self- interested and prioritize their interests over 
others’. Thus, they need to be monitored to ensure that they do not pursue their 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Small 
shareholders do not have large enough stakes in firms that motivate them to absorb 
the costs of monitoring managers. Large shareholders’ interest are better aligned 
with the interests of firms due to the substantial amount of shares they own. 
Therefore, large shareholders benefit more from the improved monitoring of firm 
managers and they are also more willing to spend resources in doing so (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). Empirical studies have found that large shareholders do impose 
monitoring pressure on managers and improve corporate governance (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1990; Maug, 1998; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002; Yafeh and Yosha, 
2003). Large shareholders examined in prior studies mainly consist of institutional 
investors, founding families and holding companies. These large shareholders are 
profit-oriented and therefore are willing to absorb the costs of monitoring firm 
managers so long as their gains exceed the costs. However, if large shareholders 
have goals other than profit maximization, will they still become motivated in 
monitoring firm managers? 
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The national wide anti-corruption campaign in China since 2012 provides us 
with a good setting to conduct this study. The campaign aims at combating 
corruption not merely of government officials but also of the entire Communist 
Party of China (CPC). Therefore, not only government officials but also employees 
of public universities and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are subject to 
investigations lead by the Central Committee of Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI). By 
collecting information of sanctioned members of CPC, we managed to identify 132 
bribe-taking managers of Chinese listed SOEs. As the largest shareholder of SOEs, 
government is not always profit-oriented. For governments, social welfare and 
political goals are often more important than generating profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Therefore, bribery of SOE managers in China provides us with the chance to 
shed light on the question of whether large shareholders who are not always 
profit-oriented still make efforts in monitoring firm managers. 
Our analysis is based on listed SOEs in China over the period 2013-2017. We 
use the proportion of state ownership (shares owned by government organizations) 
of a SOE to proxy for the incentive of government organizations in monitoring firm 
managers. We propose that government organizations, despite not always giving 
priority to profits, still play an important role in monitoring SOE managers to avoid 
their interests being hurt. Our hypothesis is supported by empirical results. Our 
regression results indicate that an 1 percentage increase in state ownership is 
associated with a 1.95% decrease in the proportion of bribe-taking managers. 
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We also examine whether sound and effective local market-supporting 
institutions deter managers from misbehaving and how this interacts with the 
effectiveness of large shareholders in monitoring managers. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that legal institutions and large shareholders are two impo rtant 
components of corporate governance system. For diffusely owned firms that have no 
shareholders who have big enough stakes in the firm to fully absorb monitoring 
costs, legal institutions work as the main corporate governance mechanism to protect 
investors’ interests. This argument is supported by our finding that SOEs located in 
provinces with weak market-supporting institutions tend to have more bribe-taking 
managers. Specifically, we find that holding other variables unchanged, the 
proportion of bribe-taking managers of SOEs located in Zhejiang (the province with 
the highest score in overall marketization index) is predicted to be 6.89% lower than 
that of SOEs located in Tibet (the province with the lowest score in overall 
marketization index). How well legal rights of investors are protected has similar 
effect on the proportion of bribe-taking managers but the magnitude is only about 
one third of the magnitude of overall marketization progression. Furthermore, we 
find that the monitoring effect of large shareholders is more prominent in provinces 
that lack well-developed market-supporting institutions. For example, 1 unit 
decrease in overall marketization index is expected to increase the monitoring effect 
of large shareholders by about 10%. This suggests that legal institutions and large 
shareholders supplement each other in monitoring firm managers. When lega l 
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institutions are too weak to protect investors’ interests, corporate governance relies 
more on large shareholders. This finding is consistent with findings in literature on 
corporate governance that ownership tends to be more concentrated in countries with 
poor legal protection of investors (La Porta, Lopez, and Shleifer 1999; La Porta et 
al., 1998).  
 This study contributes to literature on corporate governance by presenting 
empirical evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring firm managers. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that one advantage of having large shareholders is 
that they can mitigate the free-ride problem in monitoring firm managers. Empirical 
studies find that large shareholders do put pressure on management teams from 
many aspects such as cost reduction (Yafeh and Yosha, 2003), earnings management 
(Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002), and the proposal of corporate policies (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1990). Quantifying corruption of firm managers, this study adds to a 
new dimension to literature on the relation between large shareholders and the 
behaviour of firm managers. In particular, our finding that an increase in shares 
owned by large shareholders is negatively correlated with the number of 
bribe-taking managers implies that large shareholders improve corporate governance 
by deterring managers from behaving corruptly. 
Our study also contributes to studies on the determinants of corruption by 
exploring the characteristics of bribe-takers that affects level of corruption. 
Corruption is a widely studied topic in terms of its causes and consequences. At firm 
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level, many characteristics of firms including profitability, growth rate, market 
competition and ownership have been found to affect the level of corruption 
(Svensson, 2003; Bai, Jayachandran and Malesky, 2015; Nguyen and Van Dijk, 
2012). However, most existing evidence has been restricted on private-to-public 
corruption with firms taking the role of bribe-payers. Anecdotal evidence (e.g. 
corporate fraud and bribery scandals) suggests that corruption is prevalent in the 
business world. Researchers also argue that corporate corruption does not receive 
enough attention as it deserves (Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008). In this study, we 
shed light on corporate corruption and find that the monitoring pressure firm 
managers face reduces their propensity to act corruptly.  
Lastly, our study relates to the debate over state ownership. State ownership is 
often viewed as inefficient as researchers argue that SOE tends to hire excess labor, 
appoint politically connected employees and forgo profits in order to pursue political 
goals (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Krueger, 1990). However, empirical 
evidence on the relative efficiency of state ownership and private ownership is 
mixed. Vining and Boardman (1992) and Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh 
(1994) report that SOEs are less efficient and profitable than private firms. On the 
contrary, Martin and Parker (1995) and Kole and Mulherin (1997) shows that SOEs 
are not necessarily less efficient. Our empirical finding is that managers are less 
likely to engage in corruption in listed SOEs with a higher proportion of state 
ownership, which presents additional evidence that government organizations, when 
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becoming the largest shareholder of a firm, play an important role in monitoring 
firm managers. 
4.2 Institutional Background 
4.2.1 Anti-Corruption Campaign in China 
Corruption has long been an issue in China. According to the 2017 Corruption 
Perception Index constructed by Transparency International, China ranked 77 among 
180 countries covered by the index. Its one-party political system, lack of 
appropriate institutions and media freedom and bureaucrat’s monopolistic power 
granted by central planning economic system are all considered as factors that cause 
rampant corruption in China (Cao, Wang and Zhou, 2018). Hu and Guo (2001) 
estimates that 4% to 8% of China’s GNP is lost due to corruption. Kim, Li and 
Tarzia (2018) argue that corruption costs 30 billion USD to listed firms in China. 
Having realized corruption’s destructive consequences, President Xi Jinping 
launched an anti-corruption campaign soon after his officially taking office in 
November 2012. On December 4th, 2012, the Eight Point Policy was promulgated 
by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, 
which signalled the start of the anti-corruption campaign in China. Since 2013, 
CCDI led by Wang Qishan started to send central inspection teams to various 
provinces in China aiming at inspecting corrupted government officials and other 
members of the CPC. Government departments, public universities, and SOEs (both 
listed and unlisted) were all inspected by those teams. The anti-corruption campaign 
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led by President Xi Jinping is thought to be one of the boldest anti-corruption efforts 
in the history of the PRC. Before 2012, on average, 6-8 provincial or ministerial 
level government officials were inspected and arrested each year. However, more 
than 40 provincial or ministerial level government officials were arrested during 
year 2013 and 2014 (Zhang, 2018). In addition, the unwritten rule that Politburo 
Standing Committee (PSC) members are immune to criminal allegations (in Chinese: 
xin bu shang chang wei) no longer holds as Zhou Yongkang (PSC members), Xu 
Caihou and Guo Boxiong (top level military leaders) were all arrested and sentenced 
to prison. 
The anti-corruption campaign creates a great amount of interest in studying 
corruption related topics as it provides a good setting and is a good example of an 
exogenous shock. Lin et al. (2016) argue that the launch of the anti-corruption 
campaign was not expected because the Eight Point Policy, which signals the start 
of the anti-corruption campaign in China, was announced 19 days after President Xi 
Jinping took office. This is unusual because the time when the Eight Point Policy 
was announced was prior to the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, when 
major policies are usually disclosed. In addition, Lin et al. (2016) document a 
significant increase in the online attention of anti-corruption on the date when the 
Eight Point Policy was promulgated. 
Out study uses the number of bribe-taking managers to measure the level of 
corruption of an SOE. Thus, the validity of our empirical results depends on the 
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effectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign led by the CCDI. Lin et al. (2016) 
report that the anti-corruption campaign restricts the use of entertainment and travel 
costs (ETCs) as self-dealing by top managers of listed SOEs. This leads to an 
increase in the market value of listed SOEs. Pan and Tian (2017) document that the 
investment efficiency of SOEs increased after the launch of the anti-corruption 
campaign. Ke, Liu and Tang (2017) find that the anti-corruption campaign has led to 
a sharp decrease in the consumption of luxury goods and services by SOEs. Cao, 
Wang and Zhou (2018) find that the inspection of the CCDI resulted in an increased 
propensity for firms to suppress bad news. Zhang (2018) argues that the 
anti-corruption campaign in China has improved the overall environment of 
corporate governance and he finds that firms are less likely to commit fraud in the 
post-campaign period. Shu and Cai (2017) report a dramatic decrease in the market 
value of high-end Baijiu companies4. The above empirical evidence indicates that 
the anti-corruption campaign led by the CCDI under President Xi Jinping is not 
merely a slogan but constitutes an effective effort in combating corruption in China. 
4.2.2 State-Owned Enterprises in China 
Since 1978, China has been going through a dramatic economic reform aiming 
at changing its planned economy to a market economy. At the centerpiece of the 
reform is the decentralization of the macro-economy, liberation of the market and 
privatization of SOEs. Before 1978, SOEs dominated China’s economy in almost 
                                                                 
4
 Baijiu is a popular luxury grain liquor used in political networking in China. 
 114 
every aspect. In China, SOEs accounted for about 80% of total industrial output in 
1978 (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998). SOEs were also fully owned and controlled by the 
Chinese government at that time. All material needed for production was allocated 
by the government, and SOEs were financed directly by the government or through 
state-owned banks (Zhong, 2014). Moreover, output, that is what to produce and 
how much to produce, is also controlled by the government. In other words, 
managers of SOEs have almost no autonomy at all. The performance of SOEs is 
disappointing, however, as more than 40% of SOEs were losing money prior to the 
reform (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998). 
Unlike the majority of transitional economies in eastern Europe, China was 
reluctant to privatize its SOEs at the beginning of its economic reform. SOEs’ 
disappointing performance is attributed to the lack of managers’ autonomy and 
appropriately designed incentive plans. Thus, increasing SOE managers’ autonomy 
in decision making and introducing financial incentives is the focus of early-stage 
SOE reform (Wang, Xu and Zhu, 2004). The increase in SOE managers’ autonomy 
however creates an agency problem where those managers might use the assets and 
resources of SOEs for their own interests. In order to solve the issue and align the 
interest of SOE managers with SOEs’, performance-based contracts (PCs) are 
introduced. Although the efficiency and performance of SOEs are improved, these 
reforms have their own limitations and are far from success. Shirley and Xu (2001) 
report that PCs improve the productivity of around half of SOEs that sign these 
 115 
contracts with managers. However, because most PCs are not appropriately designed, 
the total efficiency and performance was not significantly improved and in some 
SOEs they even deteriorated. In other words, PCs fail to mitigate the agency 
problem between SOE managers and SOEs. 
In order to further improve the operating performance of SOEs and to help 
them raise capital, the Chinese government opened the stock market and has been 
selling part of the shares of SOEs since the 1990s. This is called partial privatization 
because the Chinese government is usually still the largest shareholder of listed 
SOEs. The idea behind partial privatization is that by introducing private and 
institutional owners, SOEs will become more diffusely held and closer to modern 
corporations. The listing of SOEs, however, exacerbates the agency problem by 
further increasing managerial autonomy. This is because although the Chinese 
government is still the controlling shareholder (the largest shareholder and usually 
holds more than 50% of SOEs shares), it no longer fully owns SOEs and thus has no 
full control of it. Moreover, the weak institutions and poor corporate governance in 
China make it difficult for minority shareholders to monitor managers’ behaviour 
(Bai, et al. 2004). Conyon and He (2011) find that executive compensation and CEO 
incentives are both lower in SOEs than in private owned firms in China. In addition, 
managers of poorly performed SOEs are less likely to be replaced than managers of 
poorly performing private firms. Hou and Moore (2010) report that SOEs that 
commit fraud are less likely to be punished by regulators than private 
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fraud-committing firms. Berkman, Cole and Fu (2014) document that the transfer of 
state ownership to private ownership of Chinese SOEs is associated with an increase 
in market value and CEO turnover. These findings indicate that the agency problem 
is a serious issue of SOEs after their partial privatization. 
The monopolistic power of SOEs, especially of those in strategically important 
sectors (i.e. financial and banking industry, energy industry and utility industry), is 
the source of corruption of SOE managers as it creates huge rents that SOE 
managers can exploit. However, before reform, SOE managers had almost no 
autonomy over the operations of SOEs; they did not have the chance to take 
advantage of SOEs’ monopolistic power. The economic reform since 1978, by 
increasing SOE managers’ autonomy and selling shares of SOEs to other 
shareholders, has weakened the Chinese government’s control over SOEs. Therefore, 
it has created opportunities for SOE managers to utilize their power to benefit 
themselves. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) report that politically connected managers 
of partially privatized SOEs tend to appoint other government officials as board 
members and post-IPO performance of these SOEs are inferior to those with 
managers who are not politically connected. Lin et al. (2016) find that ETCs of 
SOEs are normally used for managers’ perks and self-dealing. Although SOEs in 
China are more efficient and profitable after partial privatization, the associated 
increase in power and autonomy of their managers has create a new problem for 
them -- managerial corruption. 
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4.2.3 A Typical Bribe-taking Case of SOE Managers in China 
Traditional studies on corruption often view firms as bribe-payers who bribe 
government officials in order to obtain government produced goods and services and 
political favour (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The political theory of corruption 
argues that the ultimate source of corruption is power, which creates rents for 
political advantaged groups to exploit (Bliss and Tella, 1997). SOEs have long been 
a powerful and influential force in China. Although since its 1978 economic reform, 
China has claimed to transform its planned economy to a market economy; the 
Chinese government still maintains control over and shows strong will in continuing 
controlling its economy in many aspects. SOEs are one of the tools through which 
the Chinese government controls its economy. Thus, SOEs and SOE managers are 
usually viewed as representatives of governments. This provides SOE managers 
with power, even if they do not have any political background, as people might think 
the decisions they make represent the will of government. Moreover, SOE managers 
also have control, at least part control, over assets of SOEs. This leads to rent 
seeking behaviour where SOE managers use the assets of SOEs to benefit 
themselves. 
How SOE managers use their power and extract rents from their position can 
be illustrated by the following case: Yang Kun was the Vice President of the 
Agricultural Bank of China during 2009 to 2012. He is accused of taking bribes 
worth over 30 million RMB during 2005 to 2012, a period when he worked at the 
 118 
bank. The largest bribe he took was from Li Songxiao, who used to be the Chairman 
of the Board of the Zhongxin Group, a firm listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (it is renamed as Shanghai Industrial Urban Development Group in 2010). 
In 2005, due to lawsuits, no bank was willing to grant loans to the Zhongxin Group. 
Li then approached Yang to seek his help. In the same year, Yang helped the 
Zhongxin Group solve problems related to its loans from other banks. In 2007, Li 
sold 9 million shares of the Zhongxin Group to Chen Fucheng, who is the younger 
brother of Yang’s wife, for half of the market price. However, the trade of Zhongxin 
Group’s stock was suspended in 2008 because the Hong Kong Independent 
Commission against Corruption suspected that the Zhongxin Group had violated the 
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Li then gave 10 million RMB to Chen 
to compensate for the drop in share value.  
In addition to this, Yang is also accused of taking bribes worth 4.18 million 
RMB from the President of the Guohua Group Wang Yaohui and providing 1.43 
billion RMB loans to Guohua Group’s real estate project named Blue Harbor. Yu 
Peidi, the director of Greattown Holding Ltd., also gave Yang a set of wooden 
furniture worth 400 thousand RMB and 1 million USD in cash in order to obtain his 
support and get loans from the Agricultural Bank of China for the firm’s project in 
Jiangsu province. 
<Insert Figure 4.1 Here> 
From this typical corruption case, it can be seen that both the assets and 
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political influence of SOEs are used by SOE managers in generating bribery income. 
Yang took advantage of his position as the Vice President of the Agricultural Bank 
of China to provide loans worth 1.43 billion RMB to Guohua Group, and in return, 
he received around 4 million RMB. He also used the political influence of the 
Agricultural Bank of China and his position as the Vice President of the bank in 
providing benefits to others (i.e. help Zhongxin Group solve loan problems and 
provide supports to Greattown Holding Ltd for its project in Jiangsu province). In 
exchange, he took bribes from Li and Yu. The Yang case illustrates the typical 
features of SOE managerial corruption. 
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Large Shareholders and Monitoring of Firm Managers 
Agency theory argues that the goals and objectives of shareholders and firm 
managers, who are not owners of the firm, can be very different. The primary goal of 
shareholders are often profit maximization; while managers often care more about 
themselves instead of their principals (i.e. shareholders). The conflict of interest 
between shareholders and firm managers therefore suggests that firm managers need 
to be properly monitored in order to prevent them from pursuing their own goals at 
the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, the monitoring of firm managers is a public good. That is, the 
benefits of improvements in monitoring firm managers are shared pro rata among all 
shareholders. However, cost incurred in oversight are not shared but has to be 
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privately absorbed. When a firm is fully owned by only one shareholder, the owner 
enjoys all the product of his/her efforts in monitoring managers. However, as the 
number of shareholders increases, partial owners who fulfill the role of monitoring 
firm managers tend to underinvest in monitoring managerial malfeasance because 
they bears all the costs but has to share the product of its vigilance with other 
shareholders (Huddart, 1993). In extreme cases, there can even be no shareholders 
who are willing to spend resources in monitoring managers (Jensen, 1989). 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that managers will be properly monitored without 
the establishment of an appropriate corporate governance system. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that legal institutions and concentrated 
ownership are two main corporate governance systems that allow shareholders to 
obtain effective control over managers and reduce agency costs. However, the 
effectiveness of legal institutions depends heavily on court enforcement, which 
varies greatly from country to country. Courts of the U.S. and Canada are believed to 
be quite tough on managers and they impose strict legal rules that restrict 
self-dealing of firm managers. The duty of loyalty of managers to shareholders is 
accepted in most courts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries but their will and capability in interfering in 
business is weaker. For example, Tunc (1991) finds that courts permit managers to 
personally profit from business opportunities that are offered to the firms they work 
at. Outside OECD countries, the legal protection of shareholders is generally even 
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weaker (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, shareholders’ legal rights often 
cannot be exercised cheaply and easily. For example, in many countries, 
shareholders are not allowed to vote by mail but are required to attend shareholder 
meetings. This, in reality, prevents many small shareholders from using their voting 
rights.  
When legal institutions fail to properly protect shareholders and help them 
mitigate agency problems, they have to rely on concentrated ownership as an 
alternative way to enhance corporate governance. In other words, small shareholders 
need to become larger to obtain effective control over managers. The biggest 
problem of diffusely owned firms is that there are no shareholders whose interests 
are aligned with firms to the extent that they are willing to absorb all costs incurred 
in monitoring firm managers. This is referred to as the free-rider problem (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Large shareholders of firms with relative concentrated ownership, 
however, are both motivated and are capable to monitor and put pressure on 
managers. Due to the substantial amount of shares they have, large shareholders 
have huge stakes in firms and thereby enjoy a significant share of their product in 
monitoring managers. Concentrated ownership also makes it easier to achieve 
concerted actions of shareholders against the malfeasance of managers. Their voting 
rights granted by the shares they have allow them to put pressure on managers and 
mitigate agency problems. In extreme cases, they might even replace managers 
through proxy fights or take over to ensure their interests are respected (Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1986). 
La Porta et al. (1999) report that with the exception of a few countries with 
strong and effective legal protection of investors, large firms in most countries are 
not diffusely held but controlled by families and government. Even in the U.S., 
which is one of the countries with the most sound and effective legal protection of 
shareholders, concentrated ownership and large shareholders or even majority 
shareholders (have 51% shares or more) are not uncommon (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). They argue that being a minority 
shareholder can be costly, especially in countries that offer weak legal protection, as 
minority shareholders are vulnerable to expropriation.  
The monitoring role of large shareholders has been affirmed by many empirical 
studies. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find that firms with a higher proportion of 
institutional ownership (institutions are block holders) gain higher stock returns 
when proposing anti- takeover charter amendments. This finding indicates that 
investors expecting large shareholders play an active role in monitoring managers 
and will vote consistently in accordance with their interests. Yafeh and Yosha (2003) 
document that firms with higher ownership concentration spend less resources on 
activities that provide managers with private benefits. Chung, Firth and Kim (2002) 
find that firms with large institutional shareholdings are more likely to prohibit 
managers from changing reported profits towards the managers’ desired range of 
profits. Andres (2008) finds that firms with founding-families as large shareholders 
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perform better than diffusely-held firms.  
4.3.2 Government as Large Shareholders 
Existing studies mainly focus on two types of large shareholders, namely 
institutional investors and families. Governments as large shareholders of firms and 
their effectiveness in monitoring managers is not widely studied and discussed. Part 
of the reason is that SOEs are believed to be rare and will ultimately cease to exist 
(Spicer, McDermott and Kogut, 2000). However, this argument is unfounded. It is 
estimated that SOEs account for about one fifth of the global equity market value 
and contribute to around 10% of global gross domestic product (GDP) (Bruton, et al., 
2015). Many SOEs are significantly different from what they were decades ago 
when the government obtained full ownership. As a result of the global wave of 
privatization since the 1980s, modern SOEs are often a combination of state 
ownership and private ownership with government remaining as the largest 
shareholder. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in their analysis of 
large shareholders as effective monitors of firm managers make two assumptions: a) 
large shareholders are profit-oriented and therefore are economically motivated to 
monitor managers and b) large shareholders have significant cash flow rights so that 
they will benefit economically from improved monitoring of firm managers. These 
assumptions often held for large shareholders discussed in existing literature. 
However, these assumptions might not hold when the identity of large shareholders 
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is government organizations. 
Firstly, generating profits is often not the main objective and responsibility of 
government organizations that own substantial shares of SOEs. As a result, it is not 
clear whether government organizations have enough incentive in spending 
resources on monitoring firm managers in order to reduce agency costs. The main 
purpose of governments establishing SOEs is to cure market failure or imperfection 
(Shleifer, 1998). For example, Tierney (1988) argues that postal services are often 
provided by governments because governments can require mail to be delivered to 
remote regions where private postal services providers often find it unprofitable. 
Therefore, even benevolent governments, who are dedicated to providing goods and 
services with good quality to their citizens, might not be very motivated in 
monitoring firm managers because achieving economic efficiency (i.e. minimizing 
costs and maximizing income) is not their primary goal. Moreover, most 
governments in reality are not benevolent enough and they often use their control 
over SOEs as a way to channel benefits to their political supporters in order to 
secure their current positions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The lack of economic 
incentive of government in maximizing profits makes it questionable that they spend 
enough time and efforts in monitoring firm managers. 
Government officials who are responsible for monitoring managers of SOEs 
have little or no cash flow rights of the SOEs. This severely weakens their 
motivation in fulfilling their responsibilities with due diligence. Shleifer and 
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Vishny’s (1986) argument that large shareholders benefit more from improved 
monitoring of firm managers because they have more stakes in the firm. This 
argument is based on the assumption that the proportion of ownership large 
shareholders have is positively correlated with their claims on the cash flow of the 
firm. However, in terms of SOEs, it is not always the case. Although state shares are 
owned by government organizations which have claims on the cash flow of SOEs 
owned by them, the de facto controllers of SOEs are officials of government 
organizations. It is these government officials that are responsible for taking care of 
SOEs, including monitoring managers. However, in most cases, they have little or 
no claims on the product of their vigilance, at least economically, because state 
owned shares are not their personal assets. This arguably makes them even less 
motivated than private small shareholders in monitoring managers. 
Claessens and Fan (2002) further point out that government officials who are 
responsible for monitoring SOE managers are in fact also agents instead of 
principals of SOEs. SOEs, at least the part owned by government, are public assets 
whose ultimate owners are citizens of the entire country. However, citizenry is too 
diffused to impose any material impacts on SOE managers. Therefore, they need 
agents (i.e. government officials) in SOEs to represent their interests and fulfil the 
responsibility of monitoring managers. That is, government officials, one of the de 
facto monitors of SOE managers, are agents instead of principals. Therefore, there is 
also a potential agency problem that government officials do not act in the best 
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interests of government organizations and fail to properly monitor managers.  
Existing studies on the monitoring effect of large shareholders offer no clear 
answer to the question of whether when large shareholders are government 
organizations, they will become as effective as other large shareholders in 
monitoring firm managers. We intend to shed light on the issue by examining the 
effect of government organizations in monitoring the bribery of SOE managers. 
4.4 Data 
Our sample consists of listed SOEs in China during the years 2013-2017. We 
define SOEs as any firm whose largest shareholder is a government organization. 
We identify bribe-taking managers of SOEs with the help of the national wide 
anti-corruption campaign in China since 2012. Since the anti-corruption campaign, 
the official website of CCDI, which is the top anti-corruption institution in China, 
discloses information regarding corruption cases they have identified during their 
inspections in government organizations, SOEs and public universities. This is our 
main source for identifying bribe-taking managers of SOEs. The information 
disclosed is quite brief and only includes their names, the SOEs they work at, and 
the date they are arrested. In most cases, what party sanctions these SOE managers 
received are also disclosed on the website.  
We are aware that relying on a single source for identifying bribe-taking 
managers of SOEs run the risk of omitting bribery cases. We supplement our search 
for bribe-taking managers from web search engines such as Google and Baidu 
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(Baidu is the largest and most widely used web search engine in China), Law 
Yearbook of China and China Judgments Online. The Law Yearbook of China was 
first published in 1987 and updated annually. The manuscripts and materials 
included in the yearbook are provided by the relevant government departments. The 
contents are relative comprehensive, informative, accurate and authoritative. 
However, one limitation of the Law Yearbook of China is that it only includes typical 
cases (one case that is representative to a group of similar cases). The reason is 
because the book is not published for the purpose of recording corruption cases but 
to explain legal rules of China. Corruption cases are only used as examples to 
illustrate related legal rules. Thus, we only use it to supplement our search for 
bribe-taking SOE managers. China Judgments Online is an online platform for 
publishing court judgment documents. It is established  in 2013 by the Supreme 
People’s Court of China. According to Supreme People's Court's Several Opinions 
on Promoting the Construction of the Three Platforms for Judicial Disclosure, China 
Judgments Online is the platform for publishing court judgment documents of all 
national courts. Judgment documents of courts at all levels should be uploaded to 
China judgment online within 7 days after judgments take effect. However, because 
China Judgement Online only publish judgement documents of courts in China. 
Thus, information of bribe-taking SOEs managers who have not yet been trailed by 
courts will not appear on it. Therefore, we also only use it as a supplement source. In 
total, we identify 132 bribe-taking managers of listed SOEs over the period 
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2013-2017. 
The personal information of bribe-taking SOE managers is mainly collected by 
searching their names on Google and Baidu search engines. We are aware of the 
potential risk that the information we collect online is not authoritative and might 
contain mistakes. So, we often cross check with several sources and try our best to 
obtain information from more reliable sources such as Sina, Sohu, Netease, Tencent 
(these are the four most used news websites in China) and the New York Times. The 
personal information we are able to collect from these sources mainly includes SOE 
managers’ ages, career paths, and education backgrounds. The financial data of 
listed SOEs is collected from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) Data Base. Other macro data such as GDP per capita, and GDP growth of 
each province are collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. 
We admit that not being convicted of taking bribes does not mean that the 
manager takes no bribes at all. It can also be the case that the manager takes bribes 
but does not get caught. In fact, we are not claiming that SOE managers who are not 
convicted for taking bribes do not take any bribes. Our analysis is based on the 
assumption that the majority of SOE managers who are not convicted for taking 
bribes over our sample period took less bribes than those SOEs who are convicted 
for taking bribes. We believe this is a reasonable assumption. 
There are two reasons why our sample period starts in 2013 and ends in 2017. 
First, our study is based on the anti-corruption campaign in China, which started on 
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Dec 4th, 2012 as signaled by the promulgation of the Eight Point Policy (Lin et al., 
2016). The CCDI officially started to dispatch inspection teams to different 
provinces and government organizations to investigate corruption issues in 2013. 
Therefore, 2013 was the first year that bribe-taking SOE managers’ names appeared 
on the official website of the CCDI. Thus, it is the earliest year that we can collect 
data from our main data source.  
Secondly, during the years 2013-2016, the CCDI organized ten rounds of 
inspections and 125 inspection teams were dispatched to different provinces and 
organizations to investigate corruption. The focus of these ten inspection rounds was 
on each level of the government departments (central, national, provincial and city 
level) and on SOEs. In 2017, the CCDI organized another round of inspections, 
mainly focusing on 29 public universities directly under the control of central 
government. Unlike the previous ten rounds of inspection, no SOE appeared on the 
lists of organizations to be investigated. This might signal that the CCDI believes 
that after four years of intensive inspections, the majority of SOEs, if not all, had 
been investigated and most corruption cases of SOEs had been identified. Thus, 
although data availability is the main reason why our data only covers 2013-2017, it 
is reasonable to assume that our data covers the most serious bribe-taking cases 
identified by the CCDI during the anti-corruption campaign in China. 
Our data are cross-sectional data instead of panel data for two reasons. First of 
all, an SOE could have managers convicted of taking bribes in different years during 
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our sample period. For example, Fang Xingguo, the former deputy general manager 
of Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd., was arrested in 2014 because of being accused of 
taking bribes. However, two years (2016) later another deputy general manager, Tan 
Dinghua, was also accused of taking bribes and was arrested by inspection teams. If 
we treat our data as panel data, Kweichow Moutai has one bribe-taking manager in 
2014, no bribe-taking manager in 2015 and one bribe-taking manager in 2016. 
However, if we treat our data as cross-sectional data, each firm has only one 
observation over the entire sample period. In terms of Kweichow Moutai, it has two 
bribe-taking managers in total. We believe cross-sectional data is more reasonable 
because the CCDI might need more than one round of inspection to identify all 
bribe-taking managers of an SOE. 
Secondly and more importantly, bribe-taking SOE managers are often accused 
of taking bribes over a multi-year period prior to the year they were arrested. For 
example, Zheng Baiping, the former general manager of Hunan Valin Steel Co., Ltd., 
was accused of taking bribes worth 6.24 million RMB over the period 2004 to 2010. 
However, he was arrested in 2014. Given that the year when these SOE managers 
are arrested is often not the year the bribery takes place, it is more reasonable to treat 
our data as cross-sectional data. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1. We did a 99% winsorization on 
return on assets, total assets, cash holding, leverage in order to mitigate the negative 
impacts of outliers on the validity of our regression results. Correlation matrix is 
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presented in Table 4.2. Surprisingly, we fail to find a statistically significant 
relationship between bribery of SOE managers, which is measured using the 
proportion of bribe-taking managers, and our main variables of interests (state 
ownership and legal institutions). However, the correlation matrix indicates that 
SOEs with larger size, more cash and more dispersed ownership structure tend to 
have higher proportion of bribe-taking managers. In terms of correlation between 
our variables of interest and control variables, we find that SOEs that have higher 
ROA, that hold more cash, that have listed for longer period and that have high 
ownership concentration tend to have more state ownership. We believe these results 
are reasonable. For example, government is more likely to maintain their control 
over profitable SOEs, therefore it is expected that SOEs with higher ROA have more 
state ownership. The correlation matrix also shows that provinces with better 
market-supporting institutions have higher GDP per capita but lower GDP growth. 
Government is also less corrupted in provinces with better market-supporting 
institutions. 
<Insert Table 4.1 Here> 
<Insert Table 4.2 Here> 
4.5 Hypothesis Development 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders often play an active 
role in monitoring firm managers to protect their interests because of the huge stakes 
they have in firms. The more shares large shareholders have, the more incentive they 
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are in monitoring firm managers because they have more claims on the product of 
their vigilance. This argument is affirmed by empirical studies that examine the 
effectiveness of large shareholders in monitoring firm managers (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1990; Maug, 1998; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002; Yafeh and Yosha, 
2003). However, large shareholders in these studies are either institutional investors 
or family owners. The effectiveness of government as large shareholders in 
monitoring firm managers is not widely discussed in the literature. 
On the one hand, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997), substantial 
shares owned by government organizations align interests of government 
organizations with that of SOEs. Therefore, like other large shareholders, 
government organizations actively monitor SOE managers to protect their interests 
from being hurt. On the other hand, government differs from other large 
shareholders in that it is not always profit-oriented. One of the reasons why 
shareholders care about agency problems is that self- interested actions of firm 
managers might increase costs of shareholders (agency costs) therefore reducing 
their expected return. In other words, profit-oriented shareholders are motivated to 
monitor firm managers because they expect they will benefit economically from it. 
However, the primary objective of government is to solve market imperfection and 
economic efficiency is often not its priority. Thus, government might not care that 
much about the self-dealing of firm managers and might under- invest in monitoring 
them. Furthermore, the de facto monitor of SOE managers on behalf of government 
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organizations are government officials who have little or no cash flow rights in 
SOEs. In fact, government officials who are responsible for monitoring SOE 
managers are also agents and there is no guarantee that government officials will act 
in ways that meet the best interests of their principals (all citizens of a country). 
These arguments suggest that government organizations might be poor monitors of 
managers. 
Based on the above discussion, we develop the following competing 
hypotheses: 
H1a: Listed SOEs with a higher proportion of state ownership have fewer 
bribe-taking managers. 
H1b: Listed SOEs with a higher proportion of state ownership have more 
bribe-taking managers. 
Besides large shareholders, legal institutions that protect investors from being 
expropriated is another important corporate governance mechanism that allows 
shareholders to monitor firm managers. The contract view of firm argues that 
shareholders engage managers to help them manage the firm on their behalf through 
contracting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, contracts that shareholders sign 
with managers are often incomplete. That is, it is impossible for shareholders to 
restrict all possible value-destroying actions that managers might take in the intial 
contracts. Shareholders could exercise their legal rights to protect their interests 
from being hurt by managerial self-dealing. For example, they can vote on corporate 
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policies and firm strategies to ensure that these corporate matters represent their best 
interests. However, these legal rights cannot be exercise without any costs. 
The desire and capability of courts in protecting shareholders from being 
expropriated by firm managers partly determines how well the legal rights of 
shareholders can be protected and exercised. In countries where shareholders are 
provided with strong protection against self-dealing of managers (e.g. U.S., Canada 
and U.K.), managers will become less inclined to make decisions that hurt the 
interests of shareholders. Thus, even small shareholders will find it relatively easy to 
put monitoring pressure on managers. Empirically, it is found that sound and 
effective legal institutions are associated with better corporate governance and less 
self-dealing of managers (Johnson, et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; La Porta et 
al., 2000, 2002; Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2005). Therefore, our second 
hypothesis is: 
H2: Listed SOEs located in provinces with better market-supporting institutions 
have fewer bribe-taking managers. 
Large shareholders have to bear costs in monitoring firm managers. In addtion, 
due to their large stake in the firm, large shareholders are exposed to higher 
idiosyncratic risks of the firm (Huddart, 1993). Therefore, it is puzzling why some 
people choose to become large shareholders when small shareholders enjoy the same 
rate of return, bear no monitoring costs and are able to diversify their investments. 
One explanation is that legal institutions are too weak to allow firm managers 
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being effectively monitored by shareholders who have no significant control over 
the firm. In order to obtain effective control over firms and put pressure on 
management teams, small shareholders have to become larger. This argument is 
consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer’s 
(1999) finding that firm ownership tends to be more concentrated in countries 
lacking effective legal protection of investors. In other words, legal institutions and 
large shareholders supplement each other in monitoring firm managers. Coombes 
and Waston (2000) find that institutional investors pay a higher premium for the 
shares of firms located in countries with weak legal institutions. Chen, Chen and 
Wei (2009) find that the negative effect of firm-level corporate governance 
mechanism on the cost of equity is more pronounced when country- level corporate 
governance is weak. These findings suggest that when shareholders are not well 
protected by legal institutions, they have to rely more on large shareholders in 
monitoring firm managers.  
Another argument why large shareholders tend to become more effective in 
monitoring firm managers when institutions are weak is because their exit costs are 
higher. Sound and effective institutions promote financial development by ensuring 
investors that their investment return will finally come back to them (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998). Therefore, stock markets tend to be more active and liquid in countries 
with more protective environments (Brockman and Chung, 2003; Chung, 2006). 
Increased liquidity makes it easier for large shareholders to sell their stock with less 
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costs. Thus, their incentive in spending resources on monitoring firm managers 
might be reduced by the improved liquidity (Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998). In 
other words, poor liquidity as a result of weak institutions increases large 
shareholders’ commitment in monitoring firm managers. 
Based on these two arguments we propose our third hypothesis: 
H3: Monitoring the effect of large shareholders is more pronounced when 
market-supporting institutions are weak. 
4.6 Empirical Results 
4.6.1 State Ownership and Bribery of SOE Managers 
In order to test the competing hypothesis on the monitoring effect of 
government organizations on SOE managers, we run the following ordinary least 











where bribery denotes the proportion of managers who are convicted of taking 
bribes. This is calculated as the number of bribe-taking managers of an SOE divided 
by the total number of managers of that SOE. The independent variable state 
ownership is the proportion of shares owned by government organizations. 
Control variables are incorporated in order to account for firm and provincial 
characteristics. Total assets, leverage, age (the number of years since listing on stock 
market), return on assets, the amount of cash retained by the SOEs are used as 
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control variables to account for firm characteristics. In addition, we also control for 
governance characteristics, namely board independence and affiliation to 
government. Board independence is calculated as the percentage of independent 
board members. Affiliation to government is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
SOE is owned by central government and 0 if the SOE is owned by local 
government.  
Our control variables that account for provincial characteristics includes GDP 
per capita, GDP growth and level of corruption of the provinces where listed SOEs’ 
headquarters are located. The level of corruption is measured by the number of local 
government officials being arrested during our sample period. Our regressions also 
include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at provincial level. 
Table 4.3 reports the empirical results for our baseline model. In columns 1 and 
2, we do not include industry fixed effect, and standard errors are not clustered. The 
coefficient of state ownership is statistically significant and negative. It indicates 
that SOEs with more state ownership tend to have lower proportion of bribe-taking 
managers. 
In column 4, we add industry fixed effect and cluster standard error at 
provincial level. Industry fixed effect are added in order to address the issue that 
unobserved time- invariant factors simultaneously affect bribery of SOE managers 
and the proportion of state ownership. Clustering of standard errors at provincial 
level is to address issue that SOEs located in the same province are more similar to 
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each other than to other SOEs. Results in column 4 are consistent with that of 
columns 1, 2 and 3. 
<Insert Table 4.3 Here> 
Our finding that the proportion of state ownership is negatively correlated with 
the proportion of bribe-taking SOE managers has two implications. Firstly, because 
our sample are listed SOEs whose largest shareholder is government organizations, 
state ownership is the shares owned by the largest shareholder of SOEs. Therefore, 
the negative and significant coefficient of state ownership indicates that the 
existence of large shareholders is associated with fewer numbers of bribe-taking 
managers. This finding is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) argument that 
large shareholders have the incentive and ability to monitor firm managers. In 
addition, the negative relation between state ownership and  the proportion of 
bribe-taking managers also suggests that the incentive and ability of large 
shareholders in monitoring managers increases with the shares they have. 
However, our results cannot be interpreted as evidence that state ownership 
improves the overall corporate governance of SOEs. Firstly, we do not include firms 
without state ownership and diffusely held firm; therefore, we are not ab le to 
compare the monitoring effect of government organizations and the monitoring 
effect of other types of large shareholders such as institutional investors, foreign 
investors and individual investors. Secondly, the agency problem of firm managers 
is only part of the corporate governance story. Concentrated ownership as a 
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corporate governance mechanism has its own costs as large shareholders can 
expropriate other investors (La Porta et al., 1997). However, this is not the focus of 
this study. What we find here is that when large shareholders are government 
organizations, like other large shareholders, they also play a role in monitoring firm 
managers. 
4.6.2 Market Supporting-Institutions and Bribery of SOE Managers 
To test our second hypothesis that better institutions help deter managerial 












where the independent variable quality of institutionsi denotes the quality of 
market-supporting institutions of provinces where SOEs’ headquarters are located. 
We collected this data from Fan, Wang and Zhang (2011). We used three indices 
constructed by Fan, Wang and Zhang (2011) as our proxy for the quality of 
institutions of each province in China. Their indices are widely used by studies that 
relate to the financial markets of China (e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Fan, Wang and Zhang, 
2007; Berkowitz, Lin and Ma, 2015). 
The three indices we use in this study are overall marketization index, legal 
protection of producer index and financial marketization index. The overall 
marketization index measures the quality of overall market-supporting institutions in 
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China. The Producer Protection Index is constructed based on a survey of firms’ 
evaluation of local government’s legal enforcement and a court’s judicial 
independence. Financial marketization index measures the intensity of competition 
in the financial market and the extent to which government intervenes in the 
allocation of financial resources among firms. 
OLS regression results are shown in Tables 4.4 and Table 4.5. In Table 4.4, we 
only control for firm and governance characteristics. In Table 4.5, we also control 
for provincial characteristics. It can be seen from Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 that not all 
three indices are statistically significant and negative. Specifically, our results 
suggest that the intensity of competition in financial market and government 
intervention in allocation financial resources in one province might not have effect s 
on the bribery of SOEs. However, the overall marketization progression and how 
well firms are protected by law matter. Overall, the negative relationship between 
the quality of market-supporting institutions and the proportion of bribe-taking 
managers support our second hypothesis and is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s 
(1997) argument that poor institutions weaken the ability of shareholders to monitor 
firm managers. 
<Insert Table 4.4 Here> 
<Insert Table 4.5 Here> 
4.6.3 Interaction Between State Ownership and Quality of Institutions 
In the previous two sections, we find that both large shareholders and the 
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quality of market-supporting institutions work at monitoring firm managers by 
preventing them from engaging in bribery. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the 
ability of shareholders to monitor management teams depends on how well their 
rights are protected by laws. In countries with poor institutions, it is not easy for 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to monitor managers and punish 
managers with inappropriate behaviour. However, large shareholders, who own a 
significant number of shares can mitigate agency problems because they have 
enough voting rights to put pressure on management teams or even oust 
management teams through proxy fights or takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
terms of our study, in provinces where market-supporting institutions are weak, it 
might be difficult for minority shareholders to monitor managers of listed SOEs. In 
other words, corporate governance relies more on large shareholders. Thus, the 
monitoring effect of large shareholders is predicted to be more prominent in 
provinces with weak market-supporting institutions. We run the following OLS 
regression on the cross-sectional sample of listed SOEs to explore how the 













where SOi is the proportion of state ownership of a listed SOE and QIi is the quality 
of institutions of the province where the SOEs’ headquarters are located. Our 
variable of interest is the interaction term SO i
*
QIi. Control variables, fixed effects 
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and standard error clustering is the same as previous OLS regressions.  
Table 4.6 presents regression results. The coefficient of interaction term is 
statistically significant and positive. Because the overall effect of government on the 
bribery of SOE managers is affected by the coefficient of state ownership and the 
coefficient of the interaction term (β1+β3×QIi), the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term indicates that the monitoring effect of government organizations is 
more prominent in provinces with weak institutions. For example, regression results 
in columns 4 of table 4.6 show that a 1 unit decrease in the overall marketization 
index leads to a 0.159 unit increase in the overall coefficient of state ownership. This 
finding is consistent with that of La Portas et al. (1999) in that large shareholders 
and institutions complement each other as corporate governance mechanism. 
<Insert Table 4.6 Here> 
4.7 Robust Tests 
4.7.1 Using Corruption as Dummy Variable 
One disadvantage of using a continuous variable as our dependent variable (the 
number of bribe-taking managers) is that more weight is put on SOEs with large 
number of bribe-taking managers. This potentially makes our results biased as they 
might be driven by several large values in the dependent variable. As a robust check, 
we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a SOE has at least one 
bribe-taking manager and take the value of zero if the SOE has no bribe-taking 
managers as our dependent variable. We follow studies in corporate fraud by 
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running probit model to test our hypotheses (we also use logit model and the results 
are consistent with probit model). 
Regression results are presented in Table 4.7. In the first column of Table 4.7, 
we only include state ownership as our variable of interest. In the second column of 
Table 4.7, we only include overall marketization index as our variable of interest. In 
the last column of table 4.7, we include both variables and also the interaction term. 
The results are consistent with that of the OLS regression in previous sections. For 
example, the positive sign of the interaction term suggests that the effect of 
government in deterring managers’ bribe-taking activities is more pronounced in 
provinces with weak market-supporting institutions. 
<Insert Table 4.7 Here> 
4.7.2 Bivariate Probit Model 
One concern of our study is that the bribery of SOE managers is not observed 
until it is discovered. Specifically, the observed bribe-taking SOE managers is the 
result of two events: (1) the manager takes the bribe and (2) the bribe-taking 
activities of the manager has been detected by regulators. Thus, how likely the 
bribery of SOE managers will be detected could affect the validity of our results. For 
example, if the bribery of managers of certain type of SOEs is very difficult for 
regulators to detect, then our results will become biased. This issue is called partial 
observability. 
In order to mitigate partial observability, we follow Wang, Winton and Yu 
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(2010) and Chen et al. (2006) by using a bivariate probit model. For each firm in our 
sample, we denote Ci
* as the probability that managers of an SOE will be involved 
in bribery. We also denote Di
* as the probability that bribery of SOE managers will 
be detected. We then have the following reduced form models: 
iiCi X   ,
*
iC  
iiDii XD   ,
*  
where XC,i is a vector that includes factors that affect the possibility that SOE 
managers will engage in bribery, and XD,i is a vector that includes factors which lead 
to the detection of the bribery of SOE managers. Both C i
* and Di
* are dummy 
variables. Ci
* equals 1 if managers of an SOE takes bribe and equals 0 otherwise. Di
* 
equals 1 if bribery is detected and equals 0 otherwise. However, we are not able to 
directly observe Ci
* and Di
*. Instead, we only observe Zi which is the product of Ci
* 
and Di
*. In other words, Zi equals 1 if managers of an SOE take bribes and bribery is 
detected by regulators; otherwise, Zi equals 0. 
)1()1( **  iii DCPZP  
)0()0( **  iii DCPZP
 









Where ρ is the correlation between μi and εi. Maximum-likelihood method could be 
used to estimate the model, and conditions for parameter identifications are: (1) C i
* 
and Di
* do not have exactly the same variables and (2) independent variables have 
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enough variation in the sample (Wang, Winton and Yu, 2010).  
Table 4.8 presents regression results for bivariate probit model. In the first 
column we do not include the quality of institutions as an explanatory variable, and 
in the second column, we do not include state ownership as an explanatory variable. 
In the third column, we include both state ownership, the overall marketization 
index and their interaction term as explanatory variables. The first half of Table 4.8 
(corruption committing model) shows that regression results are consistent with the 
results we get in OLS and probit regressions in previous sections.  
<Insert Table 4.8 Here> 
However, one limitation of using the bivariate probit model is that we do not 
have the theory that helps us identify all factors that affect the probability that the 
bribery of SOE managers will be detected. Factors that we believe will affect the 
probability of bribery being detected includes firm characteristics (state ownership, 
leverage, age, size, profitability, cash holdings and affiliation) and province 
characteristics (quality of institutions and number of SOEs). These factors are all 
included as explanatory variables and results are presented in the second half of 
Table 4.8 (corruption detection model). We, however, fail to find any variables that 
are statistically significant across all three regressions. This implies that we might 
omit factors that affect the probability of corruption being detected. Omitting such 
factors might bias our regression results in the first half of the table. Nevertheless, 
we still believe that the bivariate probit model could be used as an appropriate 
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method when partial observability is a potential concern of the event under 
examination. 
4.7.3 Monitoring of Private Larger Shareholders 
One alternative explanation of our baseline model results could be that SOEs 
with a higher proportion of state ownership might have more large shareholders. It is 
other large shareholders instead of government organizations that work at 
monitoring listed SOEs’ managers. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the 
proportion of shares held by any shareholders other than government organizations 
who own more than 5% of shares of the SOE to measure other large shareholders’ 
incentives in monitoring SOE managers. Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 present regression 
results using OLS and probit model, respectively. 
In Table 4.9, the dependent variable is the proportion of bribe-taking managers 
of each listed SOE included in our sample. We find a negative relationship between 
shares owned by other large shareholders and the proportion of bribe-taking 
managers. This finding is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) argument that 
large shareholders are both motivated and capable of monitoring firm managers. 
However, we also find that coefficient of state ownership is still statistically 
significant and negative. In addition, the coefficient of shares owned by other large 
shareholders is much smaller than that of state ownership in absolute value. For 
example, column 6 of Table 4.9 shows that a 10% increase in shares owned by other 
large shareholders is only predicted to decrease the proportion of bribe-taking 
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managers by 0.0086%. This, to some extent, is not economically significant, 
meaning that the monitoring effect of other large holders is relatively weak in 
deterring SOE managers from taking bribes. However, a 10% increase in state 
ownership is predicted to lead to a decrease of 0.33% in the proportion of 
bribe-taking managers of a SOE. The difference in the size of these two coefficients 
indicates that in terms of SOEs, government is more effective in monitoring 
managers than private shareholders in China. 
In Table 4.10, we use a dummy variable which equals 1 if an SOE has 
bribe-taking managers being identified over our sample period and equals 0 
otherwise as a dependent variable. We use the probit model to run the regression. 
The regression results we have in probit regression are consistent with that of OLS 
regression in Table 4.9. Specifically, The positive sign of the coefficient of state 
ownership and shares held by other large shareholders indicate that the existence of 
large shareholders is associated with lower probability that manager will act 
corruptly. This is consistent with our hypothesis that when large shareholders are 
government organizations, they also spend resources on monitoring managers of 
SOEs. 
<Insert Table 4.9 Here> 
<Insert Table 4.10 Here> 
4.7.4 Poisson Regression 
As a robust check, we also use the number of bribe-taking managers of an SOE 
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as our dependent variable. Because these numbers are not continuous, we decided to 
use Poisson model instead of OLS model to run the regression. The regression 
results are reported in Table 4.11. 
<Insert Table 11 Here> 
Our regression results using the number of bribe-taking managers as dependent 
variable is consistent with our main results. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The incomplete contracting view of firms points out the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and firm managers. Managers need to be properly monitored 
in order to prevent them from pursuing their own benefits at the expense of 
shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders, who own a 
sizeable number of shares, are both motivated and capable of putting monitoring 
pressure on firm managers. Unlike small shareholders, large shareholders have large 
enough stakes in firms that motivate them to privately absorb costs incurred in 
monitoring firm managers. Their voting rights, granted by the substantial number of 
shares, allows them to put pressure on managers. However, most discussion on the 
monitoring effect of large shareholders focuses either on institutional investors or 
family owners. Little attention has been paid to the monitor effect of large 
shareholders when they are government organizations. 
We use the proportion of bribe-taking managers of a firm to measure the 
effectiveness of government organizations in monitoring managers of listed SOEs. 
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The higher the proportion, the less effectively managers of the listed SOE are being 
monitored. Based on a sample of listed SOEs over the period 2013-2017, we find a 
negative relationship between the proportion of bribe-taking managers a listed SOE 
has and the proportion of state ownership. This result suggests that government 
organizations make efforts in monitoring managers of firms of which they are one of 
the large shareholders. We also find that the monitoring effect of government 
organizations is more pronounced in provinces with weak institutions. This finding 
further confirms Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) argument that large shareholders 
compensate for weak institutions in monitoring firm managers. 
In this study, we extend existing literature on corporate governance by 
exploring the effect of large shareholders, when they are government organizations, 
on preventing managers from engaging in bribery. Many studies report that large 
shareholders are effective monitors of managers and the existence of large 
shareholders reduces the risk of shareholders being expropriated by firm managers 
(Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Maug, 1998; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002; Yafeh 
and Yosha, 2003). However, it is not clear if large shareholders who are government 
organizations will still play an active and effective role in monitoring firm managers. 
Government organizations are different from other large shareholders in that they are 
not always profit-oriented. Furthermore, it is government officials who represent 
government organizations that monitor the managers of firms of which government 
organizations are a large shareholder. Therefore, the de facto monitors (i.e. 
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government officials) are in fact also agents who have no significant cash flow rights 
in firms. These two differences between government organizations and other large 
shareholders thereby question the effectiveness of government organizations in 
monitoring managers of firms in which they own sizeable shares. We find that listed 
SOEs with a higher proportion of state ownership tend to have fewer bribe-taking 
managers. In addition, we also find that the monitoring effect of government 
organizations, who is the largest shareholders, is more prominent than that of other 
large shareholders. These results indicate that government organizations have 
effective monitoring of firms of which they are one of large shareholders.  
Our study also relates to law and finance theory which argues that the ability of 
small shareholders in monitoring firm managers depends on the effectiveness of 
local institutions (La Porta et al., 1998). Large shareholders play a more important 
role in mitigating agency problems when institutions are too weak to allow 
shareholders to effectively monitor firm managers. Specifically, we find that SOEs 
located in provinces with better market-supporting institutions are less likely to have 
bribe-taking managers. Furthermore, we also find that the monitoring effect of large 
shareholder is less prominent in provinces with sound and effective 
market-supporting institutions. These findings support law and finance theory that 
small shareholders’ ability in monitoring firm managers depends on how well their 
legal rights are protected by laws. 
From the perspective of literature on corruption, our results emphasize the 
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importance of monitoring in preventing corruption. Literature on firm level 
corruption focuses largely on how characteristics of firms which are bribe-payers 
affect level of corruption (Svensson, 2003; Bai et al., 2015). Bribery is an interaction 
between bribe-payers and bribe-takers. Therefore, bribery not only depends on 
characteristics of bribe-payers but also on that of bribe-takers. However, existing 
studies about firm level studies offer little discussion on what and how 
characteristics of bribe-takers affect bribery. In this study, we find that the 
monitoring pressure that bribe-takers face deters them from engaging in bribery. By 
aligning the interest of government organizations which own a sizeable number of 
shares of listed SOEs with that of listed SOEs, state ownership provides incentives 
for government organizations to monitor managers of SOEs. The more shares 
government organizations have, the more motivated they are in monitoring 
managers of listed SOEs and the higher the level of monitoring pressure these 
managers faces. Therefore, the less likely managers of listed SOEs will engage in 
bribery. 
However, we are aware that our study have several limitations. one limitation 
of our study is that our sample only includes listed SOEs. Therefore people need to 
be cautious when trying to apply our results and conclusions to firms without state 
ownership. This is because the ways in which SOEs and privately owned firms 
function and the objectives of private owners and government organizations can be 
very different. Thus, although we claim we find evidence supporting Shleifer and 
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Vishny’s (1986) argument, we are not arguing that our results can be applied to all 
kinds of firms without and modification. Another limitation of our study is that we 
cannot perfectly solve the partial observability problem. Although we collect data on 
bribery cases through various sources and follow literature on corporate fraud by 
using bivariate probit model, there is still the possibility that we might miss several 
bribery cases or they are not identified by the CCDI during our sample period. 
However, we believe that the anti-corruption campaign provides us with a good 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. The bribery of managers is the proportion 
of bribe-taking managers of listed SOEs being arrested by regulators during our sample period 
2013-2017. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Obs 
Bribery of Managers 3.241% 0.000% 10.471% 0.000% 100.000% 960 
Overall Marketization 
Index 
8.724 8.930 2.026 0.380 11.800 960 
Financial 
Marketization Index 
10.746 10.540 1.173 5.900 12.660 960 
Legal Protection 
Index 
11.122 8.240 5.615 0.180 19.890 960 
GDP per capita ( in 
thousands) 
34.780 47.20 24.180 8.900 86.660 960 
GDP growth 0.104 0.089 0.026 0.059 0.163  960 
State ownership 0.389 0.254 0.152 0.074 0.891 960 
Return on Assets 0.049 0.038 0.943 -0.031 0.228 960 
Assets 
 (in 10 billion) 
7.530 4.310 76.83 0.026 1473.000 960 
Cash holding  
(in million) 
20.19 5.68 1.471 14.376 26.911 960 
Leverage 0.843 0.347 3.091 0.000 14.840 960 
Age 19.626 19.000 4.439 6.000 36.000 960 
Local government 
corruption 
2.483 2.000 2.469 0.000 9.000 960 
Board Independence 0.361 0.353 0.076 0.200 0.727 960 
Affiliation 0.291 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000 960 




Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. Bribery is the proportion of managers accused of taking-bribes, state is state ownership, 
mkt is overall marketization index, fmkt is financial market izat ion index, legal is legal protection index. roa is return on assets, size is firm size measured by its total 
assets, cash is cash holdings of a firm, lv is leverage, age is the age of a firm, b i is board independence, aff is affiliation of an SOE, gdpp is GDP per capita of a 
province, gdpg is the GDP growth of a province, local is the level of local corruption and other is the shares owned by other bloc kholders. 
 bribery state mkt fmkt legal roa size cash lv age bi aff gdpp gdpg local other 
bribery 1                
state -0.0202 1               
mkt -0.0286 -0.0209 1              
fmkt -0.0621 -0.0162 0.796
***
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size 0.645
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Table 4.3 Large Shareholder and Managerial Corruption 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between the proportion of state ownership and bribery 
of SOE managers. The dependent variable is the proportion of managers accused of taking bribes. In 
column 3 and 4, we control for industry fixed effect and cluster standard errors at province level. A ll 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (proportion) 







































































































Industry Effect No No Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.029 0.030 0.049 0.050 




Table 4.4 Quality of Institutions and Corruption 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between the quality of institutions of the province 
where an SOE’s headquarter is located and bribery of SOE managers . The dependent variable is the 
proportion of managers accused of taking bribes. In column 4, 5 and 6, we control for industry fixed 
effect and cluster standard errors at province level. All variables are defined in  Appendix 1. Numbers 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (proportion) 























  -0.405 
(0.320) 
  -0.44 
(0.294) 




































































































Industry Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.051 0.050 0.049 




Table 4.5 Quality of Institutions and Corruption with Province Characteristics 
Controlled 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between quality of institutions of the province where 
an SOE’s headquarter is located and bribery o f SOE managers . The dependent variable is the 
proportion of managers accused of taking bribes. In column 4, 5 and 6, we control for industry fixed 
effect and cluster standard errors at province level. All variables are defined in  Appendix 1.  Numbers 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (proportion) 

























  -0.319 
(0.387) 
  -0.383 
(0.389) 




































































































































Industry Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.053 0.051 0.049 




Table 4.6 Quality of Institutions and Monitoring Effect of Large Shareholders 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses  between institution and monitoring effect of state 
ownership. The dependent variable is the proportion of managers accused of taking bribes. In  column 
3 and 4, we control fo r industry fixed effect and cluster standard errors at province level. All variab les 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (proportion) 







































































































































Industry Effect No No Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.037 0.035 0.055 0.057 




Table 4.7 Probit Regression 
This table reports the results of probit regression analyses for the effect of state ownership and quality 
of institutions on bribery of SOE managers . It also reports results of probit regression analyses for the 
effect of quality of institutions  on monitoring effect of state ownership. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if an SOE has managers being accused of taking bribes during our 
sample period and equals 0 otherwise. Industry fixed effect is included in the analyses and standard 







 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (dummy) 



















































































Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.077 0.089 




Table 4.8 Bivariate Probit Regression 
This table reports the estimate for the bivariate probit  model. The dependent variable in panel A is a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the SOE has managers taking bribes and 0 otherwise. The 
estimation of propensity to have corrupt managers is indicated by P(C=1), and the estimation o f 
corruption detection likelihood is indicated by P(D=1|C=1), which is the dependent variable of panel 
B. Coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered by province are reported in column 1, 2 ad 3. 







denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (dummy) 
Panel A    



























































































Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 







Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (dummy) 
Panel B    













































































Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) Yes Yes Yes 




Table 4.9 Monitoring Effect of Other Blockholders (OLS Regression) 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between the p roportion of shares owned by 
blockholders other than government organizations and bribery of SOE managers . The dependent 
variable is the proportion of managers accused of taking bribes. In column 4, 5 and 6, we control for 
industry fixed effect and cluster standard errors by province. A ll variables are defined in Appendix 1. 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (proportion) 



















































































































































































Industry Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.040 0.045 0.048 0.059 0.063 0.067 





Table 4.10 Monitoring Effect of Other Blockholders (Probit Regression) 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between the proportion of shares owned by 
blockholders other than government organizations and bribery of SOE managers . The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 if an SOE has managers being accused of taking bribes 
during our sample period and equals 0 otherwise. In column 4, 5 and 6, we control for industry and 
province fixed effect and cluster standard errors by province. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (dummy) 





























































































































































































Industry Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Province) No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.067 0.075 0.081 0.086 0.093 0.099 





Table 4.11 Poisson Regression 
This table reports the Poisson regression analyses between the proportion of state ownership and 
bribery of SOE managers . The dependent variable is the number of bribe-taking managers an SOE 
has. We control for industry fixed effect and cluster standard errors by province. All variables are 






 denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Bribery of Managers (number) 



























































































Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-square 0.046 0.060 0.068 




4.1 Appendix  
Appendix 1 Definition of Variables 
This table presents definition of variables used in our analyses and source o f data 
needed to construct these variables. 
Variable 
 
Definition Sources of Data 
Bribery of 
SOE managers 
This is a firm level variable. This variable is 
the number of bribe-taking SOE managers 
being arrested by CCDI during our sample 
period 2013-2017 divided by the total number 










This is a firm level variable. This variable is 
the number of bribe-taking SOE managers 










This is a province level variable. This variable 
is an index and it measures how market 
oriented the economy is in each province of 
China. 






This is a province level variable. This variable 
is an index and it measures how market 
oriented the financial market is in each 
province of China. 





This is a province level variable. This variable 
is an index and it measures how well 
entrepreneurs and firms are protected by legal 
rules and courts in each province of China. 
Fan, Wang and 
Zhang (2011) 
GDP per capita 
(in thousands 
RMB) 
This is a province level variable. It is the 
average GDP per capita of each province in 
China over period 2010-2012. 
China Statistical 
Yearbook 
GDP growth This is a province level variable. It is the 






province in China over period 2010-2012. 
State ownership This is a firm level variable. It is the average 
proportion of shares held by any government 






This is a firm level variable. ROA is calculated 
as the net income of a listed SOE divided by its 
total assets. This variable is calculated as the 





This is a firm level variable. This variable is 
the average total assets of a listed SOE during 
period 2010-2012.  
CSMAR data 
base 
Cash holding This is a firm level variable. This variable is 
the average of the natural log of the total 




Leverage This is a firm level variable. Leverage ratio is 
calculated as the equity of a listed SOE divided 
by the sum of its total debts. This variable is 
calculated as the average leverage ratio of a 
listed SOE during period 2010-2012.  
CSMAR data 
base 
Age This is a firm level variable. Age is calculated 






This is a firm level variable. Board 
independence is calculated as the proportion of 






This is a firm level variable. Other blockholder 
is calculated as the proportion of shares held 
by any shareholders who owns more than 5% 










government corruption is calculated as the 
number of local government officials, 
excluding SOE managers, getting prosecuted 
by CCDI in each province during period 
2013-2017. 
website 
Affiliation This is a firm level variable. This variable 
takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholder of 
a listed SOE is a central government level 
organization such as the State Council of 
China. In addition, we also check with the list 
of central government owned SOE provided by 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) 
CSMAR data 






Chapter 5 Investor Protection and Dispersion in Capital Structure 
Abstract 
Using the sample of listed firms of 64 countries over 2006 to 2014, we examine the 
relation between legal protection of investor and dispersion of firms’ capital 
structure. Consistent with previous literature, we document that firms tend to use 
more equity funding or debt funding when investors’ rights are better protected by 
law. Furthermore, we find that both creditor protection and shareholder protection 
are positively correlated with larger differences in capital structure between firms. 
Our findings are consistent with the argument that investor protection institutions are 





The law and finance theory argues that legal institutions which aim at 
protecting investors from being expropriated by others (e.g. corporate insiders) is an 
important determinant of financial market development (La Porta, et al., 1998). Due 
to investors’ higher confidence in securing their investment return, firms in countries 
with better investor protection law are valued higher and therefore have more access 
to external financing (La Porta et al., 1997, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon, 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004). Subsequent studies find that not 
only firms’ access to external financing but also their choice of capital structure is 
affected by investor protection institutions (Cheng and Shiu, 2007; Yifeng, Min and 
Tao, 2009; Alves and Ferreira, 2011). 
Existing studies on the relation between institutions and capital structure 
mainly focus on the cross-country differences in the average or aggregate level of 
firm leverage. One potential issue is that firms do not have to raise as much funds as 
possible even if they could afford the costs. Instead, it is more reasonable for firms 
to raise certain amount of funds so that they could adjust their capital structure to 
optimal level. Therefore, we might expect to see larger dispersion of capital structure 
among firms located in countries with larger and more active financial markets as 
firms often differ with each other in their needs for external financing and optimal 
structure. However, little is known about the dispersion of firms’ capital structure 




study, we intend to shed light on this issue in this study.  
We hypothesize that sound and effective shareholder protection institutions 
allow firms to have more access to equity financing and therefore allow them to 
have more freedom in choosing their capital structure. Thus, firms’ capital structure 
tend to become more similar to each other in countries with poor investor protection. 
In addition, we combine both supply side view and demand side view of debt 
financing by proposing an inverted U shaped relation between the quality of creditor 
protection institutions and the dispersion of capital structure among firms. This is 
because overly strong (weak) creditor protection institutions makes firms unwilling 
to (not able to) raise enough funds from debt markets and therefore leads to a 
situation where firms have similar capital structures. Only at medium-level creditor 
protection will firms find it neither too expensive nor too difficult to access to debt 
financing. 
To perform the analyses, we use a sample of listed firms from 64 countries over 
the period 2006-2014 to study the influence of investor protection on firms’ choice 
of capital structure. We use equity-to-asset ratio and debt-to-asset ratio to measure a 
firm’s capital structure. We then calculate the standard deviation of firms ’ 
equity-to-asset ratio and debt-to-asset ratio of a country in a given year. The higher 
the standard deviation, the larger the dispersion of firms’ choice of capital structure. 




equity-to-asset ratio or debt-to-asset ratio, is large among listed firms in countries 
with better shareholder protection.For example, the dispersion of equity-to-asset 
ratio of countries with the highest disclosure index (e.g France and U.K.) is expected 
to be larger than that of the country (Switzerland) with the lowest disclosure index 
by 0.12 of other characteristics of these countries are the same. We also find 
empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis regarding the non-linear relation 
between creditor protection institutions and the dispersion of capital structure among 
firms. Specifically, we find a positive relation between the standard deviation of 
debt-to-asset ratio and strength of legal rights index when it is below 8 and a 
positive relation between them when the index is above 8. Similarly, we also find a 
inverted U shaped relation between credit information index and the standard 
deviation of debt-to-asset ratio with a turning point of 2. Because the ranges of these 
two indices are 0 to 10 and 0 to 6, we believe our results are mathematically and 
economically meaningful. 
This study makes two contributions. Our study contribute to literature on firm 
capital structure. Capital structure is one of the most widely studied topic in the 
literature of finance. It is found to have impact on various aspects of firms and many 
factors are identified to affect firms’ choice of capital structure. However, existing 
literature focus largely on firm-level determinants of capital structure (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Chen, 2004). Our study, instead of focusing on widely studied 




protection institutions in affecting firms’ choice of capital structure.  
Our study also relates to law and finance literature. The law and finance theory 
argues that by mitigating investors’ concerns of being expropriated by corporate 
insiders (i.e. controlling shareholders and managers), sound legal protection of 
investors attracts more investors to participate in financial markets and thus exert 
fundamental influence on financial development (La Porta, et al., 2008). Cheng and 
Shiu (2007) document that firms located in countries with better creditor protection 
tend to rely more on debt financing and therefore, on average, have higher leverage. 
Firms in countries with sound shareholder protection, on the other hand, are more 
prone to equity financing. Their study report that cross-sectional variation in the 
aggregate capital structure can be partly explained by differences in legal institutions. 
In this study, we take a further step by examining the role of institutions in affecting 
the dispersion of firms’ choice of capital structure. 
The remaining sections are organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews 
related literature. Section 3 describes and summarizes data used in this paper. 
Section 4 contains a discussion about empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
5.2 Literature 
5.2.1 Determinants of Capital Structure 
What are the most effective ways for firms to use their capitals and how to 
determine the capital structure of a firm are some of the mostly asked and studied 




relative costs of debt financing and equity financing that fundamentally determine 
firms’ capital structure. Specifically, when costs of debt is relatively lower, firms 
tend to rely more on debt financing and thus have higher leverage. On the other hand, 
if costs of equity is lower, firms will choose to use more equity financing to cover 
their costs and meet their investments need in order to lower their financing costs.  
Over the past decades, researchers have proposed and identified many factors 
which affect firms costs of debt financing, equity financing or both. Existing 
literature on determinants of capital structure suggests that eight firm attributes can 
potentially affect the capital structure of a firm. The first one is the collateral value 
of assets. Scott (1977) argues that secured bonds help firm reduce potential liabilities 
they need to pay in the future and therefore increase firm value. Thus, he predicts a 
positive relationship between the ability of firm to collateralize their assets and 
leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) hold the same opinion by 
arguing that lenders of unsecured debts tend to require more favorable terms due to 
their concern of being expropriated by borrowers. Grossman and Hart (1982), 
however, predict an opposite relation between collateral value of assets and leverage 
by arguing that firms with more intangible assets should issue more debts to 
minimize agency costs. 
The second one is firms’ growth rate. Galai and Masulis (1976) argues that 
shareholders tend to make sub-optimal investment decisions in order to expropriate 




deciding which investments to make, therefore this agency problem is more 
prominent for growing firms. Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that firms could 
issue convertible bond to mitigate the issue. 
Other firm attributes that are argued or found to affect firm capital structure 
include non-tax debt shield (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), firms’ uniqueness and 
the industry they operate in (Titman, 1984), size (Ang, Chua and McConnell, 1982), 
earnings volatility (Titman and Wessels, 1988) and profitability (Myers, 1984). 
The aforementioned studies on determinants of firm capital structure focus 
largely on discussing the optimal or best capital structure of firms with given 
attributes. In other words, these studies analyse the issue from the perspective of 
demand side. However, how much debts a firm can borrow from or how much 
equities it could sell to investors is not fully at its will. In reality, many firms often 
find themselves financially constrained and therefore are prevented from reaching to 
their optimal capital structures. For example, Kumar et al. (1999) find that firms 
located in countries with larger financial markets tend to be larger, indicating that 
financial constraints might keep firms small. What factors that determine the supply 
side of external financing and how they affect firms’ choice of their capital 
structures remain largely unexplored in previous literature on firm capital structure. 
The law and finance theory proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) asserts that how well 
investors’ rights are protected by law, which is largely determined by a country’s 




firms. Therefore, legal institutions might exert fundamental influences on the choice 
of capital structures of various firms. 
5.2.2 The Role of Institutions 
Douglass North (1981), in his influential book Structure and Change in 
Economic History, argues that traditional economic theories have overlooked a very 
important determinants of economic performance, namely institutions. He asserts 
that transactions in real life is not frictionless and in some cases can be quite 
expensive. The costs of transaction stem from the uncertainty and unpredictability of 
transaction parties’ behavior (North, 1987). If two parties have abundant information 
about each other and the transaction is expected to repeat in the future, the concern 
of their violating predetermined terms of contracts or even cheating will be 
relatively low. This is because compared with the potential gains of cheating others 
(e.g. more profits), the potential loss (e.g. the loss of future income and good 
reputation) could be much higher. Therefore, people might not be motivated to do so. 
In this case, transactions can be conducted effectively and efficiently. 
However, in reality, many people do not possess enough information regarding 
other parties of transaction. In addition, many transactions are not expected to take 
place in the future. As a result, the probability that people cheating or being cheated 
by others could be high as someone might find it is more profitable to cheat others 
instead of acting according to contracts previously agreed upon by all parties. For 




quality of these souvenirs often fail to meet their expectations. The reason is because 
tourists often lack the information regarding souvenirs sellers (i.e. lack of enough 
information) and these sellers view the purchasing of souvenirs as one-off 
consumption (i.e. non-repeat transaction). Thus, people have to spend considerable 
resources (such as time, money and labor) in collecting information about other 
parties of the transaction in order to ensure, or at least decrease the possibility that 
they are cheated by others. This might considerable reduce profits people earn from 
economic activities. Moreover, if the transaction is expected to last for a time period, 
more resources might be needed in order to ensure all parities are behaving 
according to terms predetermined in the original contracts. 
One useful tool that allow people to reduce uncertainty when transacting with 
others, especially with unfamiliar ones, is legal institutions. This is because 
well-designed and appropriately enforced legal rules constrain people’s behavior and 
increase their costs of cheating (North, 1991, 1994). Thus, it works at reducing 
transaction costs and therefore promotes transactions and stipulates economic 
growth. This is the main argument of neo-institutional economics. 
5.2.3 Institutions and Financial Markets 
Neo-institutional economic theory not only explain cross-country differences in 
economic growth but also sheds light on the differences in financial market 
development among various countries. Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that 




incompleteness of financial contracts that investors sign with firms in which they 
make investments. Thus, if institutions have first order impacts on economic 
performance, it should also fundamentally affect financial development. La Porta et 
al. (1997) find a positive relation between a country’s institutions which protect 
investors from being expropriated by corporate insiders and the aggregate level of 
external financing firm have access to. Specifically, they document that in countries 
with better creditor protection, firms have more debts and the countries’ aggregate 
level of debt is also higher. Similarly, firms have higher market value and use more 
equity financing when institutions that protect minority shareholders against 
expropriation is better. 
In their influential paper Law and Finance, La Porta et al. (1998) formally 
proposed a theory, which is widely known as the law and finance theory, that aims at 
explaining cross-country differences in financial markets development. The law and 
finance theory argues that securities represent rights of owners to get future cash 
flows from sellers of the securities. For example, owners of corporate bonds are 
promised by the firm that issues these bonds to receive interests every certain time 
interval (such as annually and semi-annually). In addition, principals will also be 
repaid during or at the end of the life of the bond. In terms of equities, stockholders 
who own part or all shares of a firm, have claim on the profits of the firm and they 
often get cash flows through dividends or stock buybacks. Therefore, one popular 




the security expect to receive. However, La Porta et al. (1998) point out that 
investors cannot take for granted that these predetermined cash flows will be paid on 
time and in full amount. Bond issuers might default and only pay part or even no 
interests to creditors, not to mention the principals. Listed firms have no obligations 
to pay dividends to their shareholders, even if there are abundant cash. Moreover, 
managers might not get punished legally for not paying dividends to shareholders 
even if they promised to pay in the past. In other words, shareholders might not get 
any cash flows during the period they hold shares of listed firms. 
The transaction costs in financial markets stem from the uncertainty of 
investors in securing their investment return. For example, the agency theory argues 
that when managers are not owners of a firm or only partially own a firm, they 
might become motivated in taking actions that maximize their own benefits at the 
costs of other stakeholders, especially of creditors and other shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). In order to mitigate the problem and secure their 
investment return, investors have to spend a great amount of resources on doing 
researches on firms they want to make investments in and on preventing 
management team from expropriating them. In many cases, the costs of doing so can 
be so high that investors, especially small and individual investors, find themselves 
not being able to make profits after bearing these costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
As a result, investors will not become motivated to finance firms and financial 




The law and finance theory argues that one reason why there is a huge 
difference in financial markets development among various countries is that 
investors’ rights are not protected to the same extent. La Porta et al. (1998) further 
report that countries with common law origin (such as U.S. and U.K.) provide better 
legal protections to investors against expropriation by corporate insiders than 
countries with civil law (e.g. France and Germany) origin do. It is the differences in 
how well legal rights of investors are protected between these two types of countries 
that makes legal origin an important determinant of the amount of external financial 
resources firms have access to and ownership concentration of listed firms (La Porta 
et al., 1997, 1998; La Porta et al., 2008). 
However, the law and finance theory is challenged by Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
who argue that it is the geographical and disease environment instead of legal origin 
that fundamentally affect institutions of a country which ultimately determine its 
financial market development. Specifically, they assert that when local environment 
is not suitable for colonizers, they are more likely to establish extractive institutions 
which facilitate their extracting and transferring local resources back to their own 
countries. This kind of institutions are often characterized by lacking 
well-established protection of citizens’ legal rights such as property rights. However, 
when local environment is suitable for colonizers to settle down, they are more 
likely to establish institutions which mimic that of their own countries where legal 




Beck et al. (2003) tested both law and finance theory and endowment theory and 
report that both legal origin and the geographical and disease environment matter for 
financial development. However, the latter has stronger effects on the development 
of financial markets than the former has. 
Although researchers differ in their opinions regarding the relative importance 
of legal origin and local environment to financial development, they all agree on the 
argument that how well legal rights of investors are protected is a fundamental 
determinant of financial developments. 
5.2.4 Institutions and Capital Structure 
Following the seminal works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), the past two 
decades has witnessed a significant increase in studies on the effects of institutions 
on many aspects of firms, including their choice of capital structures. These studies 
can be divided into two categories. One stream of literature mainly focuses on the 
protection of shareholder rights and the other one focuses more on creditor rights 
protection. For equity markets, La Porta et al. (2002) find a positive relation between 
shareholder rights protection and market value of firms’ equities. In these countries, 
firms can raise more capitals by selling their equities at higher prices. Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Love (2004) find that improvement in shareholder p rotection decreases 
risk premium and thus makes equity financing cheaper for and more popular among 
firms. Deesomasak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) document that in Asia Pacific 




capital structure. Firms in countries with weak shareholder protection find 
themselves difficult to sell equities to potential investors and therefore have more 
concentrated ownership structure. 
However, for debt markets theories and findings are mixed. The supply view 
argues that better creditor protection enhance creditors’ confidence in securing their 
interests and principals. Therefore, creditors are more willing to financing firms, 
which leads to higher supply of debt financing resources in financ ial markets. 
Furthermore, there are two theories explaining what is important for creditor 
protection. The power theory argues that the power of creditors is an important 
determinant of creditor protection. This is because the largest concern of creditors is 
that they might not be able to get their money back when borrowers are in financial 
distress. When it is easier for creditors to force repayment, secure collateral or even 
obtain control of borrowers’ assets, they are more willing to extend credit (Aghion 
and Patrick, 1992). The information theory asserts that credit markets are more 
developed when information about borrowers such as their historical credits and 
existing debts with other lenders become more available. Better information sharing 
institutions mitigate lenders’ concerns of being cheated and makes them more 
willing to provide capitals (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). These two views are not 
mutually exclusive and Djankov et al. (2007) find that both creditor power and 




Shiu (2007) report that in countries with sound and effective creditor rights 
protection institutions, firms tend to have higher leverage. 
The power theory and the information theory analyse the issue from the 
perspective of the supply side. That is, they focus on the relation between the 
amount of capitals creditors are willing to provide and firms’ access to debt 
financing. However, leverage not only depends on how much capitals are available 
to firms in debt markets but also depends on firms’ willingness and ability to afford 
debts. In other words, both supply and demand of debts affect firms’ access to debt 
financing. The demand side view of debt financing argues that powerful creditors 
might deter firms, especially those with weak solvency, from accessing to debt 
financing because they are concerned that their assets or even control rights will be 
threatened when they find they have problems in repaying debts on time. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) argue that management teams in countries with more powerful 
creditors make more efforts in preventing firms from getting into financial distress 
to avoid being penalized by creditors. Cho et al. (2014) document that firms tend to 
prefer equity financing over debt financing and thus have lower leverage when 
creditor protection is too strong.  
The majority of existing studies on the relation between investor protection 
institutions and capital structure focuses on the effects of investor protection 
institutions on the aggregate or average level of equity financing or debt financing of 




investors who are willing to finance them so that they have the freedom to choose 
any capital structure that meets their best interests. Gathering as much external 
financing as possible might not be the priority of many firms firms. In addition, 
firms differ with each other in many aspects, including their needs for external 
financing and optimal capital structure. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find 
that well-developed financial markets mainly benefits firms with high external 
financing dependence and these firms growth disproportionately faster than firms 
with lower external financing dependence in countries with large financial markets. 
Therefore, simply looking at the relation between the quality of investor protection 
institutions and the aggregate or average level of external financing used by firms 
might not fully answer the question whether better institutions give firms more 
access to external financing and therefore allow them to choose their optimal capital 
structure. In other words, when examining the effects of investor protection 
institutions on firms’ choice of capital structure, we should not only focusing on the 
aggregate level of capital structure but also on its dispersion among firms in order to 
answer the question whether sound and effective legal institutions provide firms 
with more freedom in choosing their capital structures. 
Literature on the distribution of firm size might provide hints on the relation 
between legal protection of investors and capital structure dispersion. Cabral and 
Mata (2003) report that the distribution of firm size of a given cohort is highly 




time elapses, the highly right skewed distribution gradually evolves towards a more 
symmetric one. In other words, the dispersion of firm size increases as time pasts. 
They argue that the evolution of firm size distribution has two implications. First of 
all, it indicates that some of the small firms exit the market as a result of fierce 
market competition and they name it selection effect. However, they find that 
selection only accounts for a small fraction of the entire evolution of firm size 
distribution. The majority of changes in firm size distribution is caused by changes 
in the size of survivors. This is because, as argued by Cabral and Mata (2003), 
young firms are often financially constrained and therefore unable to grow to their 
optimal sizes. However, as time pasts, those survivors become less financially 
constrained and therefore have more freedom in growing to their optimal sizes. The 
work of Cabral and Mata (2003) shed lights on the relation between legal 
institutions and dispersion in firms’ capital structure. 
5.3 Hypothesis Development 
Currently, the majority of literature on the impacts of investor protection on 
capital structure focuses on how institutions affect the aggregate level of leverage. 
However, firms differ with each other in terms of their needs for leverage and their 
abilities to raise funds from capital markets. Wurgler (2000) argues that better 
shareholder protection not only enlarges financial markets which increases firms’ 
access to equity financing but also improves the aggregate level of financial 




investment in growing industries while decrease their investments in declining 
industries in countries where shareholders’ rights are better protected. This finding 
indicates that better shareholder protection might not benefit all firms, or at least, it 
does not benefit all firms to the same extent. 
The demand side view of capital structure argues that the optimal capital 
structure of a firm depends on a number of firm attributes such as size, industry and 
the nature of their assets (Galai and Masulis, 1976; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; 
Titman, 1984; Ang, Chua and McConnell, 1982; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Myers, 
1984). In other words, firms differ with each other in their needs for debt financing 
and equity financing and their optimal capital structures are very likely not to be the 
same. These studies suggest that firms should choose capital structures that meet 
their needs instead of raising as much capitals as possible from financial markets, 
even if they can afford the costs. Thus, if firms are allowed to raise any amount of 
funds from financial markets and in any forms (e.g. through debts or equities), it is 
expected that the dispersion of capital structure among various firms could be large 
as firms tend to have different optimal capital structures. 
However, the supply side view argues that how much funds firms are able to 
raise from financial markets not only depends on their needs for external financing 
but also on the willingness of investors to finance firms. In small and inactive 
financial markets, where investors are reluctant to make investments, firms might 




and finance theory and endowment theory emphasize the importance of legal 
institutions to financial development. Although these two well-recognized theories 
differ in their opinion on the fundamental causes of cross country differences in 
legal institutions, they both hold the view that sound and effective legal institutions 
that protect investors’ from being expropriated by others, especially corporate 
insiders, enhance investors’ confidence in securing their investment return. As a 
result, they become more willing to finance firms, which ultimately leads to larger 
and more active financial markets and firms having increased access to external 
financing (La Porta, et al., 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Cabral and Mata (2003) find that firm size distribution is highly right skewed 
for a given cohort of firms. That is, the proportion of large firms is significantly 
lower than expected and the size of small firms are quite close to each o ther. One 
reason, they argue, is that most firms are financially constrained and have difficulties 
in raising enough funds for expanding and making investments. Similarly, we argue 
that under-developed financial markets increase the proportion of firms that are 
financially constrained and therefore results in firms being under-financed. As a 
result, even firms with distinctively different attributes might be forced to have 
similar capital structure because they are unable to raise enough external funds or 
cannot afford the costs to reach their optimal capital structure. Thus, the dispersion 
of capital structure of firms is predicted to be smaller in countries where shareholder 




H1: The dispersion in capital structure among firms is predicted to be 
positively correlated with the quality of shareholder protection institutions. 
As discussed in the previous section, there are two different views toward the 
effects of creditor protection institutions on debt financing.  The supply side view 
argues that strong creditor protection allows creditors to secure interests and 
principals and thus encourages them to provide funds to firms. As a result, credit 
markets tend to be larger and more active in countries with better designed and 
well-enforced creditor protection institutions. However, the demand side view 
argues that strong creditor rights protection creates huge pressures on firms. 
Specifically, in countries where creditors rights are overly protected, the control 
rights of management team and of firms owners might be easily threatened by 
creditors when these firms are in financial distress and not able to repay interests and 
debts on time. This potential concern of managers and firm owners could deter firms 
from using debt financing and thus leads to lower level of leverage. 
There are both empirical evidence that support or against each argument. We 
intend to combine these two views by proposing a non-linear relation between 
creditor protection institutions and dispersion of capital structure among firms. 
Specifically, we argue that when creditor protection is too weak (too strong), firms 
will find it very difficult (will become reluctant) to use debt financing. As a result, 
firms tend to have similar capital structure and rely more on equity or on other ways 




neither too weak nor too strong, both creditors and firms will find debt markets 
attractive. Therefore, firms are more able and more willing to use debt financing. It 
then leads to larger dispersion in capital structure as firms have more freedom in 
choosing their capital structure. In other words, we propose an inverted U shaped 
relation between creditor protection institutions and dispersion in capital structure. 
Based on the above discussion, we propose our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The dispersion of firm capital structure is predicted to be small when 
creditor protection institutions are too weak or too strong. It is predicted to be  
large when creditor protection institutions are at medium level. 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
5.4.1 Data 
Our sample includes listed firms in 64 countries and regions over the period 
2006 to 2014. Financial data and securities data are collected from Compustat - 
Capital IQ Global and North America database. Doing Business Report by World 
Bank construct indices that measure the extent to which investors, both shareholders 
and creditors, are protected since 2003. Indices are updated annually, and we use 
these indices as our measurement of investor protection. In addition, the report also 
ranks the ease of establishing and operating business in each countries or regions 
among all countries or regions included in the report. We use this as a control 
variable to adjust for the general business environment of each country or region in 




growth and GDP per capita, are collected from the World Bank database, except for 
that of Taiwan. GDP growth and the GDP per capita of Taiwan are collected from 
the official website of National Statistics of Taiwan. Variables that measure a 
country’s or region’s public governance quality are collected from the World Bank’s 
World Governance database. Finally, we obtain the number of domestically listed 
firms from the World Bank’s World Financial Development database. 
Our sample period starts at 2006 because this is the first year in which the 
Doing Business Report starts to use four different indices to measure the extent to 
which shareholders are protected by legal rules. In its 2003 and 2004 reports, the 
World Bank do not provide any indices that measure the extent to which 
shareholders are protected. In the 2005 Doing Business Report, the only index that 
measures how well shareholders are protected by legal rules is the disclosure index 
that measures how much information regarding the related party transactions of 
firms needs to be disclosed. Since 2006, another three indices that measure the 
strength of shareholder protection in a country or region are added. In addition, 2006 
is also the first year that the Doing Business Report ranks the ease of establishing 
and operating business for each country or region. Therefore, we decided to use 
2006 as the start of our sample periods. Our sample period ends on 2014 because 
since 2015, the Doing Business Report changed its way of measuring shareholder 
and creditor protection. In terms of creditor protection, the maximum value of the 




credit information index increased from 6 to 8. In terms of shareholder protection, it 
no longer reports the disclosure index, director liability index and the ease of 
shareholder suits index. Instead, two new indices, namely the conflict of interest 
regulation index and the shareholder governance index are used to measure the 
extent to which shareholders are protected. In order to maintain consistency and 
make investor protection comparable across our sample period, we decided to end 
our sample period in 2014.  
Our starting sample compromises 80 countries or regions. However, in order to 
calculate standard deviation of firms’ market cap-assets ratio or total debts-assets 
ratio and make them meaningful, we require that sample countries or regions have 
more than 10 valid firm observations each year over the period 2006 to 2014. This 
requirement drops 16 countries or regions from the Capital IQ database. The 
countries or regions being excluded by these requirements are Bahrain, Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Gabon, Gahan, Gibraltar, Kuwait, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Monaco, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Virgin Islands and Zambia. 
Our final 556 country-year observations for dispersion of capital structure. 
5.4.2 Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 
The dependent variables in our study are the standard deviation of capital 
structure of firms. We use equity-to-asset ratio and debt-to-asset ratio to measure a 
firm’s capital structure. After getting these ratios, we winsorize the data at 95%. The 




regression analysis. We then calculate the standard deviation of firms’ capital 
structure using the winsorized ratios and this is how we measure the dispersion of 
capital structure of firms in one country and in a given year. This is our main 
dependent variable. The higher the standard deviation, the larger the dispersion of 
capital structure among firms. 
Our main independent variables include eight indices that measure the extent to 
which investors’ rights are protected by legal rules (four for shareholder protection 
and two for creditor protection). Indices that measure the extent to which 
shareholders are protected by legal rules are the disclosure index, the director 
liability index, the ease of shareholder suits index and the strength of shareholder 
protection index. In terms of creditor protection, we look at both the power of 
creditors and credit information sharing institutions as argued by power theory and 
information theory. The strength of legal rights index measures the power of lenders 
and the credit information index, public registry coverage (% of adult) and private 
registry coverage (% of adult) are used to measure the development of credit 
information sharing institutions. A more detailed description of each independent 
variable is provided in Appendix 1. 
We also add several control variables in our ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. Firstly, the economic development of a country might affect the 
development of financial markets. Many studies report a positive correlation 




McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Researchers also identify several channels through 
which financial markets promote economic performance such as investment 
efficiency (Tobin and Brainard, 1963), saving mobilization (Wicksell, 1935) and risk 
reduction (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). However, there are also arguments which 
assert that economic growth also affects the development of financial markets (Ang, 
2008). To control for the effects of economic development on financial markets, we 
follow La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
and GDP growth rate as control variables. 
Public governance also plays an important role in investor protection. The 
majority of empirical studies on the relation between investor protection laws and 
the financial market mainly focus on the content of such protection (La Porta et al., 
1998). How well legal rules that aim at protecting investors from being expropriated 
are enforced is of the same importance as the contents of investor protection laws. 
We control for the enforcement of legal rules by adding a country’s control of 
corruption and regulatory quality as control variables. Lastly, we also use a country’s 
rank of ease of doing business and number of listed firms as control variables. Year 
fixed effect is controlled to account for the difference in conditions of global 
financial markets across different years. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
5.1. 
<Insert Table 5.1 Here> 




main variables of interest, namely standard deviation of equity-to-asset ratio or 
debt-to-asset ratio are positively correlated with many indices that measure how well 
investors’ rights are legally protected, such as strength of legal rights index, public 
registry coverage, disclosure index and strength of shareholder protection index. 
Consistent with existing literature, we also find that the aggregate level of equity 
financing and debt financing is positively correlated with the effectiveness of 
investor protection institutions. One interesting finding is that, we find countries 
with higher GDP growth rate tend to have larger dispersion of capital structures 
among firms as illustrated by the positive and statistically significant correlation 
between the standard deviation of leverage and GDP growth rate. One poss ible 
explanation might be that in countries with fast growing economies, market 
competition are fiercer. Thus, firms have to come up with unique strategies 
including the use of their funds and the design of capital structures in order to 
remain competitive. Lastly, as expected, we also find that the number of listed firms 
is positively correlated with the dispersion of capital structure among firms. 
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
We use the OLS model to estimate the relationship between the extent to which 
investors are protected by legal rules and the dispersion of capital structure among 
firms. The baseline model is presented below: 
tj,2tj,10tj, ControlsProtectionInvestor Dispersion    




year t. Investor Protectionj,t is the investor protection indices that we collected from 
the Doing Business Report by the World Bank. Control variables include economic 
performance, public governance quality, general business environment and the 
number of listed firms.
 
5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Investor Protection and Aggregate Level of Leverage  
Following existing literature, We first examine the relation between investor 
protection and the aggregate level of firms’ capital structure. In Table 5.3 and Table 
5.4, we use the average equity-to-asset ratio and debt-to-asset ratio to measure the 
aggregate level of firms’ capital structure, respectively. The findings are mixed, 
however. In Table 5.3, we find a positive relation between shareholder protection 
and the average equity-to-asset ratio. For example, column 1 of Table 5.3 shows that, 
holding other variables unchanged, an 1 unit increase in disclosure index is expected 
to lead to a 0.011 unit increase in the average equity-to-asset ratio. Given that the 
average equity-to-asset ratio is about 0.7 in our sample, an 1 unit increase in 
disclosure index is expected to results in a 1.6% increase in the ratio (0.011/0.7) on 
average. However, we fail to find a statistically significant relation between director 
liability index and the average equity-to-asset ratio. This result still holds even we 
include all indices that measure how well investors are protected in one regression 
model. This, to some extent, supports La Porta’s et al. (2006) findings that not all 




financing decisions and financial market development.  
In addition, we also find that the average equity-to-asset ratio is positively 
correlated with GDP growth, the general business environment and the number of 
listed firms. In terms of GDP growth, one possible explanation might be that in fast 
growing economies, firms tend to have more growth opportunities and therefore 
their equities are valued higher. The higher valuation of their equities leads to higher 
equity-to-asset ratio. Similarly, firms located in countries with more 
business-friendly government characterized by less intervention and more effective 
and efficient governance should find it easier to sell their equities to investors 
compared with their counterparts located in countries with less efficient government 
and business-friendly environment. 
In Table 5.4 where variables of interest are switched to creditor protection and 
the dependent variable is changed to debt-to-asset ratio, we find empirical evidence 
supporting both the supply side view and the demand side view of debt financing. 
Specifically, we find a positive relation between legal rights protection of creditors 
and firms’ leverage. This is consistent with the supply side view of debt financing 
which asserts that better creditor rights protection encourages investors to finance 
firms and therefore allow firms to have more access to debt financing. However, we 
also find that the average level of firms’ leverage is negatively correlated with 
creditor information index and public registry coverage. These findings support the 




deter firms from using debt financing because they are concerned of losing their 
control over firms in financial distress. Our empirical results in Table 5.4 seem to 
suggest that legal institutions which strengthen creditors’ claims on borrowers’ assets 
and institutions which facilitate credit information sharing have opposite effects on 
the average leverage of firms. In addition, our results also suggest public 
enforcement is more effective than private enforcement in terms of credit 
information sharing as we fail to find a statistically significant relation between 
private registry coverage and average leverage of firms. This finding is contradict to 
that of La Porta et al. (2006) which suggests that private enforcement is more 
effective than public enforcement. 
<Insert Table 5.3 Here> 
<Insert Table 5.4 Here> 
5.5.2 Investor Protection and Dispersion of Capital Structure  
In Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, We examine how dispersion of capital structure 
among firms is affected by legal protection of shareholders. The variables of interest 
in these two tables are legal protection of shareholders and the dependent variable is 
the dispersion of capital structure among firms, which is measured by the standard 
deviation of equity-to-asset ratio and standard deviation of debt-to-asset ratio, 
respectively. In Table 5.5, expect for director liability index, we find a positive 
relation between shareholder protection and the dispersion of capital structure 




protection leads to higher dispersion of capital structure because large financial 
markets grants firms with more freedom in choosing capital structures. For example, 
column 3 of Table 5.5 indicates that, holding other variables unchanged, an 1 unit 
increase in ease of shareholder suits index is associated with a 0.019 unit increase in 
the standard deviation of equity-to-asset ratio. In other words, the dispersion of 
capital structure of the country with the highest ease of shareholder suits index is 
expected to be 0.19 higher than that of the country with the lowest ease of 
shareholder suits index if all other aspects of these countries are the same. We 
believe that the coefficients of these indices are not only statistically significant but 
also economically significant. Similar to our results in Table 5.3, we do not find a 
statistically significant relation between director liability index and  the dispersion of 
capital structure among firms. This result provides further supports to the argument 
that certain forms of investor protection institutions might not be as effective as 
others. 
In terms of control variables, we find that countries with higher GDP growth 
rate, better control of corruption and larger number of listed firms have larger 
dispersion of capital structure among firms. One possible reason could be that 
market competition is fiercer and fairer in countries with higher economic growth 
and better control of corruption. Therefore firms have to use different strategies, 
including the ways in which they finance their investments and daily operations, in 




firms tend to be negatively correlated with regulatory quality. This might because 
firms find themselves having more difficulties to obtain external financing when 
financial markets are more strictly regulated. Thus, their capital structure might 
become more similar to each other.  
The results reported in Table 5.6 also support our first hypothesis. Specifically, 
we find a positive relation between legal protection of shareholders and the 
dispersion of capital structure among firms when using debt-to-asset ratio to 
measure firms’ capital structure. However, one difference between the results in 
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 is that the coefficient of shareholder protection indices 
become smaller and ease of shareholder suits index become statistically insignificant. 
For the rest of the variables (such as GDP growth and control of corruption), their 
statistical and economic significance are quite similar to what we have in Table 5.5.  
We hypothesis that one possible reason why coefficients of shareholder 
protection indices decrease when the standard deviation of debt-to-asset ratio instead 
of the standard deviation of equity-to-asset ratio is used to measure the dispersion of 
capital structure among firms is that equity financing and debt financing are not 
perfect substitutes. There are more than just two ways (i.e. equity and debt financing) 
for firms to finance their investments. For example, accounts payable and retained 
earnings are also popular alternative sources of finance. Therefore, changes in 
shareholder protection institutions might not have as strong impacts on firms’ debt 




reason is that, on average, a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio is much smaller than its 
equity-to-asset ratio and therefore the standard deviation of former is expected to be 
smaller than the standard deviation of the latter. Table 5.1 shows that the average 
debt-to-asset ratio of firms included in our sample is 0.226, about one third as large 
as the average equity-to-asset ratio, which is 0.695. Moreover, the average standard 
deviation of debt-to-asset ratio is only 0.123 while that of equity-to-asset ratio is 
0.784. Therefore, it is not that surprising the coefficient of shareholder protection 
indices drops when the standard deviation of debt-to-asset ratio is used as the 
dependent variable. 
<Insert Table 5.5 Here> 
<Insert Table 5.6 Here> 
Table 5.7 to Table 5.10 present our OLS regression results for our second 
hypothesis which propose a non- linear relation between creditor protection and 
dispersion of capital structure among firms. As discussed in the previous sections, 
there are theories and empirical results support both arguments that sound and 
effective creditor protection could either encourage or deter firms from accessing to 
debt financing. We intend to combine these theories by proposing that when 
creditors’ rights are too weakly protected or too strongly protected, firms will 
become difficult or unwilling to use debt financing. Thus, the dispersion of capital 
structure among firms is predicted to be relatively small when creditor protection is 




firms will find it relatively easy and affordable to borrow money from creditors and 
thus they will have more freedom in choosing capital structures that meet their true 
needs. As a result, capital structure is predicted to be more dispersed in countries 
with medium-level creditor rights protection. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we need the squared term of creditor rights 
protection indices. However, we still run OLS regressions without squared terms in 
Table 5.7 and Table 5.9. In Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, the dependent variable is the 
standard deviation of equity-to-asset ratio and the variables of interest are indices 
that measure how well creditors are protected. It can be seen from Table 5.7 that 
there is a negative relation between the development of credit information sharing 
institutions and the dispersion of capital structures among listed firms. For example, 
in column two of Table 5.7, the coefficient of credit information index is -0.025, 
meaning that better credit information sharing is associated with lower dispersion in 
capital structure among firms. This result seems to support the demand side view of 
debt financing which argues that strong creditor protection deters firms from 
accessing to debt financing because of their concerns of losing control over firms 
during financial distress.  
In Table 5.8, we add the squared term of creditor protection indices and we find 
evidence supporting our second hypothesis. Specifically, we find that the coefficient 
of creditor protection indices are positive but that of their squared term is negative. 




its squared terms are included in our OLS regression model. The positive signs of 
creditor protection indices and the negative signs of their squared terms indicate an 
non- linear relation between creditor protection and the dispersion of capital structure 
among firms. Our results in Table 5.8 suggest that the dispersion of capital structure 
increases as creditor protection institutions improve. It maximizes at certain value 
then start to decrease as creditor protection institutions further improve. For example, 
regression results present in column 1 of Table 5.8 suggest that the dispersion of 
capital structure peaks when the value of strength of legal rights index equals to 7.75. 
Given that the range of the index is 0 to 10, we believe the regression results make 
sense both in math and in reality. However, we also realize that regression results in 
column 3 and column 4 of Table 5.8, where public and private registry coverage are 
variables of interest, do not support our second hypothesis. This might because 
unlike other indices which consists of several components that measure various 
aspects of investor protection, these two variables only measure the percentage of 
adults and firms listed in a credit bureau’s database. Therefore, they might not be as 
comprehensive as strength of legal rights index and credit information index in 
measuring how well legal rights of creditors are protected. Overall, we believe that 
regression results presented in Table 5.8 support our second hypothesis that the 
relation between creditor protection institutions and the dispersion of capital 
structure among firms is non-linear and inverted U shaped. 




<Insert Table 5.8 Here> 
In Table 5.9 and Table 5.10, we use the standard deviation of debt-to-asset ratio as 
our dependent variable and the results are consistent with what we have in the 
previous two tables. Specifically, in Table 5.9, we find that the dispersion of capital 
structure is negatively correlated with creditor rights protection and the results still 
hold even if we include all four indices into one single regression model (see results 
in column 4 of Table 5.9). Similarly, we fail to find a statistically significant linear 
relation between the strength of legal rights index and the dispersion of capital 
structure among firms. In Table 5.10, we add squared terms of creditor rights 
protection into our OLS regression models. The results are consistent with our 
previous ones. For example, column 1 of Table 5.10 indicates a positive relation 
between the strength of legal right index and the dispersion of capital structure when 
the index is below 8 and a negative relation between them when the index is over 8. 
Regression results in the second column of Table 5.10 also indicates an inverted U 
shaped relation between credit information index and the dispersion of capital 
structure among firms (the turning point is about 2). Given the range of these two 
indices are 0 to 10 and 0 to 6, we believe these results are are both mathematically 
and economically meaningful. 
<Insert Table 5.9 Here> 





The Law and finance theory argues that legal protection of both creditors and 
shareholders promotes financial market development and thus allows firms to have 
more access to external financing (La Porta et al., 1998). However, firms differ from 
each other in their needs to raise funds from financial markets and thus they may not 
benefit from an improvement in investor protection and from financial market 
development to the same extent. Studies have documented that financial 
development benefits firms with higher dependence on external financing more 
(Ranjan and Zingales, 1998). Wurgler (2000) further reports that in countries with 
better investor protection and more developed financial markets, firms in declining 
industries might even find it is more difficult to raise funds from financial markets 
as a result of investors’ divestment.  
Didier et al. (2014) find that firms’ access to external financing through equity 
markets and debt markets is limited with only a few large firms being able to issue 
equities and bonds and sell them to investors. Thus, we hypothesize that 
under-developed financial markets as a result of weak investor protection, limits 
firms’ access to external financing. Therefore, they have less freedom in choosing 
capital structure and thus the dispersion of capital structure among firms is predicted 
to be smaller. In other words, they are forced to choose similar capital structure 
because of financial constraints. However, the supply and demand side view of debt 




protection and dispersion of capital structure among firms. That is, we propose a 
positive relation between the strength of creditor rights protection and dispersion of 
capital structure among firms when creditor rights are weakly protected. In contrast, 
we hypothesize a negative relation between creditor rights protection and dispersion 
of capital structure among firms when creditor rights are overly strongly protected. 
Based on a sample of listed firms in 64 countries over the period 2006 to 2014, 
we find empirical evidence support both hypotheses regarding the effect of 
shareholder protection and creditor protection on the dispersion of capital structure 
among firms. Specifically, we find that the dispersion of capital structure among 
firms is positively correlated with shareholder rights protection. This finding 
supports our hypothesis that firms in countries with better shareholder protection 
have more freedom in choosing their capital structure because of large equity 
markets. In terms of creditor protection, we find a non- linear relation between 
creditor rights protection and dispersion in capital structure. Specifically, when 
creditor rights protection is too weak or too strong, the dispersion of capital structure 
among firms is small, and when creditor rights protection is at medium level the 
dispersion of capital structure tend to be large. We believe this finding supports both 
the supply and demand side view of debt financing.  
Our finding is consistent with law and finance theory which argues that legal 
protection of investors exert fundamental influence on financial market by affecting 




present empirical evidence that legal protection of investors affect firms’ choice of 
capital structure. Our study contributes to literature by extending studies on capital 
structure by exploring macro- level factors instead of firm attributes that affect 
capital structure of firms.  
One of the limitations of this study is that we only look at the dispersion of 
capital structure among listed firms. Listed firms only represent a small portion of 
all firms. Furthermore, compared with the most of unlisted firms, these firms are 
much less financially constrained. We are not sure whether our results still hold for 
unlisted firms. Secondly, the variation in investor protection mainly comes from the 
differences in investor protection between different countries and the within country 
variation in investor protection is quite small. This might lead to a situation where 
dispersion in capital structure is caused by some unobserved time invariant factors 
instead of the extent to which investors are protected by legal rules. In the future, we 
might narrow down to a smaller number of countries to allow larger within country 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This Table reports the number of firm-year observations and key statistics for variables used in this 
paper. The sample includes listed firms in 64 countries over period 2006 to 2014. 




0.784 0.754 2.076 0.271 0.268 562 
STD 
(Debt-to-Asset Ratio) 




0.695 0.699 1.000 0.154 0.216 562 
Mean 
(Debt-to-Asset Ratio) 
0.226 0.245 0.539 0.000 0.207 556 
Disclosure Index 6.377 7.000 10.000 0.000 2.532 562 
Director Liability 
Index 
4.881 5.000 9.000 0.000 2.243 562 
Ease of Shareholder 
Suits Index 




5.824 5.700 10.000 2.300 1.592 562 
Strength of Legal 
Rights Index 
6.102 6.000 10.000 1.000 2.307 556 
Credit Information 
Index 
4.411 5.000 6.000 0.000 1.575 556 
Public Registry 
Coverage (% of 
Adult) 
9.419 0.000 100.000 0.000 19.578 556 
Private Registry 
Coverage (% of 
Adult) 
44.58 38.600 100.000 0.000 38.922 556 
GDP per capita 
(in thousands) 
24.00 15.432 106.749 0.326 22.772 562 
GDP Growth 3.216 3.345 14.231 -17.669 4.188 562 
Control of Corruption 0.583 0.394 2.465 -1.434 1.079 562 




Ease of Doing 
Business Rank 




Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlat ion matrix o f the variab les used in this study. Std (ea) is the standard deviation of equity -to-asset rat io, std (da) is the standard deviation 
of debt-to-asset ratio, m (ea) is the mean of equity-to-asset ratio, m (da) is the mean of debt-to-asset ratio, slr is strength of legal rights inex, ci is credit information 
index, pub is public coverage, p ri is private coverage, dis is disclosure index, d l is director liability index, ess is ease of shareholder suit index, ssp is strength of 
shareholder protection index, gdpg is GDP growth, gdpp is GDP per cap ita, cc is control of corruption, rq  is regulatory quality, nol is number of listed firms  and rank 






 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 std(ea)  std(da) m(ea)  m(da)  slr ci pub pri dis dl ess ssp gdpg gdpp cc rq nol rank 
std(ea)  1                  
std(da) 0.95
***
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Table 5.3 Shareholder Protection and Average Equity-to-Asset Ratio 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between shareholder protection and the 
average equity-to-asset ratio of firms. The dependent variable is the average equity-to-asset ratio of 
all listed firms in one country in a year. We also control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 Dependent Variable: Average Equity-to-Asset 
Ratio 









Director Liability Index  0.004 
(0.276) 
  0.002 
(0.579) 








Strength of Shareholder Protection 
Index 






































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.4 Creditor Protection and Average Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between creditor protection and the average 
debt-to-asset ratio of firms. The dependent variable is the average debt-to-asset ratio of all listed firms 
in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public governance quality, 







indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 Dependent Variable: Average Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












  -0.004 
(0.550) 





































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.5 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Shareholder Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
shareholder protection. The dependent variable is the ratio of standard deviation of equity-to-assets 
ratio of all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Equity-to-Assets ratio) 





















Strength of Shareholder 
Protection Index 









































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.6 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Shareholder Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
shareholder protection. The dependent variable is the ratio of standard deviation of debt-to-assets 
ratio of all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Debt-to-Assets ratio) 









Director Liability Index  -0.001 
(0.861) 
  -0.001 
(0.714) 




Strength of Shareholder 
Protection Index 







































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.7 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Creditor Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
creditor protection. The dependent variable is the ratio of s tandard deviation of equity-to-assets ratio 
of all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Equity-to-Assets ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strength of Legal Rights Index 0.009 
(0.113) 
   0.004 
(0.486) 

























































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.8 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Creditor Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
creditor protection. The dependent variable is the ratio of standard deviation of equity-to-assets ratio 
of all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Equity-to-Assets ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




   






   



















   0.136 
(0.573) 
 




    0.358 
(0.242) 















































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 562 562 562 562 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.9 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Creditor Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
creditor protection. The dependent variable is the ratio o f standard deviation of debt-to-assets ratio of 
all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public governance 






 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Debt-to-Assets ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strength of Legal Rights Index 0.006 
(0.119) 
   0.001 
(0.734) 

























































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 
Adjusted R
2




Table 5.10 Dispersion of Capital Structure and Creditor Protection 
This table presents the regression results of the relation between capital structure dispersion and 
creditor protection. The dependent variable is the ratio of standard deviation of equity-to-assets ratio 
of all listed firms in one country in a year. We control for the economic development, public 







 indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Dependent Variable: STD (Debt-to-Assets ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strength of Legal Rights Index 0.032 
(0.102) 
   






   

















   0.136 
(0.454) 
 




    -0.284 
(0.379) 













































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 556 556 556 556 
Adjusted R
2






5.8 Appendix 1 Details of Investor Protection Indices 
Index Explanation Scale Source More Details 
Disclosure 
Index 
It measures the internal, 














It measures minority 
shareholders’ ability to 
sue and hold interested 












Suits Index  
It measures shareholders’ 
access to internal 
corporate documents, 
obtainability of evidence 
during trials and 













The average of 
disclosure index, director 
liability index and ease 













It measures the 
protection of rights of 
borrowers and lenders 










It measures the scope 
and accessibility of 
credit information 
distributed by credit 










It is the number of 











listed in the largest 
public registry as 









It is the number of 
individuals and firms 
listed in the largest 
private registry as 












Chapter 6 Conclusion 
Institutions exert first-order influence on financial market at both macro- level 
and micro- level. Sound and effective institutions, especially property right 
institutions and contracting right institutions, reduce transaction costs therefore 
promote financial development and boost firm value (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
In this thesis, I conduct three studies to further explore the effect of institutions on 
financial market. This thesis fills gaps in the literature by exploring how checks on 
government power relates to financial development and firm value and by looking at 
the role of large shareholder in preventing firm managers from acting corruptly and 
how this role is affected by local institutions. In addition, I also explore how 
institutions affect the allocation of capitals in financial market. 
In Chapter 3, I identify a new form of institutions that checks government 
power thereby allows financial market to flourish and boost market value of firms. 
New institutional economics have long been emphasizing the importance of checks 
on government power (North, 1991). As the ultimate coercive power, government 
can abuse its political power therefore expropriate its citizens if its power is left 
unconstrained. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) compare the relative importance of 
contracting rights institutions and property rights institutions to financial 
development. They report that property rights institutions, which protect citizens 
from government expropriation, have much stronger effect on financial development 




They argue that this is because it is difficult for citizens to find alternative ways 
other than checks on government power to reduce government expropriation. This 
argument is challenged by the rise of several Asian countries under one-party or 
dominant-party dictatorship (e.g. China, Singapore and South Korea). Due to the 
lack of democracy and political competition, government power is often viewed as 
weakly constrained and risk of being expropriated by government is high. Therefore, 
these countries are predicted to have under-developed financial market and low 
economic growth rate. However, Singapore and South Korea are two of the most 
developed countries not only in Asia but also around the world. China achieved 
dramatic economic development during the past decades and its stock market is the 
second largest in the world, only smaller than U.S. stock market. Allen et al. (2005) 
argues that alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship 
support economic and financial development in China. I propose that government 
power can still be checked in countries under one-party or dominant-party 
dictatorship through government power self-check system. The promulgation of 
revised internal discipline of Communist Party of China (CPC), which aims at 
preventing government officials in China from abusing their political power, 
provides me with an ideal setting to test the hypothesis. Consistent with my 
expectation, the revised internal discipline invokes a positive reaction in stock 
market in China. Moreover, firms that are more vulnerable to government 




These results support my argument that government power self-check system is a 
form of institutions, which allow government power to be constrained, that lead to 
financial development and that boost firm value. 
Chapter 3 contributes to literature on law and finance theory by identifying a 
new form of institutions that are important to financial development and firm value. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that sound and effective legal protection of investors 
from being expropriated encourages them to finance firms therefore promotes 
financial development and boosts firm value. Literature on law and finance theory 
mainly focuses on corporate insider expropriation. This study complements existing 
literature by presenting firm-level evidence that risk of being expropriated by 
government reduce firm value and it can be reduced by constraining government 
power. In addition, this study also relates to the literature on legal enforcement. 
Studies on relation between investor protection and financial development use 
indices that based on the existence of certain legal rules to measure how well 
investors are protected against expropriation. These indices cannot measure how 
well legal rules are enforced. The revised internal discipline of CPC does not change 
legal rules in China. By imposing restrictions on government officials, it enhances 
judicial independence in China. Thus, legal enforcement is improved. The pos itive 
reaction of stock market in China supports the argument that legal enforcement also 
matter for quality of institutions. 




institutions in preventing firm managers from engaging in corruption. Agency theory 
argues that firms managers are self- interested utility maximizers. If not properly 
monitored, they will behave in ways that maximize their interest at the expense of 
shareholders’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). La Porta et al. (1998) point out that 
institutions that protect shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders 
serve as a mechanism to mitigate agency problem. In countries with weak 
institutions, large shareholders serve as a way to monitor managers to ensure that 
they behave in the way that meets interest of firms and shareholders. The more 
shares large shareholders have, the more motivated they are in monitoring firm 
managers (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In chapter 4, I take 
advantage of the recent national wide anti-corruption campaign in China to examine 
the aforementioned arguments. I find that state owned enterprises (SOEs) with more 
shares owned by government organizations, who are the largest shareholders, have 
fewer bribe-taking managers. I also find that SOEs located in provinces with sound 
and effective market-supporting institutions also tend to have fewer bribe-taking 
managers. The monitoring effect of large shareholders are stronger in firms located 
in province with weak market-supporting institutions. In addition, I also compare 
monitoring effect of the largest shareholder with that of other blockholders. These 
findings are consistent with La Porta’s et al. (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) 
arguments.  




presenting evidence that both large shareholder and market-supporting institutions 
reduce agency costs. Existing literature report that large shareholder put monitoring 
pressure on managers therefore lowers costs (Yafeh and Yosha, 2003), reduces 
earnings management (Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002), and affects proposal of 
corporate policies (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990). This study adds to new evidence 
on the monitoring effect of large shareholders by reducing the probability of 
managers engaging in corruption. I further document that the monitoring effect of 
large shareholders are more powerful in places with weak institutions, supporting 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) argument that large shareholder serves as a 
complement to institutions in mitigating agency costs. Chapter 4 also contributes to 
literature on determinants of corruption by exploring what characteristics of 
bribe-takers affect level of corruption. Corruption is a widely studied top ic. However, 
most firm-level studies on corruption focuses on characteristics of firms who are 
bribe-payers(Svensson, 2003;Nguyen and Van Dijk, 2012; Bai et al., 2015). This 
study, on the other hand, focus on characteristics of bribe-takers. The finding that 
SOEs with more state ownership are less likely to have bribe-taking managers is 
consistent with the resource constrained theory which argues that the level of 
corruption depends on how much resources are spent on monitoring (Kedia and 
Rajgopal, 2011). 
In chapter 5, I extend literature on capital structure by exploring the relation 




affect firms’ choice of capital structure is one of the mostly researched topics in 
finance field and researchers have identified many firm attributes such as size, 
industry and the collateral value of their assets have effects on firms’ choice of 
capital structure (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chen, 2004). Little attention has been 
paid to factors other than firm attributes. Effective legal protection of investors 
against expropriation of corporate insiders provide investors with incentive to 
finance firms (La Porta et al., 1998). As a result, financial market is larger and more 
active. Firms in countries with better legal protection of investors have more access 
to external finance and their equities are valued higher by investors (La Porta et al., 
1997). Therefore, they have more freedom in choosing their capital structures as 
they are less likely to be financially constrained. I propose that capital structure are 
more dispersed in countries with better legal protection of investors because it 
reduce expropriation risk therefore allow firms to have more access to external 
financing. Based on a sample of listed firms in 64 countries over period 2006 to 
2014, I find empirical evidence that supports my hypothesis. Specifically, I find a 
positive relation between shareholder rights protection and dispersion in capital 
structure, measured using the standard deviation of either equity-to-asset ratio or 
debt-to-asset ratio. However, in terms of creditor rights protection, I identify a 
non- linear relation between it and dispersion in capital structure. I document that 
dispersion in capital structure peaks in countries with medium-level creditor rights 




creditor rights protection. I believe this finding is consistent with both supply side 
and demand side view of debt financing.  
Chapter 5 contributes to literature by exploring factors other than firm 
attributes that affect capital structure (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Existing literature 
on capital structure mainly focuses on firm-level determinants and pays little 
attention to other determinants. This is more close to a demand side view where 
firms choice capital structures mainly based on their needs. However, most firms 
cannot finance their daily operation and investments only using their own money 
without the support of external financing. How much debt or equities firms could 
sell not only depends on their needs for external financing but also on how much 
external financing resources are available. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that 
expropriation by corporate insiders such as managers and controlling shareholders, 
reduce expected return of outside investors thus discourages them from financing 
firms. Legal rules that protect investors from being expropriated by corporate 
insiders mitigate outside investors’ concern thereby contribute to financial 
development and boost market value of firms. Chapter 5 contributes to literature on 
capital structure and law and finance theory by documenting that legal protection of 
investors is an important macro-level determinants of firms’ capital structure. 
 
